Hill v. Hiles

• Decision Date: 01 March 1941
• Docket Number: Ag. No. 10.
• Citation: 309 Ill.App. 321,32 N.E.2d 933
• Parties: HILL ET UX. v. HILES.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

309 Ill.App. 321

32 N.E.2d 933

HILL ET UX.

v.HILES.

Ag. No. 10.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District.

March 1, 1941.

Appeal from Circuit Court, St. Clair County; Maurice V. Joyce, Judge.

Action by John Hill and Frances Hill, his wife, against Norbert Hiles to recover for injuries sustained by the plaintiffs in an automobile collision. From a judgment in favor of the defendant, the plaintiffs appeal.

Judgment reversed, and cause remanded.

Chester Farthing, of Belleville, for appellants.

Kramer, Campbell, Costello & Wiechert, of East St. Louis, for appellee.

DADY, Justice.

Plaintiffs, John Hill and Frances Hill, his wife, bring this appeal from a judgment of the trial court entered against plaintiffs on a verdict finding defendant not guilty in an automobile accident case. The accident occurred in the City of Belleville, on October 8, 1938, about eight P. M., and each plaintiff was very seriously injured.

Plaintiff John Hill was driving his car east on Main Street with his wife as a passenger. They were on a joint mission. Main Street is a paved State highway known as Route 15, is about 60 feet in width from curb to curb, and is divided into two 27 1/2-foot one-way traffic lanes by a 5 foot unpaved parkway, the northerly lane being for west bound traffic and the southerly lane for east bound traffic. Ninety Sixth Street is a northerly and southerly paved street 25 feet in width which enters Main Street from the north and ends at Main Street. To allow south bound traffic on Ninety Sixth Street to cross to the southerly lane of Main Street, there is directly south of the southerly end of Ninety Sixth Street a 50-foot paved opening in such parkway. There is no stop sign on Main Street. There is a stop sign on the west side of Ninety Sixth Street, which sign is 43 feet north of the north curb of Main Street and 25 feet north of the southeast corner of a drug store building facing south on Main Street. The distance between such building and the north curb of Main Street is about 14 feet.

Immediately prior to the accident the defendant drove his car southerly on Ninety Sixth Street into Main Street and through such opening in the parkway and then turned east on Main Street in front of plaintiffs' car.

The complaint alleged that the defendant so carelessly and negligently drove his automobile southerly on Ninety Sixth Street and thence onto Main Street, that he caused it to suddenly turn east in front of the automobile of the plaintiff John Hill, who was then driving easterly on Main Street, and that the plaintiff John Hill in order to avoid a collision with the automobile of the defendant was forced to suddenly turn his automobile in a southeasterly direction and thereby struck another automobile parked on the south side of Main street.

The sixth paragraph of the complaint further alleged that the Division of Highways of the State had, pursuant to law, erected a stop sign on Ninety Sixth Street on the northerly side of Main Street, and that the defendant drove his automobile into Main Street without stopping the same at said intersection. Undisputed evidence showed the erection of such stop sign as alleged.

John Hill testified that immediately prior to arriving at the intersection he was driving about 35 miles per hour; that he was from five to ten feet west of the opening in the parkway when the defendant came out of Ninety Sixth Street between Hill and the east side of the opening in the parkway and swerved to the defendant's left in front of the Hill car, and that Hill then swerved to his right to avoid striking defendant's car and crashed into a car parked on the south side of Main Street. The record shows the front end of such parked car was about 88 feet east of the east edge of the opening in such parkway. Hill further testified that in entering such east bound traffic lane the defendant came “clear over to where such parked car was, * * * completely over to the right to make the turn;” that defendant gave no warning or signal “before he came out there or as he came out there;” that when Hill first saw the defendant's car it was in his path making a left turn, about five or ten feet from the Hill car and going about 25 or 30 miles per hour.

Frances Hill testified that when she and her husband got in front of the drug store building defendant's car came out in front of them at an angle, and her husband then swerved his car and struck the parked car and she was rendered unconscious.

