Hill v. Lowe's Home Ctrs.
| Decision Date | 22 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | 1:21-cv-00185-SRC |
| Parties | BOBBY HILL, Plaintiff(s), v. LOWE'S HOME CENTERS, LLC, et al., Defendant(s) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
Out shopping one day, Bobby Hill slipped and fell at a Lowe's store, sustaining injuries. He then sued two “Lowe's” entities, Lowe's Home Centers LLC and LC Realty, LLC in state court. After Defendants removed the case on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, the Court concluded that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and remanded under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Hill v Lowe's Home Centers, LLC et al., No. 21-cv-00141 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 23, 2021) (“Hill 1”). About a month later Defendants removed the case a second time, again on the basis of diversity jurisdiction.
In Hill 1, The Court described the allegations in Hill's state-court petition:
Hill, a Missouri resident, claims in his petition that in March 2018 he visited a Lowe's store in Cape Girardeau, Missouri, to buy goods. Doc. 1-3 at ¶¶ 1-5. He claims that as he attempted to enter the premises, he slipped on a large accumulation of water on a tile floor and fell. Id. at ¶¶ 5-6. Hill alleges that the water on the floor was unsafe, and that Defendants knew or should have known about the water and should have removed it or warned him about it. Id. at ¶ 7-9. Hill claims that he “suffered severe injuries to his person, including injuries to his neck, lower back, left shoulder, and knee”-resulting in “damages in the form of lost wages, medical expenses, loss of future earnings, pain and suffering, and loss of quality of life.” Id. at ¶¶ 10-11. Hill seeks damages “in excess of $25, 000.00, together with interest and costs” and “such other and further relief as [the state court] shall deem just and proper.” Id. at p. 2.
In their first notice of removal, Defendants argued that the Court had diversity jurisdiction because Hill is a citizen of Missouri and both Lowe's entities are citizens of other states. Hill 1, at 2. Defendants claimed that the amount-in-controversy exceeded $75, 000 based on what Defendants characterized as Hill's “allegations of extensive, severe, and disabling physical and mental injuries, including but not limited to an injury to his neck, lower back, and knee, as well as his allegations of lost wages and medical expenses.” Id. The Court remanded Hill 1 under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), concluding that “Defendants have not shown the requisite jurisdictional amount in controversy by a preponderance of the evidence, and have not disclosed the citizenship of the Defendants.” Hill 1, at 8.
After returning to state court, Defendants served written requests for admission on Hill regarding the amount in controversy. Doc. 1 at ¶ 15; Doc. 1-9. Hill responded that same day, stating that he “seek[s] more than $75, 000 in damages from all Defendants in this lawsuit as a result of this [incident].” Doc. 1-9 at ¶ 1. In their second notice of removal, Doc. 1, Defendants again claim that removal is proper because the Court would have original diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Doc. 1 at ¶ 20. Defendants argue that removal is timely under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) because they filed the second notice of removal within thirty days of receiving Hill's response regarding the amount in controversy. Id. at ¶ 19. In contrast to their first notice of removal, Defendants also identify the citizenship of the parties. Id. at ¶ 18.
A defendant may remove to federal court any state court civil action over which the federal court could exercise original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). “The [removing] defendant bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.” In re Prempro Prod. Liab. Litig., 591 F.3d 613, 620 (8th Cir. 2010). Because “[t]he threshold requirement in every federal case is jurisdiction, ” the Eighth Circuit has admonished district courts “to be attentive to a satisfaction of jurisdictional requirements in all cases.” Sanders v. Clemco Indus., 823 F.2d 214, 216 (8th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted). “Federal courts are to resolve all doubts about federal jurisdiction in favor of remand and are strictly to construe legislation permitting removal.” Dahl v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 478 F.3d 965, 968 (8th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). But when a federal court does have jurisdiction over a case properly before it, it has a “virtually unflagging obligation to exercise it.” Holbein v. TAW Enterprises, Inc., 983 F.3d 1049, 1060 (8th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Though sections 1446 and 1447 of Title 28 do not mention second removal specifically, courts have interpreted them to address second removal petitions or applied them in the second-removal context. Section 1446(b)(3) states that “[e]xcept as provided in subsection (c), if the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice of removal may be filed within 30 days after receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable.” And section 1446(c)(3)(A) adds that “[i]f the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable solely because the amount in controversy does not exceed the amount specified in section 1332(a), information relating to the amount in controversy in the record of the State proceeding, or in responses to discovery, shall be treated as an ‘other paper' under subsection (b)(3).”
In Davis Neurology PA v. DoctorDirectory.com LLC, the Eighth Circuit stated regarding a second removal petition that 896 F.3d 872, 875 (8th Cir. 2018).
Defendants argue that the second removal is timely under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) because they filed it within thirty days of receiving Hill's response to Defendants' request for admission regarding the amount in controversy. Doc. 1 at ¶ 19. If failure to establish the amount in controversy was the only reason the Court remanded Hill 1, Defendants' second removal may have been timely.
But the Court need not address Defendants' argument regarding receiving new information establishing the amount in controversy, because the Court remanded Hill 1 for a separate, independent jurisdictional reason-failure to properly allege the citizenship of defendants. Hill 1, at 7-8 (“. . . .
Diversity jurisdiction “requires . . . complete diversity of citizenship of the litigants.” OnePoint Sols., LLC v. Borchert, 486 F.3d 342, 346 (8th Cir. 2007). “Complete diversity of citizenship exists where no defendant holds citizenship in the same state where any plaintiff holds citizenship.” Id. (quotation omitted). “To establish complete diversity of citizenship, a complaint (or notice of removal) must include factual allegations of each party's state of citizenship.” Hammond v. Patterson Auto Sales, Inc., No. 14-cv-01460, 2014 WL 6463351, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 17, 2014) (citing Sanders, 823 F.2d at 216). “A corporation's citizenship is determined by its state of incorporation and its principal place of business, ” id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1)), but “[a]n LLC's citizenship, for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, is the citizenship of each of its members.” E3 Biofuels, LLC v. Biothane, LLC, 781 F.3d 972, 975 (8th Cir. 2015) (quotation omitted); see also OnePoint Sols., 486 F.3d at 347 n.4 .
Additionally, “although [the Eighth Circuit] has not yet specifically addressed whether the citizenship of sub-members is relevant to establishing diversity citizenship, ” other federal courts addressing this issue have explained that the Court not only needs to know the citizenship of each member of the LLC, but also the citizenship of any “sub-member.” See Clark v. SL W. Lounge, LLC, No. 18-cv-01223, 2019 WL 527781, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 11, 2019); see also Happe v. Sharkninja Operating, LLC, 21-cv-00349-SRC (E.D. Mo. Mar. 26, 2021). For purposes of clarity, “sub-members” includes the members of members (i.e., first-tier submembers), and the members of first-tier sub-members (i.e., second-tier sub-members), the members of second-tier sub-members (i.e., third-tier sub-members), and so on, until the Court knows the citizenship of all persons and entities within the ownership structure.
In Hill 1, the Court noted two problems with Defendants' jurisdictional allegations:
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