Hill v. Matthews Paint Co.
| Decision Date | 03 April 1957 |
| Citation | 149 Cal.App.2d 714,308 P.2d 865 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | John C. HILL, d/b/a Pacific Bronze Company, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. MATTHEWS PAINT COMPANY, a corporation, Defendant and Respondent. Civ. 21810. |
Mitchell & Hibbert, Los Angeles, for appellant.
Moss, Lyon & Dunn, Sidney A. Moss, and Henry F. Walker, Los Angeles, for respondent.
By the instant action Plaintiff sought damages for losses sustained as the result of a fire allegedly caused by the spontaneous combustion of a spray material purchased from defendant. Trial was to the court without a jury. The court found for defendant and entered judgment accordingly. Plaintiff appeals.
Plaintiff's complaint comprises three causes of action. Count I alleges, in substance, that defendant breached an express oral representation, promise and warranty to manufacture a spray finish material 'which would be safe and in all respects fit and proper for plaintiff's use and capable of drying within twelve hours.' Count II is predicated on defendant's breach of an implied warranty to furnish a spray material fit and proper for plaintiff's use. The third count charges defendant with negligence in manufacturing, selling and delivering to plaintiff a spray finish material that was both inherently dangerous and unfit for plaintiff's use. The answer, after admitting the sale of the spray, denied the above allegations and interposed the affirmative defense of plaintiff's negligence in application of the spray as proximately contributing to the injury.
The underlying issue presented is whether the evidence sustains the findings on which the judgment rests. In examining this question we are required, under conventional rules of appellate review, to state the evidence in the aspect most favorable to the prevailing party.
Since 1948 plaintiff had been engaged in the business of large-scale manufacture of novelty items of an ornamental nature. 1 His operations in 1950 were conducted in a plant in the city of Gardena. The items manufactured by plaintiff were subjected to a finishing process in which they were spray-painted. This was accomplished in four sheet-metal spray booths located in plaintiff's plant. Each spray booth contained a rotating wheel or turntable with 20 pedestals, on which the raw castings were placed for successive spraying with three different coating materials.
The spraying cycle in plaintiff's operations followed a set pattern. First, as the wheel or table rotated, each casting was sprayed with a coating of burnt umber lacquer, which was a 'nitrate cellulose dope' used primarily as a sealer. Second, a coating of non-jell lacquer, with finely-ground copper powder added to give a bronze color, was applied on top of the base coat. Third, a final coating was applied to produce a glossy finish. Each coating was applied with the use of a spray gun fed by a hose connected to a gallon container attached to the wall outside the spray booth. Each coat was applied alternately, but in the same order, as the castings were rotated on the turntable. One entire spraying cycle took about 25 minutes.
The spraying booths were constructed and installed for plaintiff by a company specializing in such equipment. Each booth was equipped with an exhaust vent or duct used to draw fumes or overspray into the air outside the building. This apparatus consisted of a stack (duct) and fan placed in the top center part of the spray booth enclosure. The stack extended upwards running through and above the roof of the plant, thus enabling the overspray to be expelled outdoors. The fan was situated inside the stack, approximately three or four inches above the point where the stack joined the top of the booth. The fan was operated by a motor attached to the outside of the blower section of the stack. The fan was mounted in a housing, and a belt running through the side of the housing in an enclosed casing connected the fan to the motor.
Plaintiff testified that in 1948, he purchased all the spraying materials he used from the Andrew Brown Company. In 1950 or 1951, he began purchasing the first or base coating from the India Paint Company. Later, the India Paint Company also supplied him with the non-jell lacquer used for the second coating. The glossy finish material used in the third coat continued to be furnished by the Andrew Brown Company. Plaintiff testified he had never experienced any difficulty in the use of these products.
In August, 1953, one Chester Pollet was in the employ of defendant as a salesman whose duties were to visit prospective customers to solicit orders for defendant's finishing materials. Pollet was a layman not versed in the chemistry of paints and varnishes. He called on plaintiff for the first time on August 25, 1953, in the hope of obtaining business. Plaintiff informed Pollet that he was interested in obtaining a third coating material that would dry faster and harder than the substance he obtained from Andrew Brown, something that would 'dry overnight so it could be wrapped with paper, not stick.' Pollet informed plaintiff that 'we would see if we could do that for him.' Pollet testified he spent twenty minutes at plaintiff's place of business and was shown the spray booths and how the material was applied. He recollected only that plaintiff gave him a sample of the burnt umber material he was using and that he informed him that the materials he was using were lacquers and synthetics.
