Hill v. Lewis, 710

Decision Date24 April 1974
Docket NumberNo. 710,710
Citation318 A.2d 850,21 Md.App. 121
PartiesLucille Dashiell HILL et al. v. Raymond Calvin LEWIS, Personal Representative of Estate of Catherine Dashiell Kohlheim Lewis.
CourtCourt of Special Appeals of Maryland

Elsbeth L. Bothe, Baltimore, with whom were Bernard G. Link, Baltimore, and Thomas S. Simpkins, Princess Anne, on the brief, for appellants.

Kenneth V. Heland, Salisbury, and Alexander G. Jones, Princess Anne, with whom was Vaughn E. Richardson, Salisbury, on the brief, for appellee.

Argued before ORTH, C. J., and DAVIDSON and MOORE, JJ.

ORTH, Chief Judge.

I

Catherine Dashiell Kohlheim Lewis (Catherine) was found dead in the basement of her residence in Princess Anne, Somerset County, Maryland on 1 January 1972. She died without issue but left surviving her a husband, Raymond Calvin Lewis (Raymond), whom she married 14 April 1971, and two sisters, Lucille Dashiell Hill and Isabel Dashiell Shores (the Sisters). Catherine died testate. Her will, disposing of an estate appraised at $124,716.93, and duly admitted to probate in the Orphans' Court for Somerset County, named Raymond personal representative and devised to him real property, consisting of a 300 acre farm known as Goshen, appraised at $75,550. The rest and residue of the estate was devised and bequeathed to the sisters in equal shares. Raymond, as duly appointed personal representative, filed an administration account about 11 July 1972. On 1 August 1972 the Sisters excepted to the account with respect to any distributions, commissions, or allowances to Raymond and prayed for his removal as personal representative. They alleged that Catherine did not die of natural causes, and requested that issues of fact raised by their petition be transmitted to a court of law for determination. Raymond answered the petition, averring that Catherine died as the result of an accident, and prayed that the petition be dismissed. He moved for a denial of the request for determination of any issues by a court of law. By orders filed 22 August 1972 the Orphans' Court denied the motion to dismiss the petition of the Sisters, refused to approve the administration account, and did not approve the motion for denial of the request for a determination of issues by a law court. The Sisters thereupon, on 11 September 1972, submitted the following issue of fact for determination:

'Did Raymond Lewis murder Catherine Dashiell Lewis?'

On 26 September 1972 the Orphans' Court entered an order approving the issue for determination by the Circuit Court for Somerset County. On 8 November 1972, upon Raymond's suggestion, the case was removed to the Circuit Court for Dorchester County, and the record was promptly transmitted to that court.

On 24 November 1972 Raymond moved for summary judgment. The motion was supported by seven affidavits. A report of the autopsy performed on Catherine was filed, depositions of various witnesses were taken, and interrogatories demanded and answered. The motion for summary judgment was answered on 17 July 1973 and further answered on 24 July. On the latter date there was a hearing on the motion. On 29 August the Circuit Court for Dorchester County ordered 'that the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Raymond C. Lewis, personal representative of the estate of Catherine Dashiell Kohlheim Lewis, be and it is hereby granted, and the Clerk is directed to certify to the Orphans' Court in answer to the issue presented a finding by this Court of 'No'.' The Sisters noted an appeal 'from the order entered in this action on August 29, 1973.' They question the authority of the court below to grant a motion for a summary judgment with respect to an issue transmitted for determination to it from an Orphans' Court, and claim that even if the court had such authority, it erred in granting the motion in the circumstances here.

II

It is the settled law of this State, Chase v. Jenifer, 219 Md. 564, 567, 150 A.2d 251, that neither a murderer, nor his heirs or representatives, can share in the estate of the person murdered, under the statutes of descent and distribution, or otherwise, Price v. Hitaffer, 164 Md. 505, 165 A. 470. 1 See United Life and Accident Insurance Company v. Prostic, 169 Md. 535, 182 A. 421; Schmeizl v. Schmeizl, 184 Md. 584, 42 A.2d 106; Schmeizl v. Schmeizl, 186 Md. 371, 46 A.2d 619. Actual conviction of murder is not a requisite for the application of the rule. Chase v. Jenifer, supra, 219 Md. at 566-567, 150 A.2d 251.

Code, Art. 93, § 2-105, concerning the Orphans' Courts, provides:

'In any controversy in the court, issues of fact may be determined by the court or, at the request of any interested person made within such time as may be determined by the court, by a court of law. Where such request is made before the court has determined the issue of fact, the court shall transmit the issues to a court of law. After the determination of the issue, whether by the court or after transmission to a court of law, the court shall enter an appropriate judgment or decree. This section shall not apply where the estate is administered under the jurisdiction of a court having general equity jurisdiction.'

