Hill v. Hill
Decision Date | 06 April 1926 |
Docket Number | 37151 |
Citation | 208 N.W. 377,201 Iowa 864 |
Parties | ANNA HILL, Appellant, v. JOHN E. HILL, Appellee |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Plymouth District Court.--WILLIAM HUTCHINSON, Judge.
ACTION for separate support and maintenance, with cross-petition asking for divorce. On trial, the lower court dismissed plaintiff's petition, and granted a divorce on the cross-petition. Plaintiff appeals.--Affirmed in part reversed in part.
Affirmed in part; reversed in part.
T. M Zink and A. R. Molyneux, for appellant.
H. S Martin and Roseberry & Roseberry, for appellee.
ALBERT, J. DE GRAFF, C. J., and STEVENS, FAVILLE, and MORLING, JJ., concur.
The appellee's cross-petition sought divorce on the grounds of cruel and inhuman treatment such as to endanger his life. The legislature, in its wisdom, has seen fit to provide grounds or causes for divorce. Such grounds are specified in Section 10475, Code of 1924. Among them is the following:
"When he is guilty of such inhuman treatment as to endanger the life of his wife."
Section 10477 authorizes a divorce in favor of the husband on the grounds specified in the aforesaid Section 10475. It must be confessed that, in some of our cases, because of the loose use of language therein, there is an apparent confusion in the construction of this section; in some others, the requirements of the section that the inhuman treatment be of such character as to endanger the life of the spouse has not been given its full force and effect.
In the early cases touching this question the real interpretation of this statute seems to be clearly pronounced. In the case of Beebe v. Beebe, 10 Iowa 133, the court said:
In the case of Caruthers v. Caruthers, 13 Iowa 266, we said:
"The material inquiry is * * * whether the life of the complainant is endangered, or will be, bye the continuance of the cohabitation."
In Knight v. Knight, 31 Iowa 451, at 456, we said:
"
To the same effect is Vanduzer v. Vanduzer, 70 Iowa 614, 31 N.W. 956.
In Schichtl v. Schichtl, 88 Iowa 210, 55 N.W. 309, it is said:
In Hall v. Hall, 162 Iowa 653, at 661, 144 N.W. 320, we said:
To the same effect is Pfannebecker v. Pfannebecker, 133 Iowa 425, 110 N.W. 618.
These expressions from our former opinions are wholly in line with the wording of this statute. In other words, the primary question for determination is whether or not the life of the spouse is in danger. If not, the character of the treatment, however despicable, is not a ground for divorce. It is not the intention of our statute that a decree of divorce shall be granted for the mere asking. The strength of our social structure depends largely on the permanency and stability of the marital relation. The home is the unit of our civilization, and should not be disrupted for a transient or trivial reason. The marriage tie should not be severed to meet the fleeting fancy or whim of either party, but only as a last resort, when the protection and preservation of the life of the injured spouse demand it.
We have ever been committed to the rule that incompatibility of temper is not a ground for divorce. Sylvester v. Sylvester, 109 Iowa 401, 80 N.W. 547; Yetley v. Yetley, 196 Iowa 314, 194 N.W. 88; Meyer v. Meyer, 169 Iowa 204, 151 N.W. 74; Olson v. Olson, 130 Iowa 353, 106 N.W. 758. In the latter case we said:
"Incompatibility of temper is no ground for divorce; and, while we may not compel husband and wife to live together, we can at least make it so difficult to obtain a divorce as to encourage another effort at observance of the matrimonial vows."
In determining this question, of course it is proper to take into consideration the disposition and temperament of the parties, their health and mental ability, their knowledge and experience in the world, their standing and position in the community, the degree of comfort and refinement which may reasonably be expected in their home life, and their previous training and education. Thompson v. Thompson, 186 Iowa 1066, 173 N.W. 55; 19 Corpus Juris 53, Section 97. It is apparent, therefore, that, under this section of the statute, in order to warrant a divorce two things are necessary: First, a proof that the accused party is guilty of inhuman treatment; second, that such inhuman treatment is of such character as to endanger the life of the spouse. A failure of proof in either of these matters would require the court to refuse the prayer of the appellee. With these primary rules settled, we turn now to the evidence in this case.
It would be useless for us to set out the testimony. The abstract and amendments consist of some 450 pages, and we can do no more than to briefly summarize the same. It may first be said that it appears that the past life of this family has been combed with a fine-tooth comb. Many instances in the family life which should have been long since forgotten have been resurrected, redecorated, colored, and magnified far beyond their importance. We have no evidence on the early history of these people, their education or station in life, or their acquaintance, knowledge, or appreciation of the civilization in which they lived.
It appears that sometime in 1902 the appellee, J. E. Hill, then a young man of about 18 years of age, resided on a farm near Cherokee. He eloped with a young woman who lived in his neighborhood. They went to Dakota City Nebraska, where each swore to a forged consent of their parents to their marriage. They were there married, and...
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