Victori Botha, a witness for plaintiffs, testified that he was a friend of defendant; that he saw defendant drive south from Ninety Sixth Street; that he first saw defendant's car when it was 4 or 5 feet south from the north curb of Main Street and that he saw the collision; that defendant “didn't make any stop anywhere near the curb of Main Street” before coming into Main Street; that defendant “pulled out in front of Mr. Hill's car;” that defendant “just zoomed out into Main Street;” that defendant “made a second gear stop in the middle of the street, but he never stopped, he just zoomed through.”

The defendant testified that he stopped on Ninety Sixth Street within about 10 feet of Main Street, about 10 feet north of the north Main Street curb, and that “I stopped at the parkway, not what you call a dead stop, but I wasn't going very much, I wasn't dead stopped.”

Other witnesses testified for both sides and there was a conflict in the testimony as to whether defendant so stopped, but in passing upon the issues raised we do not consider it necessary or material to refer to such other evidence.

At the conclusion of the plaintiffs' case the court struck paragraph six from the complaint and said to the jury, “The question of negligence of the defendant as to whether he stopped on Ninety Sixth Street on the north side of Main Street is not before you for consideration, because the court holds that whether he made that stop sign or not would not in any way tend to prove that it was the proximate cause or negligence, if there was any, of the defendant, and that is entirely eliminated from your consideration,” and that such paragraph six was stricken and was not to be considered by the jury. We are called upon to pass on the propriety of these rulings.

Section 165 of the Motor Vehicle Act, Ill.Rev.Stat.1939, c. 95 1/2, provides that: “Except as hereinafter provided motor vehicles traveling upon public highways shall give the right-of-way to vehicles approaching along intersecting highways from the right and shall have the right-of-way over those approaching from the left.” Section 167 of the same Act provides that: “The Department [of highways] may in its discretion and when traffic conditions warrant such action give preference to traffic upon any of the State Highways under its jurisdiction, upon which has been constructed a durable hardsurfaced road over traffic crossing or entering such highway by erecting appropriate stop signs or stop lights and in such case vehicles entering upon or crossing such highway shall come to a full stop as near the right-of-way line of such highway as possible and regardless of direction shall give the right-of-way to vehicles upon such highway.” The undisputed evidence shows that Main Street was given preference as provided by Section 167. Inasmuch as Section 165 specifically states that it applies “except as hereinafter provided,” it must be concluded that Section 167 governed, and Section 165 had no application to the facts in this case.

If the defendant did not come to a stop before entering the intersection as required by Section 167, then he violated the provisions of Section 167. A violation of a statute prescribing a duty for the protection and safety of persons is prima facie evidence of negligence, if such violation caused or contributed to cause the injury. United States Brewing Co. v. Stoltenberg, 211 Ill. 531, 71 N.E. 1081;True & True Co. v. Woda, 201 Ill. 315, 66 N.E. 369. Whether the alleged negligence of defendant in not so stopping was the proximate cause of the injury was under the facts in this case a question of fact for the jury. True & True Co. v. Woda, supra. What is the proximate cause of an injury is ordinarily a question of fact to be determined by the jury from a consideration of all of the evidence. It can only be raised as a question of law when the facts are not only undisputed, but also such that there can be no difference in the judgment of reasonable men as to the inferences to be drawn therefrom. Phillabaum v. Lake Erie & W. R. R. Co., 315 Ill. 131, 145 N.E. 806;Schultz v. Ericsson Co., 264 Ill. 156, 106 N.E. 236. In Wintersteen v. National Cooperage Company, 361 Ill. 95, 197 N.E. 578, 583, the court said: “If a reasonably prudent person might, and ordinarily would, foresee that the omission to do a certain act or the commission of an act in a certain way would likely result in injury to another, and injury to another does follow as a result thereof, such act of omission or commission is negligence, and the proximate cause of the injury.”

We believe that the fact that Main Street was a preferred street, and the fact that Ninety Sixth Street, as it connected with Main Street, was not a preferred street, within the meaning of the Motor...