Hill v. State

Decision Date05 December 1989
Docket NumberNo. S89A0386,S89A0386
Citation386 S.E.2d 133,259 Ga. 655
PartiesHILL v. The STATE.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

Thomas L. Burton, Rochelle L. Cross, John Thomas Chason, Atlanta, for Hill.

Lewis R. Slaton, Dist. Atty., Rebecca A. Keel, Asst. Dist. Atty., Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Richard C. Litwin, Atlanta, for State.

SMITH, Justice.

Appellant Michael Lee Hill was indicted for the murder of Johnny Gilbert. A jury found him guilty, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment. We affirm. 1

Prior to the murder, the appellant agreed to sell some drugs for the victim. The appellant sold some of the drugs and traded the remainder for a handgun. The appellant owed the victim money for the drugs he did not sell. Witnesses testified that on the night of the murder, the appellant and the victim began arguing about the money the appellant owed to the victim for the drugs he did not sell. The appellant stated that he was going to "put his foot down." The victim hit the appellant on the head, and the appellant and the victim began to fight.

While out of view of any witness, the appellant shot the victim twice in the chest. One witness observed the appellant shoot the victim in the back as he tried to run.

The appellant testified that the victim pulled a gun on him and was beating him on the head when he shot the victim in self-defense. No weapon was found at the scene of the crime. Several witnesses testified that they saw the appellant running from the scene with a gun, making comments to the effect that the victim would not bother the appellant anymore and that the appellant hoped that the victim would die.

1. The evidence put forth at trial was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

2. The appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his oral request for a charge on aggravated assault. The record reveals that the court charged the jury on justification and self-defense, including the phrase:

A person is justified in using force which is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm only if he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent death or great bodily injury to himself or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony. (Emphasis supplied.)

The appellant argues that since the forcible felony he was seeking to prevent was an aggravated assault by the victim, then a charge on the elements of aggravated assault was necessary to explain the meaning of justification.

The charge given by the court was comprehensive and fairly apprised the jury of when a homicide is justifiable. The failure to charge the jury on the elements of aggravated assault, especially in the absence of a written request 2 for such a charge, cannot be held to be prejudicial or harmful error. See State v. Stonaker, 236 Ga. 1, 222 S.E.2d 354 (1976).

3. The appellant contends the trial court's charges on murder and voluntary manslaughter were coercive and unduly restricted the options which the jury could consider. In charging the jury that it could not consider the question of voluntary manslaughter unless it first found that appellant was not guilty of murder, the court followed the practice approved by this Court in Alexander v. State, 247 Ga. 780, 279 S.E.2d 691 (1981). See also Harrell v. State, 249 Ga. 48, 288 S.E.2d 192 (1982). Therefore the charge was without error.

4. Finally, the appellant alleges that the trial court erred in refusing to allow him to testify about the victim's specific acts of violence toward third persons in order to justify his reasonable apprehension of danger at the time of the murder. Evidence of a victim's violent character and general reputation for violence may be admitted upon "a prima facie showing that the victim was the aggressor; that the victim assaulted defendant; and that defendant was honestly seeking to defend himself." Cooper v. State, 249 Ga. 59, 287 S.E.2d 212 (1982). However, the victim's violent character may not be established by proof of specific acts of violence, although a defendant may offer evidence that the victim had a reputation for a particular type of violence. Williams v. State, 249 Ga. 6, 287 S.E.2d 31 (1982). Since the appellant testified that the victim was the aggressor, the trial court properly allowed evidence of the victim's violent character and general reputation for violence. The court's refusal to allow the appellant to...

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14 cases
  • Smith v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • November 12, 1996
    ... ... However, "[e]vidence of a victim's violent character and general reputation for violence may be admitted upon 'a prima facie showing that the victim was the aggressor; that the victim assaulted defendant; and that defendant was honestly seeking to defend himself.' [Cit.]" Hill v. State, 259 Ga. 655, 657(4), 386 S.E.2d 133 ... (1989). 2 Here, Greene arguably made a showing that Smith acted as an aggressor against him. Whether or not the evidence made a prima facie showing that by his conduct Greene was honestly seeking to defend himself rather than to act himself as ... ...
  • Chandler v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • July 3, 1991
    ...act would have been relevant to her defense of justification. (a) Under current law this enumeration has no merit, Hill v. State, 259 Ga. 655(4), 386 S.E.2d 133 (1989), and therefore presents no reason to reverse the judgment in this (b) However, after further consideration of this issue we......
  • Holmes v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • February 16, 2001
    ...in the absence of a written request for such a charge, cannot be held to be prejudicial or harmful error. [Cit.]" Hill v. State, 259 Ga. 655, 656(2), 386 S.E.2d 133 (1989). See also White v. State, 175 Ga.App. 154, 156(3), 333 S.E.2d 17 (1985). Compare Wiseman v. State, 249 Ga. 559, 561(5),......
  • Campbell v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • March 17, 1993
    ...the victim against third persons was not admissible. Lolley v. State, 259 Ga. 605, 606(1), 385 S.E.2d 285 (1989); Hill v. State, 259 Ga. 655, 657(4), 386 S.E.2d 133 (1989). 2 There was no 3. The third enumeration alleges error in the court's failure to charge on accident when no written req......
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