Hill v. Wilson, Docket No. 156953

• Decision Date: 20 March 1995
• Docket Number: Docket No. 156953
• Citation: 209 Mich.App. 356,531 N.W.2d 744
• Parties: Frederick James HILL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Rose Catherine WILSON, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 744

531 N.W.2d 744

209 Mich.App. 356

Frederick James HILL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Rose Catherine WILSON, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 156953.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Dec. 20, 1994, at Lansing.

Decided March 20, 1995, at 9:15 a.m.

Released for Publication May 24, 1995.

Fowler, Tuttle, Clark & Coleman by David M. Clark, Lansing, for plaintiff.

Denfield, Timmer, Jamo & O'Leary by James S. O'Leary, Lansing, for defendant.

Before FITZGERALD, P.J., and GRIBBS and TALBOT, ^* JJ.

GRIBBS, Judge.

Plaintiff appeals as of right from the circuit court order granting defendant's motion for summary disposition. MCR 2.116(C)(10). We affirm.

Plaintiff was injured when his motorcycle struck the rear of defendant's car. The collision occurred on a two lane highway shortly after 4:30 p.m. on a work day. Traffic was heavy. Defendant was driving her car well below the speed limit, and plaintiff was directly behind defendant on his motorcycle. Although plaintiff did not see them, a family of ducks apparently crossed the road both in front of defendant's car and in front of the car ahead of defendant's. The road on which they were driving runs along a lake, and defendant testified that duck-crossings are not uncommon. Plaintiff pulled to the left to pass defendant's car, but was unable to complete the pass because of oncoming traffic. When plaintiff reentered the lane, defendant's car slowed down or stopped. Defendant testified that the car ahead of her slowed down to avoid the ducks ahead of it and that she also slowed down both to avoid the car and to avoid ducks in front of her. Plaintiff testified by deposition that he normally leaves about four or five "bike lengths" between his motorcycle and the car ahead. Plaintiff estimated that he was approximately three bike lengths behind defendant's car when defendant's brake lights lit up. Plaintiff testified that although he believed he was a safe distance behind defendant, he was unable to stop because defendant braked too abruptly. Plaintiff collided with the left rear bumper of defendant's car. There was no evidence of shrieking brakes or skid marks, and defendant's car did not swerve. There was other traffic behind plaintiff's motorcycle, but no other collisions occurred. In short, a whole line of vehicles stopped abruptly, but only plaintiff was unable to do so safely.

The trial court found that plaintiff had a duty to travel at a reasonable speed and to maintain a safe distance behind defendant's car. The trial court noted that stopping for obstructions in the road ahead is a "proper activity" for a motorist and should be anticipated by other drivers. The trial court found that defendant did not owe to plaintiff a statutory duty of due care in stopping, because she was "confronted with an emergency in the road." We disagree that the sudden emergency doctrine applies in this case. Far from being a sudden emergency, we find the phenomenon of motorists being forced to make unanticipated stops is a common occurrence during rush hour. However, despite our disagreement with some of the trial court's reasons, we agree with its result.

The trial court succinctly responded to plaintiff's claim that defendant should have hit the ducks, if necessary, and avoided the accident, by saying: "This is ridiculous. This case is bad. Suing people because they stop for an animal on the roadway. This case is dismissed."

As the trial court implicitly recognized, there is ample statutory guidance on this matter. Plaintiff relies on M.C.L. § 257.648(1); M.S.A. § 9.2348(1), which provides that a motorist in defendant's position is required, "before stopping or turning from a direct line," to "first see that the stopping or turning can be made in safety." However, a person driving behind a vehicle, such as plaintiff was in this case, has a duty to travel at a speed and distance behind the other motorist that will allow them to stop within a clear distance ahead. M.C.L. § 257.627(1); M.S.A. § 9.2327(1).

Plaintiff had a statutory duty not to attempt to pass defendant's vehicle unless "the left side ... [was] clearly visible and ... free of oncoming traffic for a sufficient distance ahead to permit the overtaking and passing to be completely made without interfering with the safe operation" of other vehicles. M.C.L. § 257.638; M.S.A. § 9.2338.

Plaintiff also had a duty not to follow defendant's car "more closely than is reasonable and prudent." M.C.L. § 257.643(1); M.S.A. § 9.2343(1). Indeed, any motorist who collides with the rear end of another vehicle traveling in the same direction is presumed negligent, although that presumption is rebuttable. M.C.L. § 257.402; M.S.A. § 9.2102. Lucas v. Carson, 38 Mich.App. 552, 557, 196 N.W.2d 819 (1972).

The parties cite no Michigan case law applying comparative negligence principles to analogous circumstances, and we find none. However, we find it instructive to visit recent decisions of other states that also apply comparative negligence.

Florida law has a statutory presumption of negligence where a driver collides with the vehicle ahead. Indeed, in Florida, evidence that the driver of the leading vehicle made a sudden and unexpected stop is sufficient to rebut the presumption of negligence. Even so, the abrupt stop by the driver of the leading vehicle in Kao v. Lauredo, 617 So.2d 775 (Fla.App.1993), was insufficient to create a factual issue and overcome the presumption of negligence...