Hill v. Johnson

• Docket Number: 3:20-cv-895-TJC-PDB
• Decision Date: 09 June 2023
• Parties: JEFFREY LANCE HILL, SR., individually; Aggrieved Party and as Real Party in Interest of El Rancho No Tengo, Inc., Plaintiff, v. LEANDRA G. JOHNSON, individually & officially, GREGORY S. PARKER, individually & officially, WILLIAM F. WILLIAMS, III, individually & officially, JOEL F. FOREMAN, individually and as Columbia County attorney, JENNIFER B. SPRINGFIELD, individually and officially, SUWANNEE RIVER WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT, COLUMBIA COUNTY, FLORIDA, CITY OF LAKE CITY, FLORIDA, and MICHAEL SMALLRIDGE, individually and as Receiver for Columbia County, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

1

JEFFREY LANCE HILL, SR., individually; Aggrieved Party and as Real Party in Interest of El Rancho No Tengo, Inc., Plaintiff, v. LEANDRA G. JOHNSON, individually & officially, GREGORY S. PARKER, individually & officially, WILLIAM F. WILLIAMS, III, individually & officially, JOEL F. FOREMAN, individually and as Columbia County attorney, JENNIFER B. SPRINGFIELD, individually and officially, SUWANNEE RIVER WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT, COLUMBIA COUNTY, FLORIDA, CITY OF LAKE CITY, FLORIDA, and MICHAEL SMALLRIDGE, individually and as Receiver for Columbia County, Defendants.

No. 3:20-cv-895-TJC-PDB

United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Jacksonville Division

June 9, 2023

ORDER

TIMOTHY J. CORRIGAN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This case is again before the Court on pro se Plaintiff Jeffrey Lance Hill, Sr.'s Complaint. (Doc. 1). Defendants-various judges, individuals, and government entities-filed renewed^[1] motions to dismiss Hill's complaint. (Docs. 58, 60-64). Defendant Jennifer B. Springfield also moved for injunctive relief to limit Hill's future filings. (Doc. 59). Hill responded in opposition to each motion except Springfield's Motion for Injunctive Relief. (Docs. 65-70).

I. MOTIONS TO DISMISS

The facts of this case have been described in numerous judicial orders and need not be repeated here. Hill has filed numerous lawsuits nearly identical to this one. See (Doc. 44 at 3). Hill consistently challenges the state court's decisions regarding his property, alleging the Defendants' actions constituted a taking of his property the fines against him were excessive, and that he was denied his right to a jury trial, among other things. See (Doc. 1). Hill brings his claims under “Title 42 U.S.C. sections 1982, 1983, 1985 and common law” against the Honorable Leandra G. Johnson, the Honorable Gregory S. Parker, the Honorable William F. Williams, III, Joel F. Foreman, Jennifer B. Springfield, Suwannee River Water Management District (SRWMD), Columbia County, Florida, City of Lake City, Florida, and Michael Smallridge. Id. at 1-2. Hill's claims are as follows:

Count I: “Violation of Rights Secured by the Takings Clause of Amendment V and Amendment XIV of the United States Constitution; (42 U.S.C. sec. 1983- Defendant Leandra G. Johnson)”

Count II: “Right to be Secure From Excessive Fines; Amendment VIII (42 U.S.C. section 1983 - Defendant Leandra G. Johnson)”

Count III: “Right to be Free from Taking of Property Without Just Compensation; Right to Due Process; Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; 42 U.S.C. 1983- 42 U.S.C. 1985(3) - (Defendant Gregory S. Parker)”

Count IV: “Right to be Secure in Property; Right to Due Process of Law; Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; Right to Trial by Jury; Seventh Amendment; 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983 - (Defendant William F. Williams, III)”

Count V: “Right to Just Compensation and Due Process of Law as Secured by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; 42 sec. 1983, Florida Statute 817.535 - (Defendant Joel F. Foreman, individually and as attorney for Columbia County, Florida)”

Count VI: “Right to Equal Protection of the Laws; Amendment Fourteen; 42 sec. 1985(3); (Defendant Jennifer B. Springfield)”

Count VII: “Violations of the Takings Clause; Title 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983; Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments - (Defendant Suwanee River Water Management District)”

Count VIII: “Violations of the Takings Clause and Due Process; Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; Title 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983; (Defendant Columbia County, Florida)”

Count IX: “Violations of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; Title 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983 - (Defendant City of Lake Ci ty, Florida)”

Count X: “Violations of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; Title 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983 - (Michael Smallridge - individually and a Receiver for Columbia County).”

Id. at 8-15. The Court will liberally construe Hill's pro se allegations. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, Hill's complaint is still due to be dismissed.

A. Judicial Immunity

Counts I, II, III, and IV are due to be dismissed based on judicial immunity. Counts I through IV are all brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Florida state court judges that ruled on Hill's state court cases at various times.

