Schmeizl v. Schmeizl

• Decision Date: 16 April 1946
• Docket Number: 119.
• Citation: 46 A.2d 619,186 Md. 371
• Parties: SCHMEIZL et al. v. SCHMEIZL.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

46 A.2d 619

186 Md. 371

SCHMEIZL et al. v. SCHMEIZL.

No. 119.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

April 16, 1946

Appeal from Orphans' Court of Baltimore City; Philip L. Sykes Leo J. Cummings, and Samuel Lasch, Judges.

Proceeding by Joseph Schmeizl, as administrator of the estate of Frederick Schmeizl, deceased, against Matilda I. Schmeizl Jacob Schmeizl, and others for distribution of the estate. From an order of distribution, petitioner and respondents Jacob Schmeizl and others appeal.

Affirmed and cause remanded.

Thomas G. Young, Jr., of Baltimore (William Lentz, of Baltimore, on the brief), for appellants.

Anthony S. Federico and Harry Yaffe, both of Baltimore, for appellee.

Before MARBURY, C.J., and DELAPLAINE, COLLINS, GRASON, and HENDERSON, JJ.

DELAPLAINE Judge.

Matilda I. Schmeizl, appellee, lived with her husband, Frederick Schmeizl, in Baltimore nineteen years from August, 1911, when they were married, until August, 1930, when she left him and went to California. During the last fifteen years she has been living with a friend named Bert Phillips, first at Los Angeles and afterwards at Santa Rosa, and was known there as Mrs. Phillips. In 1943 Schmeizl died intestate without issue. Joseph Schmeizl, a brother, qualified as administrator of the estate in the Orphans' Court of Baltimore City. Mrs. Schmeizl came to Baltimore and claimed her distributive share in the estate, but the administrator questioned whether she was intestate's widow. The issue was tried in the Superior Court of Baltimore City, where the jury found that she was not. On April 12, 1945, however, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling and remanded the cause to enable the Superior Court to enter a finding that she was. Schmeizl v. Schmeizl, Md., 42 A.2d 106.

After the decision of the Court of Appeals, the administrator filed a petition in the Orphans' Court alleging that Schmeizl's next of kin were his widow, himself and another brother, and three sisters, but conflicting claims had been made by them, and therefore asked that distribution be made under the Court's direction and control. Mrs. Schmeizl answered that there was no ground on which the Court could assume direction and control of distribution, and prayed that the petition be dismissed. On the contrary, the brothers and two of the sisters answered (1) that the Statute of 13 Edward I, ch. 34, bars Mrs. Schmeizl from her widow's share in the estate, and (2) that it would be against public policy to allow her to inherit from her husband after she had abandoned him and lived for many years with another man. Under an express provision of our testamentary statute, the administrator of any estate may petition the Orphans' Court for a meeting of persons entitled to distributive shares therein on some day to be appointed by the Court, and distribution may then and there be made under the Court's direction and control. Code 1939, art. 93, § 151. While the duty of ascertaining who are the distributees of an estate rests upon the administrator, the statute furnishes a simple and adequate method of ascertaining the identity of the distributees and the share to which each is entitled to receive, and affords him complete protection if he complies with the conditions therein prescribed. State, for Use of Czyzowicz v. Brown, 170 Md. 97, 100, 183 A. 256. In this case the Orphans' Court, after a hearing on the petition, ordered the administrator to distribute the sum of $2,000 and one-half of the residue to Mrs. Schmeizl, and one-tenth of the residue to each brother and sister. The present appeal is from that order.

It has long been established at common law that, in the absence of statutory provision to the contrary, a widow will not be barred from her right of inheritance in her husband's estate, even though she has deserted him and lived in adultery. Bryan v. Batcheller, 6 R.I. 543, 78 Am.Dec. 454; Meyers' Adm'r v. Meyers, 244 Ky. 248, 50 S.W.2d 81; Cox v. Cox, 95 Okl. 14, 217 P. 493, 34 A.L.R. 432; In re Torres' Estate, 67 Nev. 156, 120 P.2d 816, 139 A.L.R. 481; Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216, 54 S.Ct. 684, 688, 78 L.Ed. 1219; 26 C.J.S., Descent and Distribution, § 59. Even if a wife contracted a bigamous marriage, she cannot be deprived of her widow's right of inheritance in her husband's estate, because the bigamous marriage is void and hence her status as widow is not destroyed. Brown v. Parks, 169 Ga. 712, 151 S.E. 340, 71 A.L.R. 271. In Pennsylvania it has been held that where a wife leaves her husband and lives in adultery she is barred from sharing in her husband's estate, but the Court predicated that decision upon a Pennsylvania statute providing that 'no wife who shall have, for one year or upwards previous to the death of her husband, willfully and maliciously deserted her husband, shall have the right to claim any title or interest in his real or personal estate.' In re Lodge's Estate, 287 Pa. 184, 134 A. 472, 473. The Statute of 13 Edward I, ch. 34, enacted by Parliament in the year 1285, provides that if a wife 'willingly leave her husband, and go away, and continue with her advouterer,' she shall be barred from dower in her husband's lands, unless he should forgive her and take her back. 1 Alexander's British Statutes, Coe's Ed., 186-190. This statute has generally been recognized as in effect in the United States, either by adoption as part of the common law or by express legislative enactment; but, even if in force in Maryland, it could not bar Mrs. Schmeizl of her distributive share in her husband's personal estate, because the statute applies only to dower. Mack v. Pairo, 136 Md. 179, 110 A. 198.

Appellants urge the Court to read an exception into the statute of distribution on the theory that the Legislature could never have intended any consequences so unjust. The doctrine of equitable construction, accepted by the Roman law, was introduced in England before the rise of courts of chancery. It was a conception of power, existing side by side with the law yet not in derogation of it, based upon reason and drawing its inspiration and guidance from the dictates of conscience and the principles of justice. The early English judges, disregarding the letter of the statute extended its provisions to cases which in their judgment were within the mischief which the law was designed to remedy but which were not expressly provided for, and excepted from the operation of the statute those cases which were covered by its general terms but were excluded by reason and justice. But the doctrine giving the judge power to mould the statute in accordance with his notions of justice has no place in our law. We follow the fundamental rule that a Court is not at liberty to surmise a legislative intention contrary to the letter of the statute, or to indulge in the license of inserting or omitting words with the view of making the statute express an intention which is not evidenced in the origianl form. A statute should be construed according to the ordinary and natural import of its language, unless a different meaning is clearly indicated by the context, without resorting to subtle or forced interpretation for the purpose of extending or limiting its operation. Where there is ambiguity in the provisions of a statute, or the intention of the Legislature is doubtful, the Court may look to the consequences; but where the language of the statute is clear and explicit, and expresses a definite and sensible meaning, the Court cannot disregard the mandate of the Legislature and insert an exception, where none has been made by the Legislature, for the sake of relieving against hardship or injustice. State Tax...