Hill v. Texas, New Mexico & Oklahoma Coaches, Inc.
| Decision Date | 20 October 1954 |
| Docket Number | No. A-4532,A-4532 |
| Parties | Damon HILL, Petitioner, v. TEXAS, NEW MEXICO & OKLAHOMA COACHES, Inc., Respondent. |
| Court | Texas Supreme Court |
Nelson & McCleskey, Lubbock, George E. Gilkerson, Sudon, for petitioner.
Klett, Bean & Evans, Trout & Jones, Lubbock, for respondent.
Petitioner filed this suit against respondent for damages alleged to have been sustained when respondent's bus on which petitioner was riding as a passenger overturned. The jury found that the driver or respondent's bus was guilty of negligence and that his negligence proximately caused the overturning of the bus and resulting injuries sustained by petitioner. The trial court entered judgment for petitioner. On appeal by respondent, the Court of Civil Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the cause for new trial. 266 S.W.2d 412.
The Court of Civil Appeals has held the trial court committed reversible error with respect to the definition of negligence and proximate cause given in its charge. We overrule petitioner's point to the effect that respondent failed to state in its objection to the court's charge the grounds of its objection as required by Rule 274, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. We have examined the objections to the trial court's charge and hold them sufficient to present the points of the objection to the definitions of 'negligence' and 'proximate cause'.
The trial court's charge defined 'negligence' as follows:
'You are further instructed that as a carrier of passengers the defendant was under a duty to exercise such a high degree of foresight as to possible dangers and such a high degree of prudence in guarding against them as would be used by very cautious, prudent and competent men under the same or similar circumstances; and you are further instructed that the term 'negligence' as used in these special issues in this charge means a failure, if any, to exercise this high degree of care as herein defined.'
The definition of 'proximate cause' as given in the charge was as follows:
'* * * the term 'proximate cause' as that term is used in the special issues in this charge means that cause which in its natural and continuous sequence produces a result that would not have occurred but for such cause, and which result or some like result ought reasonably to have been anticipated or foreseen by a very competent, cautious and prudent person in the light of the attending circumstances.'
Respondent objected to both definitions on the ground that they placed upon the carrier a greater burden than that required by law. Respondent contends that the standard definition of ordinary care and proximate cause requiring a defendant to use such care as an 'ordinarily prudent' person (or 'reasonably prudent person') would use under the circumstances, no matter how dangerous the operation may be, is adequate and correct, and that an instruction requiring the carrier to use that 'high degree' of care that a 'very prudent' person would use obligates the defendant to do more than what is 'reasonably' prudent under the circumstances.
The definition of negligence, in our opinion, is not subject to the objection urged by respondent. Rule 272, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that the trial court in its charge shall only submit controverted questions of fact to the jury for its determination, and further provides that the court shall instruct the jury as to the law arising on the facts. The law imposes on carriers a very high degree of care for the safety of their passengers. The petitioner plead facts, which, if proved, presented material fact issues to be determined by the jury. In this case, material issues of fact were raised. Special issues were submitted, and the jury by its verdict found the respondent guilty of negligence in several respects, and further found that each act of negligence so found was a proximate cause of the overturning of the bus, and resulting injuries sustained by petitioner. Respondent contends that when the court correctly instructs the jury on 'ordinary care', it is the province of the jury to decide what degree of care is 'reasonably' required by the circumstances. In other words, respondent takes the position that carriers of passengers are not under a duty to use that high degree of care that a very prudent person would use in the light of attending circumstances. With this contention we do not agree. The definition of 'negligence', as quoted above, and given in the court's charge, correctly states the law applicable to the facts in this case. Trinity & B. V. Ry. Co. v. McDonald, Tex.Com.App., 208 S.W. 912; Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co. v. Menefee, Tex.Civ.App., 190 S.W.2d 150, writ refused, w. o. m.; Dallas Railway Co. v. Hallum, Tex.Civ.App., 276 S.W. 460, writ refused; International and Great Northern Railroad Co. v. Halloren, 53 Tex. 46, 53, 37 Am.Rep. 744; Fort Worth & D. C. Ry. Co. v. Kidwell, 112 Tex. 89, 245 S.W. 667; Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co. v. Black, Tex.Sup., 257 S.W.2d 416.
The cases of Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co. v. Menefee and Dallas Railway Co. v. Hallum, supra, support our further conclusion that the trial court did not commit reversible error in defining proximate cause. Proximate cause was defined in these cases in substantially the same language as the definition given in the present case.
The respondent relies on the case of Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co. v. Black, supra (257 S.W.2d 417) recently decided by this court, to support its contention that the definition of 'proximate cause' given in the instant case was reversible error. In that case, the trial court defined 'negligence' as applied to the Railway Company as meaning 'a failure to exercise a high degree of care'. The court defined 'proximate cause' as it has been defined and approved in numerous cases. The respondent in that case objected to the definition because it failed to encompass the high degree of care a carrier of passengers must exercise in reasonably foreseeing the result, and requested the court to include in its definition of 'proximate cause' the words: "by a person in the exercise...
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