Hill v. Hubbell Distribution, Inc.
| Decision Date | 18 April 2013 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL CASE NO. 1:12cv51 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of North Carolina |
| Parties | WALTER A. HILL, Plaintiffs, v. HUBBELL DISTRIBUTION, INC., Defendant. |
THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 12].
On March 13, 2012, the Defendant Hubbell Distribution, Inc.1 (Hubbell) removed this action from the General Court of Justice, Superior Court Division, Buncombe County on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. [Doc. 1]. Although not stated separately, it appears that the Plaintiff intended to allege two causes of action: one for wrongful discharge inviolation of N.C. Gen. Stat. §9-32 and a second one for a violation of the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. §95-25.22. [Doc. 1-1]. For relief, the Plaintiff seeks reinstatement, damages, vacation pay, and interest. [Id. at 5-6]. The Defendant has moved for summary judgment. [Doc. 12].
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment shall be awarded "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, ... show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). As the Supreme Court has observed, "this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact."
Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 519 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. denied 541 U.S. 1042, 124 S.Ct. 2171, 158 L.Ed.2d 732 (2004) (emphasis in original).
A genuine issue of fact exists if a reasonable jury considering the evidence could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied 513 U.S. 814, 115 S.Ct. 68, 130 L.Ed.2d 24 (1994) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). "Regardless ofwhether he may ultimately be responsible for proof and persuasion, the party seeking summary judgment bears an initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Bouchat, 346 F.3d at 522 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). If this showing is made, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party who must convince the Court that a triable issue does exist. Id.
Nonetheless, in considering the facts for the purposes of a summary judgment motion, the Court will view the pleadings and material presented in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).
First, the Court must address whether subject matter jurisdiction lies regarding this action. Even though the Plaintiff has not moved to remand this action or otherwise challenged removal, district courts have an independent obligation to address subject matter jurisdiction, even sua sponte. Ellenburg v. Spartan Motors Chassis, Inc., 519 F.3d 192, 196 (4th Cir. 2008). The Plaintiff's first claim is predicated on his purported discharge because he was called for jury duty, in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. §9-32(a). That statute provides that any employer which violates the statute may be liable in a civil action for reasonable damages and an employee who was discharged in violation of the statute "shall be entitled to be reinstated to his former position." N.C. Gen. Stat. §9-32(b). Plaintiff has made demand on the Defendant for actual damages in the amount of $33,567.41. [Doc. 1-2]. In addition thereto, the Plaintiff seeks reinstatement. [Doc. 1-1]. Hubbell has alleged, and the Plaintiff has not disputed, that in addition to the actual damages demanded, reinstatement of the Plaintiff to his former position will cause it to incur additional costs in excess of $42,000.00 because it will be compelled to either re-hire the Plaintiff in a newly created position or in his original position which would then require Hubbell to provide a severance package to the individual hiredto replace him. [Doc. 1]. Combining these elements shows that the jurisdictional threshold of $75,000.00 is met because the amount in controversy in a diversity proceeding is "the pecuniary result to either party which [a] judgment would produce." Dixon v. Edwards, 290 F.3d 699, 710 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation and citation omitted); 28 U.S.C. §1332 ().
The Defendant's position regarding the calculation of the jurisdictional amount is, therefore, supported by the law and undisputed by the Plaintiff. See Keith v.Clarke American Checks, Inc., 261 F.Supp.2d 419, 422-23 (W.D.N.C. 2003) (); Crespo v. Delta Apparel, Inc., 2008 WL 2986279 (W.D.N.C. 2008) (). The Court therefore finds that the jurisdictional threshold has been established based on the first cause of action alone and the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this matter.
Hubbell is a manufacturing company which produces light fixtures, surge protectors and other parts for electrical devices. [Doc. 13-2 at 5]. The Plaintiff (Hill) was a manufacturing technician doing a variety of jobs at Hubbell's Asheville plant. [Id. at 6-7]. He was initially hired in October 2009 and worked as an hourly employee on the first shift. [Id. at 10]. His immediate supervisor throughout his employment was Michael Brock (Brock). [Id. at 8].
Hubbell has an attendance policy outlined in its Employee Handbook which excuses an employee's absence from work for jury duty. [Doc. 13-2 at 56-57; 60]. Hubbell also pays its employees the earnings they would have received but for serving on jury duty. [Id.]. Hill was aware of this policy and conceded that he had received a copy of the Employee Handbook. [Doc. 13-2 at 18-19].
Hill was summoned for jury duty at the Buncombe County Courthouse for March 28, 2011. [Doc. 13-2 at 59]. The summons contained a provision instructing Hill to call a telephone number the evening before jury duty in order to listen to a recorded message which would advise whether or not his appearance the next morning was required. [Id.]. The summons contained the following language:
A recorded message will inform you if your appearance will be required. This message will run the entire night until normal business hours. Sometimes the court is able to release some or all of the jurors when the need for jurors is less than anticipated.
[Id.]. The summons was mailed to Hill at 279 Hillside Street, Asheville, N.C. 28801. [Id.].
Hill did not reside at this address, but rather it was his mother's home. [Doc. 13-2 at 2-4]. He did, however, receive mail at his mother's address and retrieved it from her from time to time. [Id.]. Hill testified that his eighty year old mother routinely opened and read his "legal mail." [Id. at 13]. Hill testified that on the morning of March 28, 2011, his mother telephoned him and advised him that he had jury duty that day. [Id. at 28]. Hill testified that he did not recall having picked up his mail prior to that morning although he admitted that he had visited his mother on March 5, 2011 because it was her birthday. [Id. at 28-29]. Hill went to his mother's house to pick up the jury summons. [Id. at 33].
Hill's mother testified that she did indeed call him the morning of March 28, 2011 to remind him that he had jury duty. [Doc. 13-3 at 2-3]. Although she was not sure, her recollection was that Hill had retrieved the summons sometime prior to March 28, 2011 and had taken it with him. [Id. at 4]. She acknowledged that she had placed a note on her calendar to callher son the morning of jury duty to remind him. [Id.].
Hill testified that before he left to go to his mother's house to pick up the summons, he called Brock to tell him that he had jury duty. [Doc. 13-2 at 34]. Brock told Hill to "go and do what [you] have to do" but to stay in contact. [Id. at 36-37].
Hill concedes that he did not call the telephone number on the summons to find out whether he had been released from jury duty. [Id. at 38]. Instead, he claims that he went to the Buncombe County Courthouse and arrived in the area of the jury assembly room at approximately 8:45 on the morning of March 28, 2011. [Id. at 40-41]. Hill testified that he and three other jurors waited in the hallway until a court employee advised them that they were not needed for jury duty. [Id. at 41-42]. Hill testified that he had waited about an hour and a half before the court employee told him that he was free to go. [Id. at 42].
Hill then called his supervisor, Brock, to advise that he had been released from jury duty. [Id. at 43]. Hill also testified that he told Brock that since it was past 10:30 am, Hill would have been assessed one entire day off and he could use the time to take care of some personal...
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