Hill v. Westbrook's Estate

• Decision Date: 17 January 1950
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: HILL v. WESTBROOK'S ESTATE et al. Civ. 17113.

Page 727

213 P.2d 727

95 Cal.App.2d 599

HILL v. WESTBROOK'S ESTATE et al.

Civ. 17113.

District Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 3, California.

Jan. 17, 1950.

Hugh E. Macbeth and Hugh E. Macbeth, Jr., Los Angeles, for appellants.

Emmett E. Patten and Glen A. Duke, Monrovia, for respondent.

VALLEE, Justice.

Appeal by Edward J. Westbrook, administrator of the estate of Charles Westbrook, deceased, from a judgment for plaintiff, and from an order denying his motion for a new trial. Since the latter order is nonappealable, the appeal therefrom is dismissed.

Plaintiff's complaint is founded upon a claim against the estate of Charles Westbrook, deceased, duly presented to, and rejected by, the administrator. A copy of the claim is made a part of the complaint. It reads as follows: "For services rendered decedent from about August 15, 1930, to date of death, by Minnie Westbrook, consisting of keeping house for him during all of said time, living with him as man and wife during all of said time, and during said time bearing decedent two children, namely *** performing the usual duties of a housewife during all of said time, and earning a salary from time to time during said period, all of which was turned over to said decedent *** $10,000." The complaint alleged the death of decedent on July 31, 1946, the appointment of the administrator, the filing and rejection of the claim, the performance at decedent's request of the services set forth in the claim, services performed in the management of a rooming house, and the reasonable value thereof.

The answer denied generally all the allegations of the complaint. It also set up the statute of limitations, that plaintiff had been paid for all services rendered, and that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against defendants.

Plaintiff first went to work for decedent in July or August, 1930. At that time decedent owned and operated a rooming house, consisting of fifteen rooms, and a hamburger stand next door. Plaintiff's duties at that time consisted of cleaning the rooms, mopping floors, doing the laundry, making beds, handing out linen, cooking, and assisting decedent in the hamburger stand. The record does not disclose just when the meretricious relations between the parties commenced, but the relationship is conceded. As a result of the relationship two children were born. Thereafter plaintiff continued with the services she had been accustomed to performing. When the hamburger stand was subsequently converted into a liquor store she also assisted decedent in the store and waited on customers. There was testimony that the value of the services performed in the rooming house was $3 to $4 a day. In 1944, 1945 and 1946 plaintiff worked in a shirt factory in Monrovia, and there is testimony from which it may reasonably be inferred that she used her earnings for the benefit of decedent and made payments upon the home he had purchased in Monrovia. The evidence does not show the amount of her earnings in 1944. Her earnings in 1945 were $949.99, and in 1946 were $787.27.

The court found that plaintiff performed services for decedent between August 15, 1930, and July 31, 1946; that during decedent's lifetime he promised to reimburse plaintiff for her services at the time of his death and to make provision for her in his will; that he failed to do so; and that the reasonable value of the services was $3,000. The services which the court found were performed were those mentioned in the claim and in the complaint, to-wit, "keeping house for him during all of said time, cooking his meals from day to day, living with him as man and wife during all of said time and bearing the said Charles Westbrook two children, namely *** managing and cooperating with the said Charles Westbrook in the management of a rooming house business and earned [earning] a salary from time to time during said period, all of which was turned over to the said Charles Westbrook or expended by the plaintiff in behalf of the said Charles Westbrook." (Italics added.) Judgment was rendered accordingly, from which this appeal was taken.

When a man and woman knowingly live together in a meretricious relationship--in the absence of an express agreement, oral or written, that she be compensated for services performed--there is no implied obligation on the part of the man to compensate the woman for household services rendered by her. Lazzarevich v. Lazzarevich, 88 Cal.App.2d 708, 719, 200 P.2d 49 and cases cited therein; 35 Am.Jur. 219, sec. 55; 58 Am.Jur. 534, sec. 29; 71 C.J. 80, sec. 40; Anno. 29 L.R.A.,N.S., 787; L.R.A.1917B 683; Ann.Cas.1916B 114; cf. Gjurich v. Fieg, 164 Cal. 429, 129 P. 464, Ann.Cas.1916B, 111. One reason for the rule is the illegality of the relationship where it enters into the alleged agreement. 71 C.J. 80, sec. 40. Another reason is the presumption of gratuity arising from the family relationship of the parties, which family relationship repels the implication of a promise to pay that would otherwise arise from the performance and acceptance of valuable services. 71 C.J. 80, sec. 40; cf. Gjurich v. Fieg, 164 Cal. 429, 129 P. 464, Ann.Cas.1916B, 111.

Although the parties live together in illicit relationship during the time the services are performed, an express contract to compensate for services performed as a housekeeper has been held valid and enforceable unless made in contemplation of such illicit relationship. Emmerson v. Botkin, 26 Okl. 218, 109 P. 531, 29 L.R.A.,N.S., 786, 138 Am.St.Rep. 953; Lytle v. Newell, 68 S.W. 118, 24 Ky.Law Rep. 188; Rhodes v. Stone, 63 Hun. 624, 17 N.Y.S. 561. Whether the contract was dependent upon the illicit relationship is a question of fact. Trutalli v. Meraviglia, 215 Cal. 698, 12 P.2d 430; Lytle v. Newell, 68 S.W. 118, 120, 24 Ky.Law Rep. 188.

When a man and woman live together "under an agreement to pool their earnings and share equally in their joint accumulations, equity will protect the interests of each in...