Hill v. State

Decision Date26 September 1927
Docket Number175
Citation298 S.W. 321,174 Ark. 886
PartiesHILL v. STATE
CourtArkansas Supreme Court

Appeal from Pike Circuit Court; B. E. Isbell, Judge; affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

P. L Smith, for appellant.

H. W Applegate, Attorney General, and John L. Carter, Assistant for appellee.

OPINION

WOOD, J.

The prosecuting attorney of the Ninth Judicial Circuit of Arkansas, through his deputy of the county of Pike, filed an information with the mayor of the town of Delight, accusing Jesse Hill of the crime of an aggravated assault, alleged to have been committed as follows: "The said Jesse Hill, in the county and State aforesaid, on the 21st day of January, 1927, did unlawfully strike and hit the person of H. D. Dean with a deadly weapon, with the intent to inflict upon his person great bodily injury, no considerable provocation appearing, against the peace and dignity of the State of Arkansas."

The mayor issued the warrant, the defendant was arrested and tried in the mayor's court by a jury, which returned the following verdict: "We, the jury, find the defendant guilty of assault, and assess his fine at $ 1000 and costs."

The defendant appealed to the circuit court. In that court he demurred to the information on the ground that the mayor was without jurisdiction, that the mayor and marshal of the town and all of the jurors were interested in the conviction, and that his conviction before the mayor was therefore without due process of law and in violation of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States as well as article 2 of the Constitution of the State. The demurrer was overruled by the circuit court, and the defendant was tried by the jury in that court, and the following verdict was returned: "We, the jury, find the defendant guilty of assault and battery, and assess a fine of $ 100."

In the circuit court the defendant presented prayer for instruction No. 7, which, in effect, told the jury that the defendant had a right, under the law, to protect his person against the attacks of the prosecuting witness, and, if he only did enough to protect his person or only what any prudent person would have done for the protection of his person under the circumstances, it was the duty of the jury to acquit him. The defendant also presented prayer for instruction No. 8, which, in effect, told the jury that the defendant had the right to go before a justice of the peace of his township and offer to submit, and that the law favors pleas of guilty in small offenses, and, if the jury found that the defendant did submit or surrender himself in the proper court and offered to submit, and that there was no collusion between him and the justice, and that the irregularity, if any, was the fault of the justice and not that of the defendant, he had a right to go before the justice, and, unless the jury found him guilty of a greater offense than he offered to submit to, the jury should acquit him. The defendant's prayer for instruction No. 9 would have told the jury that, under the charge, it could only consider the guilt or innocence of the defendant for assault and battery.

The court, over the general objection of the appellant, refused the above prayers for instructions and gave instructions which, in effect, defined in the language of the statute the offenses of simple assault, assault and battery, and aggravated assault, and the punishment for each, and also instructed the jury that no words, however opprobrious, would justify an assault, and that a person was justified in using such force as was necessary to protect himself against an assault made upon him.

The court also gave the usual instructions, to which the defendant offered no objection, giving the defendant the benefit of the presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt.

1. There is a bill of exceptions in the record in which the above prayers for instructions were set forth, but it does not set out any testimony that was adduced at the trial. It must be presumed therefore, in the absence of a bill of exceptions setting forth the evidence, that there was testimony to justify the court in its rulings upon the prayers for instructions....

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8 cases
  • Borchert, Application of
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Washington
    • February 16, 1961
    ...of our legislative safeguards against possible bias or prejudice, has been upheld in the following jurisdictions: Hill v. State, 1927, 174 Ark. 886, 298 S.W. 321; Brooks v. Town of Potomac, 1928, 149 Va. 427, 141 S.E. 249; Richardson v. State, 1928, 109 Tex.Crim.R. 148, 4 S.W.2d 79; Ex part......
  • State ex rel. Bowman v. Bd. of Com'rs of Allen Cnty.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Ohio
    • June 17, 1931
    ...543;Boyd v. State (Miss.) 114 So. 353;Fleming v. Greenwood (Miss.) 115 So. 221;Owens v. Dancy (C. C. A.) 36 F.(2d) 882;Hill v. State, 174 Ark. 886, 298 S. W. 321;Uihlein v. St. Paul (C. C. A.) 32 F.(2d) 748. In Tari v. State, 117 Ohio St. 481, 159 N. E. 594, 57 A. L. R. 284, this court decl......
  • Stephenson v. State
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Ohio
    • November 28, 1928
    ...If we are correct in this last proposition, then two other cases may be cited in support of the same position. In Hill v. State, 174 Ark. 886, 298 S. W. 321, Hill was charged with the crime of aggravated assault, and tried before a mayor having a pecuniary interest in the outcome of the tri......
  • Stephens v. State
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Arkansas
    • May 23, 1988
    ...an information, this defect is cured on appeal to the circuit court because the trial in the circuit court is de novo. Hill v. State, 174 Ark. 886, 298 S.W. 321 (1927). Counsel for appellant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial before the appellant was tried in the circuit c......
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