Hill v. Worldmark Corporation/Mid America Extrusions Corp., 93A02-9211-EX-571

• Decision Date: 26 April 1994
• Docket Number: No. 93A02-9211-EX-571,93A02-9211-EX-571
• Citation: 632 N.E.2d 1173
• Parties: James J. HILL, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. WORLDMARK CORPORATION/MID AMERICA EXTRUSIONS CORPORATION, Appellee-Defendant.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 1173

632 N.E.2d 1173

James J. HILL, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. WORLDMARK CORPORATION/MID AMERICA EXTRUSIONS CORPORATION Appellee-Defendant.

No. 93A02-9211-EX-571.

Court of Appeals of Indiana Fifth District.

April 26, 1994.

Morris L. Klapper, Klapper Isaac & Parish, Indianapolis, for appellant.

Robert J. Wicker, Greenwood, for appellee.

RUCKER, Judge.

James J. Hill appeals the decision of the Worker's Compensation Board denying his claim for total permanent disability benefits.

We reverse.

This is the second time this case has come before us. On the first occasion Hill argued that the Board's conclusion he was not disabled was based on evidence devoid of probative value or so proportionately inadequate the conclusion could not be supported on any rational basis. Determining the Findings of Fact gave no indication of what evidence the Board relied upon in reaching its conclusion, we did not reach the merits of Hill's claim. ¹ In an unpublished memorandum opinion we remanded the case with instructions to the Board to make specific findings of fact regarding Hill's ability to obtain reasonable types of employment in light of his back injury. Hill v. Worldmark Corporation (1993), Ind.App., 615 N.E.2d 917. On remand the Board issued Findings as ordered. However, they are insufficient to support the denial of Hill's claim for total permanent disability benefits and therefore the judgment of the Board must be reversed.

The record reveals that Hill worked for thirteen years as a packer for the Worldmark Corporation. His job involved lifting bundles of aluminum weighing approximately 100 to 140 pounds and lifting I-beams weighing between 30 and 100 pounds. The job also required him to stand eight to ten hours every work day. Hill is functionally illiterate, does not have a driver's license, and is totally dependant on others to help him with documentation. Prior to his job at Worldmark, Hill's other jobs also involved lifting and carrying.

On January 8, 1991, Hill severely injured his back during the course of his employment. After receiving medical attention, Hill attempted to return to work the following day and was given a light duty job of sweeping. Due to the pain in his back, Hill could not perform the work. He has not worked since January 9, 1991.

In proceedings not at issue in this appeal, Hill obtained reimbursement for medical expenses incurred as a result of his injury along with temporary total disability benefits as provided under Ind.Code § 22-3-3-7. On August 18, 1991, Dr. John L. Beghin rendered an opinion indicating that Hill had reached maximum recovery and had a permanent partial impairment of 3% as a result of his injury. Based on Dr. Beghin's opinion, Worldmark terminated all worker's compensation benefits to Hill as of August 18, 1991. Hill continued to seek medical treatment and did not return to work.

On December 23, 1991, Hill filed an Application for Adjustment of Claim with the Indiana Worker's Compensation Board claiming that he was permanently totally disabled, requesting Worldmark to reimburse him for medical expenses incurred after August 18, 1991, and requesting total disability compensation benefits under Ind.Code § 22-3-3-10(b)(3). Evidence was presented to a single member hearing officer who denied Hill's claim. The hearing officer entered findings in support of its decision. Hill appealed to the Full Board which adopted the hearing officer's findings and conclusions. On appeal to this court we remanded the cause with instructions to the Board to make specific findings of fact regarding Hill's ability to obtain reasonable types of employment in light of his back injury. On remand the Board entered the following:

Pursuant to the decision of the Court of Appeals of Indiana, it is found that Dr. Beghin examined Petitioner on August 15, 1991, and "allowed Mr. Hill to resume normal activities without restriction."

It is further found that Mr. Hill testified that he has not been able to work after January 9, 1991, and at no time thereafter.

It is further found that no vocational experts were called to testify by the parties in this case.

It is further found that this matter has been reversed and remanded with instructions to make specific findings of fact regarding Mr. Hill's ability to obtain reasonable types of employment in light of his back injury.

It is further found that Dr. Beghin was the treating physician when he examined [Hill] on August 15, 1991, and "allowed Mr. Hill to resume normal activities without restriction."

It is further found that subsequent to the rendering of the opinion by Dr. Beghin, [Hill] disagreed with Dr. Beghin as to his ability to work and has been examined and tested at several medical facilities; that none of those tests or examinations, with one exception, vary greatly with the opinion of Dr. Beghin.

It is further found that the one exception is the report of Dr. Hugh Williams, an orthopedic surgeon who found that [Hill] will never be able to work again; that determination is based upon a misunderstanding of the results of a diskogram performed by Dr. Peters.

It is further found that the opinion of Dr. Williams is not considered for this reason.

It is further found that no vocational expert testified in this matter for either party.

It is further found that Dr. Driehorst testified at the hearing that [Hill's] range of motion tests were inconsistent such that he did not believe that [Hill] was exhibiting maximum effort; that in his deposition he testified that [Hill] was a symptom magnifier.

It is further found that [Hill] was able to return to reasonable types of employment on August 18, 1991.

It is further found that Dr. Hugh Williams, an orthopedic surgeon makes a finding that [Hill] will never be able to work again; that that determination is based on a misunderstanding of [Hill's] diskogram at the hands of Dr. Peters; due to that lack of understanding, Dr. William[s] opinion is not given weight.

It is further found that no other medical doctor comes to a determination of ability to work that is substantially different than that.

Dated this 15th day of December, 1993.

Supplemental Record at 13-14.

We first observe that several of the findings on remand are merely restatements of the original findings which this court has already determined to be inadequate. Also, a number of the findings are duplicative of each other and provide little insight into the Board's reasoning. Further, a "finding" that we remanded the cause with instructions provides no meaningful information for review. Indeed "Finding" No. 4 is nothing more than a comment on the procedural posture of this case. It is the duty of the Board, as trier of fact in disability cases, to make findings which reveal its analysis of the evidence and which are specific enough to permit intelligent review of the Board's decision. K-mart Corp. v. Morrison (1993), Ind.App., 609 N.E.2d 17, trans. denied. The need for specific findings of fact is not predicated on esoteric legal technicalities or the rote imposition of statutory provisions. Rather, as our supreme court observed in Perez v. United States Steel Corp. (1981), Ind., 426 N.E.2d 29 The reasons [for requiring administrative findings] have to do with facilitating judicial review, avoiding judicial usurpation of administrative functions, assuring more careful administrative consideration, helping parties plan their cases for rehearings and judicial review, and keeping agencies within their jurisdiction.

Id. at 31 quoting Davis, 2 Administrative Law Treatise § 16.05 p. 444 (1958). As we discuss below, only two of the thirteen findings on remand are specific enough to permit intelligent review of the Board's decision.

Because he is a claimant, Hill bears the burden of proving his entitlement to recovery for a permanent total disability. He therefore appeals from a negative judgment. In our review of that judgment we will neither reweigh evidence nor judge witnesses' credibility. Rather, we examine the record to determine whether there is any substantial evidence and reasonable inferences which can be drawn therefrom to support the Board's findings and conclusion. Only if the evidence is of a character that reasonable men would be compelled to reach a conclusion contrary to the decision of the Board will it be overturned. Glenn v. Board of Comm'rs (1990), Ind.App., 552 N.E.2d 485.

In the case before us the Findings clearly establish that Hill suffered an impairment. However, neither the Findings nor the evidence of record support the Board's conclusion that...