On August 28, 1953, Pollet delivered to plaintiff a one-gallon sample of defendant's finishing material known as QD Synthetic No. 53-821. Pollet had previously sold this same compound to other customers. He told plaintiff he thought it would dry fast enough and hard enough to satisfy his requirements. When Pollet called on plaintiff three days later, he was told that the gallon sample had proved satisfactory. Plaintiff next ordered a five-gallon sample 'to test the material further.' On September 9, 1953, Pollet spoke to plaintiff again at the latter's place of business. Plaintiff expressed satisfaction with the five-gallon sample and gave Pollet an order for a 55 gallon drum of defendant's QD spraying compound.
On September 19, 1953, a fire broke out in plaintiff's place of business which caused the loss for which recovery is sought. The fire originated in the southwest spray booth then being manned by an employee of plaintiff known as Lito Ruiz Mendez (herein called Ruiz). While engaged in applying the first coating of spray (the burnt umber--not defendant's product) to the castings Ruiz observed a flame drop down from the fan onto the pedestal table. The table started to burn and the fire spread rapidly. Ruiz deshed from the booth to report the incident to Joe Guzman, who was at work in another booth. Ten seconds later, the fire had become very intense and smoke and flame enveloped the booth. The fire department was notified and fire-fighting equipment was dispatched to the scene.
Captain Craycroft, of the fire department, arrived with the fire engines and launched an investigation when the fire was extinguished. The southwest spray (Ruiz) booth had collapsed in ruins. In the debris Captain Craycroft found an electric fan and motor and identified it as being the same one introduced as Exhibit 'G.' He testified it was not an explosion-proof type of motor. After examining it, he dropped it a few feet from where he found it. Det. Lt. Morrison, assigned to the Arson Detail of the sheriff's office, picked up this motor from the ashes. He also testified that the motor was not of an explosion-proof type. Such a motor, he stated, may create either static electricity or give off a spark which could produce an ignition. All other motors observed by Lt. Morrison in the ruins were not of an explosion-proof type. Lt. Morrison testified he talked to one of plaintiff's employees (obviously Guzman) who stated he 'saw fire and sparks coming out of the (southwest) spray booth from the stack or duct at the top of the spray booth.' Based on his investigation, Lt. Morrison concluded there were two possible causes of the fire: (1) an accumulation of overspray in the duct system spontaneously igniting; or (2) a mechanical failure in the fan system in the duct.
Captain Craycroft testified that Guzman, when questioned about the origin of the fire, 'told me that sparks from an electric motor ignited fumes from the lacquer.' Captain Craycroft stated he made an investigation to determine the cause of the fire and concluded it was caused by sparks from an electric motor. He testified the motor found in the debris of the southwest booth had no spark shield.
Plaintiff testified that Exhibit 'G' was not, nor could it be, the type of motor or fan which was in operation in the spray booth. He estimated the inside diameter of the stack did not exceed 16 inches, whereas the outer diameter of the fan in Exhibit 'G' is 17.7 inches. He stated Exhibit 'G' was one of 13 fans and motors installed in the walls of the building to act as a hotair exhaust. He testified that the motor operating the fan in the stack was explosion proof. Plaintiff's son gave testimony to the same effect.
Plaintiff testified he recommenced business operations at a new location on October 8, 1953, and continued to use defendant's QD product. About a week later, two fires, on successive days, occurred in a trash pile where overspray dust from defendant's product and other cleanouts from the spray booths had been thrown. On October 17, 1953, the overspray dust in one of the spray booths started to smoke. Plaintiff testified he discontinued operations for two days in an effort to learn the cause of these fires. On October 19 he resumed operations, this time reverting to the Andrew Brown product in place of defendant's QD material. He testified that no fires occurred after he ceased using defendant's QD spray.
Thereafter, using the expert...
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