Hill v. Jones
| Decision Date | 31 December 1909 |
| Docket Number | 16,332 - (134) |
| Citation | 123 N.W. 927,109 Minn. 370 |
| Parties | OLIVE M. HILL v. HUGH A. JONES |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Action in the district court for Washington county to recover $15,000 for breach of promise of marriage. The case was tried before Stolberg, J., and a jury which rendered a verdict in favor of plaintiff in the sum of $5,000. From an order denying defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial, he appealed. Reversed and new trial granted.
Demand to Perform Marriage Promise Unnecessary.
Where an alleged promise of marriage is denied by the defendant, or his conduct amounts to a repudiation thereof, a demand that he perform is not necessary before suit.
Evidence Improbable -- New Trial.
Evidence in support of plaintiff's case held so doubtful of merit and in many respects so improbable, that a new trial should have been granted, under the rule of Messenger v. St Paul City Ry. Co., 77 Minn. 34, and Martin v. Courtney, 75 Minn. 255, 256.
C. D. & R. D. O'Brien, for appellant.
James Mattimore, J. P. Kyle, and W. R. Duxbury, for respondent.
Action for damages for breach of promise of marriage, in which plaintiff had a verdict for $5,000, and defendant appealed from an order denying his alternative motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial. The motion for a new trial was based upon the grounds (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict; (2) errors in law occurring at the trial; and (3) excessive damages appearing to have been given under the influence of passion and prejudice. The argument on this appeal was confined mainly to the questions whether the evidence sustains the verdict and alleged errors in law.
1. An examination of the record discloses no errors in law.
The main contention of defendant on this branch of the case is that, inasmuch as it appears without dispute that no definite time was set for the marriage, other than "about the middle of December" following the engagement, to give plaintiff a right of action it was incumbent upon her to demand of defendant that the marriage take place, and, having made no such demand, she cannot recover. A number of authorities are cited in support of this contention; but an examination thereof discloses that they are not in point. There are authorities holding that where, in marriage engagements, the time of performance is indefinite and left to future agreement, there being no dispute about the engagement, an action will not lie for a breach thereof until the complaining party demands performance or herself offers to perform. But where the agreement of marriage is disputed and denied, or the conduct of defendant amounts to a repudiation of the agreement, and in effect a...
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