Under federal law,

“[j]udges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity from damages for those acts taken while they are acting in their judicial capacity unless they acted in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.'” Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). “This immunity applies even when the judge's acts are in error, malicious, or were in excess of his or her jurisdiction.” Id. Whether a judge's actions were made while acting in his [or her] judicial capacity depends on whether: (1) the act complained of constituted a normal judicial function; (2) the events occurred in the judge's chambers or in open court; (3) the controversy involved a case pending before the judge; and (4) the confrontation arose immediately out of a visit to the judge in his [or her] judicial capacity. Scott v. Hayes, 719 F.2d 1562, 1565 (11th Cir. 1983).

Sibley v. Lando, 437 F.3d 1067, 1070 (11th Cir. 2005); see also Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967) (“Few doctrines were more solidly established at common law than the immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction . . . .”).^[2] Hill's allegations, assumed as true and liberally construed, show that Judges Johnson, Parker, and Williams were all acting within their judicial capacities. See (Doc. 1 ¶ 19) (“Defendant Leandra G. Johnson (Johnson), awarded the Agency an injunction against the farm . . . . The farm appealed to the Florida First District Court of Appeal and that court per curiam affirmed without a written opinion.”); id. ¶ 20 (“Defendant Johnson awarded the Agency a $100,000.00 fine against the farm. The farm appealed to the Florida First District Court of Appeal; that court per curiam affirmed without written opinion.”); id. ¶ 23 (“Defendant Parker . . . rendered an order in [Hill's] case . . . .”); id. ¶ 24 (“Defendant Parker . . . awarded fees and costs . . . .”); id. ¶ 29 (“Defendant Williams, acting as a state circuit judge, denied Plaintiffs' motion to rehear Defendant Parker's Order . . . .”).

In his response, Hill argues that Judges Johnson, Parker, and Williams were acting outside of the scope of their judicial capacity when:

• Judge Johnson granted an injunction to SRWMD because she was deprived of subject matter jurisdiction under Florida Statutes 403.813(1)(g) and (h). (Doc. 67 at 1). Hill also asserts that Judge Johnson was outside the scope of her judicial capacity when she awarded SRWMD $100,000 “because there is no law in Florida prescribing such an amount for the lack of a permit from [SRWMD].” Id. at 1-2.

• Judge Parker entered an order authorizing SRWMD to drain Hill's pond on his property, awarded SRWMD $280,376.20, and transferred Hill's cases to Judge Williams. Id. at 2.

• Judge Williams entered orders in Hill's cases because Judge Williams is a judge in Suwannee County, Florida, not Columbia County, Florida. Id.^[3]

These allegations, assumed as true, largely describe what Hill believes to be legal deficiencies in the judges' decisions, not facts supporting the conclusion that Judges Johnson, Parker, and Williams were acting “in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Bolin, 225 F.3d at 1239 (citation omitted). Hill's argument that Judge Williams was acting outside his judicial capacity because Judge Williams served in a different county than assigned is similarly unmeritorious. See Judges of Polk Cnty. Ct. by Herring v. Ernst, 615 So.2d 276, 277 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (“Logically, we conclude if a circuit judge may be assigned temporarily outside the circuit where he or she was elected, then a county judge may be temporarily assigned to serve outside the county where he or she was elected.”); Physicians Healthcare Plans, Inc. v. Pfeifler, 846 So.2d 1129, 1133 (Fla. 2003) (“Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.050(b)(4) [now Rule 2.215(b)(4)] delegates the chief justice's assignment power to the chief judges of the judicial circuits to ‘assign any judge to temporary service for which the judge is qualified in any court in the same circuit.'”). Hill provides no other allegations regarding why this assignment was improper.^[4] Therefore, Defendants Judges Johnson, Parker, and Williams are all entitled to judicial immunity.

B. Res Judicata

Hill's case is another attempt to relitigate his state court cases, and as such Counts V-IX are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. See Hill v. Johnson, 787 Fed. App'x 604, 607-08 (11th Cir. 2019)^[5](holding that Hill “was simply quarrelling with the outcome and attempting to relitigate his claims”). “Res judicata bars the filing of claims which were raised or could have been raised in an earlier proceeding.” Ragsdale v. Rubbermaid, Inc., 193 F.3d 1235, 1238 (11th Cir. 1999). “Under Eleventh Circuit precedent, a claim will be barred by prior litigation if all four of the following elements are present: (1) there is a final judgment on the merits; (2) the decision was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the parties, or those in privity with them, are identical in both suits; and (4) the same cause of action is involved in both cases.” Id. A dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim is a judgment on the merits. N.A.A.C.P. v. Hunt, 891 F.2d 1555, 1560 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing Federated Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 399 n.3 (1981)).

In 2015, Hill sued SRWMD in federal court alleging violations of Hill's First, Fifth, Eight, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.^[6] (Doc. 1 in Hill v. Suwannee River Water...