Hill v. State

• Decision Date: 04 December 1907
• Citation: 106 S.W. 145
• Parties: HILL v. STATE.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

106 S.W. 145

HILL v. STATE.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

December 4, 1907.

Appeal from District Court, Hamilton County; N. R. Lindsey, Judge.

W. W. Hill was convicted of murder in the second degree, and he appeals. Reversed and remanded.

Goodson & Goodson, J. C. George, H. E. Chesley, and A. R. Eidson, for appellant. F. J. McCord, Asst. Atty. Gen., J. L. Lewis, Sadler & Arnold, J. H. McMillan, Dist. Atty., and R. Q. Murphree, for the State.

BROOKS, J.

Appellant was convicted of murder in the second degree, and his punishment assessed at 30 years' confinement in the penitentiary.

Appellant in his motion for a new trial objected to the following charge of the court: "Now, if you believe from the evidence that the defendant, prior to the time he killed Charley House (if he did so), had been informed by Clarence Griffin or by Chester Griffin that the said Charley House had used insulting language towards the daughter of the defendant, in substance that the said Charley House had stated that he had had sexual intercourse with the said daughter of the defendant, and if you further believe from the evidence that the defendant believed that the deceased had stated that he had had sexual intercourse with defendant's daughter (if you find either Clarence or Chester Griffin had so informed him), and if you find from all the facts and circumstances in evidence that said information aroused in the mind of defendant sudden passion such as anger, rage, sudden resentment, or terror, rendering his mind incapable of cool reflection, and that the defendant, on first meeting with the deceased, after he, the defendant had been informed (if he had been so informed) that the deceased had made such statements about his, defendant's, daughter, and, acting under the immediate influence of such sudden passion (if any) in Hamilton county, Tex., and on or about the 18th day of May, 1906, with intent to kill, shot with a gun and thereby unlawfully killed the said Charley House as alleged in the indictment, you will find the defendant guilty of manslaughter, and so say in your verdict, and assess his punishment at confinement in the penitentiary for any period of time not less than two nor more than five years, and in this connection you are instructed that it makes no difference whether the said Charley House had in fact ever used the insulting language about the daughter of the defendant, in substance that he had had sexual intercourse with the said daughter of the defendant, provided you believe from the evidence that Clarence or Chester Griffin informed the defendant, prior to the killing of the said Charley House, that he, the said House, had used such insulting language about defendant's daughter, and that the defendant believed from the said statements of the Griffins, or either of them, to him, that the said Charley House had, in fact, used such insulting language about the defendant's said daughter and that the information, in fact, aroused in the mind of the defendant such sudden passion as to render him incapable of cool reflection, and that such state of mind continued up to the time of the killing. You are instructed that the testimony of Joe Collier, `that Chester Griffin told him, in Mr. Griffin's field, that House said to him that when he [House] and the girl came from Dublin around by way of Hico that they acted as man and wife, and that House claimed he had been keeping the girl,' and the testimony of Charlie Collier `that Chester Griffin, at the ball game at Bear creek, told him that House had told him (Chester Griffin) that he had taken the girl from Dublin around by way of Hico and had stayed all night with her, and that he had been keeping her for some time,' and the testimony of old man Britton `that Chester Griffin stated, at the ball game on Bear creek, that House told him that he had taken Hill's girl around from Dublin by way of Hico, and that he had stayed all night with her, and that he had been keeping her a year or two,' was not admitted before you to prove or as tending to prove that House had, in fact, made such statements, and you will not consider said testimony at all for that purpose. Said testimony was admitted before you, and you are permitted, to consider the same in passing upon the credibility of said witness Chester Griffin as a witness in this case, and in passing upon the weight to be given to his testimony and in determining the issue whether the said witness Chester Griffin made the statements to the defendant in regard to House that the defendant claimed he did make." The evidence in substance shows, from defendant's standpoint, that Charley House had been talking about his daughter in a manner that solely reflected upon her chastity. Being armed with information from various witnesses that Clarence and Chester Griffin had told said witnesses that said Griffins had informed them that deceased had been talking about his daughter, he armed himself with a gun, went to the field where the Griffin boys were plowing, and being informed, in substance, that the deceased had told them that appellant's daughter was unchaste, he proceeded to the field where deceased was plowing, and there shot deceased to death. The state's case makes out a cold-blooded murder. The defense's testimony makes out a case of manslaughter. The learned trial court seems to have proceeded upon the theory that appellant could not act upon hearsay testimony, and thereby reduce the homicide to manslaughter. In other words, the trial court seems to have acted on the theory that, before appellant could reduce the homicide to manslaughter on the ground that deceased had made insulting remarks about his daughter, some witness would have to inform appellant that he, the witness, had been told by the deceased that appellant's daughter was unchaste, or that the deceased would have to make a statement to the witness, and the witness communicate said statement to appellant, substantially showing that deceased had made remarks that reflected upon the chastity of his daughter. This is not the law. If the deceased told the Griffin boys that appellant's daughter was unchaste, this, in a technical sense, would be hearsay testimony, even if said Griffin boys should testify to same themselves. The record before us shows that the Griffin boys denied in substance making the statement to appellant that he swore they did make just prior to the difficulty. Now, this being the shape of the...