An issue may be sent to a law court for trial only when (1) the orphans' court has jurisdiction of the subject, (2) the question is properly before the orphans' court, and (3) the issue is relevant and material to the question before the orphans' court. Myers v. Hart, 248 Md. 443, 237 A.2d 41; Ades v. Norins, 204 Md. 267, 103 A.2d 842; Fidelity Trust Company v. Barrett, 186 Md. 483, 47 A.2d 72. It is clear that the issue here met these tests. Whether a person has forfeited his right to inherit from a decedent, under a will, or as an heir, or as a distributee of an intestate estate, is a question which may be raised in an orphans' court. Schmeizl v. Schmeizl, 184 Md. at 599, 42 A.2d 106. The question whether Raymond forfeited his right to inherit from Catherine was properly before the orphans' court. The issue was relevant and material to that question. It was ancillary to relief in a matter over which the orphans' court had jurisdiction to decide, Goldsborough v. De Witt, 169 Md. 463, 182 A. 324, but was not wholly within its discretion, Vickers v. Starcher, 175 Md. 522, 2 A.2d 678. It was a single, definite, and material question framed from the allegations of a petition and the answer thereto, Ades v. Norins, supra, 204 Md. at 272, 103 A.2d 842. It was properly submitted to the law court.

'In answering issues the circuit court acts, strictly speaking, not as an appellate court nor in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. It acts rather as: '. . . a tribunal ancillary to the orphans' court, whose aid is invoked for the single purpose of determining issues of fact submitted to it by the orphans' court for its guidance in dealing with some matter before it." Ades v. Norins, supra, 204 Md. at 273, 103 A.2d at 844, quoting Holland v. Enright, 167 Md. 604, 607, 175 A. 466, 468.

In other words, the law court has limited jurisdiction under the statute. 2 Holland v. Enright, 169 Md. 390, 181 A. 836. It has no power to review the proceedings of the orphans' court wherein the issues were framed, or to consider the sufficiency of the pleadings upon which the issues were founded. 6 'The general rule has been adopted that the trial court has no right to revoke or modify issues after they have been transmitted by the Orphans' Court.' Forsythe v. Baker, 180 Md. 144, 149, 23 A.2d 36, 38. On the other hand, it is well settled that after issues have been sent to a court of law for trial, the orphans' court has no right to revoke or modify them, for the functions of the orphans' court are suspended until the verdict is returned by the trial court. Idem, citing Pegg v. Warford, 4 Md. 385, 396; Schmidt v. Johnston, 154 Md. 125, 133, 140 A. 87; Greenhawk v. Quimby, 168 Md. 396, 177 A. 537; Baldwin v. Hopkins, 172 Md. 219, 232, 191 A. 565. Further, the law is firmly established that the orphans' court is bound to accpet the findings of the trier of fact in the trial court as conclusive, and to make them effective by proper judgment or decree. This is the clear intent of the provision: 'After the determination of the issue, whether by the (orphans') court or after transmission to a court of law, the (orphans') court shall enter an appropriate judgment or decree.' Code, Art. 93, § 2-105. Forsythe v. Baker, supra, 180 Md. at 149, 23 A.2d 36, citing Flaks v. Flaks, 173 Md. 358, 196 A. 116.

Despite the settled state of much of the law with respect to issues submitted by an orphans' court to a court of law, the Sisters bring into question the conduct of the trial in a law court of issues so propounded by an orphans' court. The Court said in Forsythe v. Baker, supra, 180 Md. at 149, 23 A.2d at 38:

'Unless the issues are wholly immaterial, or contain solely questions of law, or are for any reason so defective that no reasoned verdict could be rendered upon them, it is the imperative duty of the trial court to submit the issues to the jury.'

The Sisters construe this as prohibiting the trial court from granting a motion for summary judgment as to the issues. We think it must be considered within the context in which it was made. The statement was made concerning the lack of power in the trial court to review the proceedings of the orphans' court wherein the issues were framed or to consider the sufficiency of the pleadings upon which the issues were founded. It led to the conclusion that the general rule is that the trial court has no right to revoke or modify issues after they have been transmitted. The statement in this context supports the general rule, but goes no further. Earlier in Forsythe the Court discussed the province of the trial court when its aid was invoked as a tribunal ancillary to the orphans' court. It is, the Court said, at 148-149, 23 A.2d at 38, '* * * merely to submit the issues of...

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