Hill v. Madison Cnty.
| Decision Date | 02 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:19-CV-127-DPJ-FKB |
| Parties | BETTY HILL, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL HEIRS-AT-LAW AND WRONGFUL DEATH BENEFICIARIES OF HARVEY HILL, DECEASED AND THE ESTATE OF HARVEY HILL PLAINTIFF v. MADISON COUNTY, ET AL. DEFENDANTS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi |
Harvey Hill died while in custody at the Madison County Detention Center. Plaintiff Betty Hill, on Mr. Hill's behalf, filed this suit alleging that several officers and jailers inflicted the injuries that caused his death. Two of these Defendants—Master Sergeant James Ingram and Prison Guard James Bufford—have moved to dismiss the state-law claims against them. For the following reasons, Ingram's and Bufford's motions to dismiss Plaintiff's individual-capacity claims [115, 123] are both granted as to the negligence claims but are otherwise denied. Bufford's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's official-capacity claim [125] is granted.
According to the Second Amended Complaint (SAC), Harvey Hill was arrested for trespassing on May 5, 2018, and taken to the Madison County Detention Center. SAC [105] ¶¶ 16, 20. The following day, "an altercation occurred" between Mr. Hill and several prison guards. Id. ¶ 21. Mr. Hill allegedly began "yelling incoherently," became "combative," and "was in an excited state[.]" Id. ¶ 27. While in this "emotionally excited state," Mr. Hill "refused [the prison guards'] verbal commands[.]" Id. ¶ 23. "Defendant[s] Bufford and Ingram believed that Mr. Hill [was] not show[ing] them proper deference and/or respect." Id.
What happened next is described in more detail below, but Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Bufford and Ingram "brutally beat, tortured and bound Mr. Hill." Id. ¶ 16. Significantly, Plaintiff claims the beating continued after Mr. Hill was handcuffed. Id. ¶¶ 25, 27. And when the physical confrontation ended, Plaintiff says Defendants left Mr. Hill lying on the cell floor for 46 minutes "without assistance." Id. ¶ 30. He was later found unresponsive and "taken to Merit Health Central Hospital in Jackson, Mississippi where he was officially pronounced dead." Id. ¶¶ 31-32.
Plaintiff filed this action on behalf of Mr. Hill's estate. She alleges nine causes of action against various officers, guards, medical staff, and related entities. Relevant to the instant motions, Plaintiff brings four claims against Defendants Bufford and Ingram: violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, negligence, wrongful death, and assault and battery. Bufford and Ingram have moved to dismiss the individual-capacity state-law claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Bufford also seeks dismissal of all federal claims asserted against him in his official capacity.
To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. This standard "'simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of' the necessary claims or elements." In re S. Scrap Material Co., LLC, 541 F.3d 584, 587 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.at 556)). When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true and views them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. New Orleans City v. Ambac Assur. Corp., 815 F.3d 196, 199 (5th Cir. 2016). In a Rule 12(b)(6) analysis, courts may rely on the complaint, its proper attachments, "'documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.'" Dorsey v. Portfolio Equities, Inc., 540 F.3d 333, 338 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007)).
The Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA) "provides the exclusive remedy against a governmental entity or its employees" under Mississippi law. Covington Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Magee, 29 So. 3d 1, 4 (Miss. 2010). Although the MTCA generally extends sovereign immunity to government employees for "wrongful or tortious act[s] or omission[s]," it provides exceptions to that immunity and exceptions to the exceptions. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-3.
In this case, both Bufford and Ingram say sections 11-46-7(2) and 11-46-9(1)(m) of the MTCA shield them from individual liability. Ingram Mem. [116] at 3-4; Bufford Mem. [124] at 3-4. In response, Plaintiff argues that no immunity exists under these statutes because Ingram and Bufford were not acting within the course and scope of their employment when they beat and killed Mr. Hill. Pl.'s Resps. [129, 134] at 6.
Starting with section 11-46-7(2), the statute provides the following:
An employee may be joined in an action against a governmental entity in a representative capacity if the act or omission complained of is one for which the governmental entity may be liable, but no employee shall be held personally liable for acts or omissions occurring within the course and scope of the employee's duties.
(Emphasis added). Significant to these motions, section 11-46-7(2) defines "course and scope" as follows: "For the purposes of this chapter an employee shall not be considered as acting within the course and scope of his employment . . . if the employee's conduct constituted fraud, malice, libel, slander, defamation or any criminal offense." Id. So if the "conduct" fits these labels, there is no immunity from personal liability under section 11-46-7(2). Id.
Similarly, section 11-46-9(1)(m) also requires proof that the defendant acted within the course and scope of employment. It states:
(Emphasis added). The term "inmate" is interpreted "broadly, to include pretrial detainees" like Mr. Hill. Hinds Cty. v. Burton, 187 So. 3d 1016, 1024 (Miss. 2016).
In sum, the disputed immunity statutes apply only when government employees act "within the course and scope of their employment." Miss. Code Ann. §§ 11-46-7-(2), 11-46-9(1). And both apply the same definition of that term. See id. § 11-46-7(2) (). So, the central question is whether Plaintiff plausibly alleged that Bufford and Ingram's conduct as to each cause of action constituted "fraud, malice, libel, slander, defamation or any criminal offense." Id. (emphasis added). If so, there is no immunity. To make the analysis easier to follow, the Court will re-order the disputed causes of action.
Bufford and Ingram say the assault-and-battery claim should be dismissed because they acted within the course and scope of employment when subduing Mr. Hill, who was combative and noncompliant. Ingram Reply [130] at 7-8; Bufford Reply [138] at 3-4. Relatedly, they contend that the force they used was permissible under the County's use-of-force policy. Ingram Reply [130] at 8; Bufford Reply [138] at 4.
Mississippi law defines the crime of assault as follows:
A person is guilty of simple assault if he or she (i) attempts to cause or purposely, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another; (ii) negligently causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon or other means likely to produce death or serious bodily harm; or (iii) attempts by physical menace to put another in fear of imminent serious bodily harm[.]
Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-7(a)(1).
Because assault is a crime under Mississippi law, Defendants' conduct would fall outside the course and scope of their employment if proven. Id. §§ 11-46-7-(2), 11-46-9(1)(m). Defendants therefore argue that Plaintiff failed to plead a plausible assault-and-battery claim. The following pleaded facts say otherwise:
These actions, specifically the kicking during the first incident and beating during the bathroom incident, support a plausible showing that Bufford and Ingram "purposely, knowingly or recklessly cause[d] bodily injury to another." Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-7(a)(1)(i); see Brown v. Wilkinson Cty. Sheriff's Dep't, No. 5:16-CV-124-KS-MTP, 2017 WL 1479428, at *8 (S.D. Miss. Apr. 24, 2017) () (quoting McBroom v. Payne, No. 1:06-CV-1222-LG-JMR, 2010 WL 3942010, at *9 (S.D. Miss. Oct. 6, 2010)); Holloway v. Lamar Cty., No. 2:15-CV-86-KS-MTP, 2015 WL 9094531, at *5 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 16, 2015) (); Lewis v. Marion Cty., ...
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