Hill v. Halford
| Decision Date | 18 January 2012 |
| Docket Number | CAUSE NO.: 1:11CV63-SA-DAS |
| Parties | RICKIE HILL PLAINTIFF v. MIKE HALFORD, individually and officially, ROOSEVELT BRIDGES, individually and officially, and LOWNDES COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT DEFENDANTS |
| Court | United States Bankruptcy Courts. Fifth Circuit. U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Northern District of Mississippi |
Defendants Mike Halford and Roosevelt Bridges have filed motions to dismiss Plaintiff's allegations against them in their individual capacities. Plaintiff failed to respond. After reviewing the complaint, motions, and case law, the Court makes the following findings:
Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff, a teacher and coach with the Lowndes County School District, was relieved of his coaching duties after allegations regarding inappropriate contact with a female student surfaced. According to the Plaintiff, school officials forced him to undergo testing for sexually transmitted diseases and report the results of the tests to them.
Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint against the school district, Mike Halford, Superintendent of the Lowndes County School District, and Roosevelt Bridges, the Athletic Director. Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated his constitutional rights by failing to hold a due process hearing and forcing him to undergo medical testing and requiring him to release that information to the school district. Halford and Bridges assert that, in their individual capacities, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against them, or alternatively, that they are entitled to qualified immunity.
In considering a motion to dismiss, the court accepts as true all well-pleaded facts and viewsthem in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996). However, a court is not bound to accept legal conclusions couched as factual allegations. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S. Ct. 2932, 92 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1986). The plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to state a claim for relief that is facially plausible. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955).
The Fifth Circuit has held that claims brought under Section 1983 against public officials have a heightened pleading requirement, and that a Section 1983 claim requires a plaintiff to allege Baker, 75 F.3d at 195.
Hill brings four constitutional claims - procedural due process, violation of right to privacy, unreasonable search and seizure, and right against self-incrimination - and two state law claims: breach of contract and invasion of privacy.
A. Constitutional Claims
Because the Constitution creates no private cause of action, an aggrieved plaintiff must pursue such claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as Hill does here. To state a viable claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and (2) that the person depriving the plaintiff of this right acted undercolor of any statute of the State. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S. Ct. 2250, 101 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1988).
Hill's complaint provides that "the individual officers, directors, supervisors, managers, employees and/or agents mentioned herein, acted within the scope of their duties as officers, directors, supervisors, managers, employees and/or agents of Defendant Lowndes County School District and under the color of state law." Defendants assert that this language precludes personal liability as Hill admits that all actions were taken in their official capacity. In Kentucky v. Graham, the Supreme Court explained the difference between individual capacity claims and official capacity claims:
Personal-capacity suits seek to impose personal liability upon a government official for actions he takes under color of state law. Official-capacity suits, in contrast, "generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent." As long as the government entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against that entity. It is not a suit against the official personally, for the real party in interest is the entity. Thus, while an award of damages against an official in his personal capacity can be executed only against the official's personal assets, a plaintiff seeking to recover on a damages judgement in an official-capacity suit must look to the government entity itself.
473 U.S. 159, 165-66, 105 S. Ct. 3099, 87 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1985) (internal citations omitted). In Hafer v. Melo, the Supreme Court unanimously held that state officials sued for damages in their personal capacities are "persons" within the meaning of Section 1983, even when the claim is based upon the carrying out of official responsibilities. 502 U.S. 21, 112 S. Ct. 358, 116 L. Ed. 2d 301 (1991). The Court rejected the novel proposition that the fact that the official acted under public authority, which fulfills the color of law requirement, insulates the official from personal liability.
Claims against individual public officials under Section 1983, however, are subject to thedefense of qualified immunity. Foley v. Univ. of Houston Sys., 355 F.3d 333, 338 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Todd v. Hawk, 72 F.3d 443, 445 n.7 (5th Cir. 1995); Wicks v. Miss. State Emp. Servs., 41 F.3d 991, 996 n.21 (5th Cir. 1995); Coleman v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 528, 534 (5th Cir. 1997)). "Qualified immunity balances two important interests— the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably." Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S. Ct. 808, 172 L. Ed. 2d 565 (2009). "The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials 'from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Id. (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1982)). If an official's conduct was objectively reasonable, it does not matter if that official's conduct violated a constitutional right; he is still entitled to qualified immunity. Nerren v. Livingston Police Dep't, 86 F.3d 469, 473 (5th Cir. 1996).
In evaluating a claim of qualified immunity, the court considers (1) whether the plaintiff has alleged a violation of a constitutional right, and (2) whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200, 121 S. Ct. 2151, 150 L. Ed. 2d 272 (2001), overruled in part by Pearson, 555 U.S. 223, 129 S. Ct. 808, 172 L. Ed. 2d 565 (2009). Courts have discretion to determine which of these questions to address first. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236, 129 S. Ct. 808.
"The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted." Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202, 121 S. Ct. 2151; see also Wernecke v. Garcia, 591 F.3d 386,392 (5th Cir. 2009) (). Moreover, each defendant's actions must be evaluated individually. Meadours v. Ermel, 483 F.3d 417, 421-22 (5th Cir. 2007). See also Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1948, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 ().
Therefore, in order to overcome Defendants' defense of qualified immunity, Hill's complaint must allege facts that, if true, demonstrate that each individual defendant violated his rights by acting in a way that he or she should have known was unlawful. "When considering a defendant's entitlement to qualified immunity, we must ask whether the law so clearly and unambiguously prohibited his conduct that 'every reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates [the law].'" Morgan v. Swanson, --- F.3d ---, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 19656, 2011 WL 4470233 at *7 (5th Cir. Sept. 27, 2011) (citing Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2083, 179 L. Ed. 2d 1149 (2011)). The Court examines Hill's claims against each of the defendants in light of this standard.
Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants, and in particular, the Lowndes County School District and Mike Halford, unlawfully denied Hill the right to a due process and name-clearing hearing prior to being removed from his coaching position.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment includes a procedural component and a substantive component. Montgomery v. Mississippi, 498 F. Supp. 2d 892, 910 (S.D. Miss. 2007) (citing Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331, 106 S. Ct. 662, 88 L. Ed. 2d 662 (1986)). Proceduraldue process protects against "the deprivation by state action of a constitutionally protected interest in 'life, liberty or property'. . . without due process of law." Id. (quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125, 110 S. Ct. 975, 108 L. Ed. 2d 100 (1990)). The...
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