Hill v. Wright County Board of Adjustment, No. A05-346 (MN 11/29/2005)
| Decision Date | 29 November 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. A05-346.,A05-346. |
| Parties | Steve Hill, et al., Appellants, v. Wright County Board of Adjustment, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Appeal from the District Court, Wright County, File No. C5-03-3588.
Bruce Grostephan, Peterson, Engberg & Peterson, (for appellants)
Jay Squires, Ratwik, Roszak & Maloney, (for respondents)
Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Hudson, Judge; and Wright, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
On appeal from summary judgment dismissing appellants' challenge to respondents' denial of appellants' zoning application to sell a lot independently from any other lot, appellants argue that (1) respondents failed to comply with Minn. Stat. § 15.99 (2004); (2) the denial of their application was unreasonable and arbitrary; (3) the denial constitutes a "taking" of their land; and (4) they were denied equal protection of the law. We affirm.
On July 10, 2003, appellants Steve Hill and French Lake Land, LLC submitted a zoning application to respondents Wright County Board of Adjustment to "transfer or sell [two lots composing Tract B on the attached survey] independently from any other lot." Tract B totals 16,326 square feet and has shoreline access on Lake Sylvia. In 1978, respondents had declared Tract B unbuildable for any family dwellings and placed a deed restriction on the property proscribing a sewer system and permanent residential structures.
On July 14, 2003, appellants were notified that their application was incomplete because a survey was not attached and no reasons were given for the request. Appellants submitted a survey two days later. On August 8, 2003, respondents considered appellants' request and mailed notice to appellants indicating:
[Y]our item heard on August 8, 2003 was continued to September 12, 2003 . . . . The reason for the continuance is: County Attorney to review application and advise the Board. Your continued hearing will extend the final decision on your request beyond 60 days from your fully completed application. By law, this is your notice under Minn. Stat. [§]15.99[,] [s]ubd. 3(f) that additional time is needed by the Board of Adjustment to make a decision, up to an additional 60 days.
On September 12, 2003, respondents again considered appellants' request. It was noted that Tract B was contiguous with Tract A, a 3.4-acre parcel also owned by appellants. Under Wright County Zoning Ordinance (WCZO) § 404 (2003), lots that are less than 20,000 square feet are not saleable if the owner has contiguous lots. Appellants' attorney suggested that Tracts A and B were not contiguous and that appellants intended to sell Tract B with Tract C, another 20-acre parcel owned by appellants. Respondents unanimously determined that Tract B was unbuildable and to keep it in joint ownership with Tract A. The county attorney was directed to prepare findings consistent with the board's determination for adoption at an October 10 hearing.
Thereafter, respondents sent notice to appellants advising: Respondents met on October 10 and denied appellants' request. The same day, appellants were provided written findings and reasons for the denial, as well as the September 12 meeting minutes. Appellants brought suit in district court challenging the denial. After a hearing, the district court granted respondents' motion for summary judgment and this appeal follows.
On appeal from summary judgment, this court determines whether any genuine issues of material fact exist and whether the district court erred as a matter of law. State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 4 (Minn. 1990). This court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was granted. Fabio v. Bellamo, 504 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. 1993). Summary judgment is appropriate when a party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to the party's case, Bersch v. Rgnonti & Assocs., Inc., 584 N.W.2d 783, 786 (Minn. App. 1998), review denied (Minn. Dec. 15, 1998), or "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party." DLH, Inc. v. Russ, 566 N.W.2d 60, 69 (Minn. 1997) (alteration in original) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986)).
Respondents complied with Minn. Stat. § 15.99 (2004)
Appellants argue that the district court erroneously determined that respondents complied with Minn. Stat. § 15.99 (2004). This court reviews de novo the district court's interpretation of the law, including questions of statutory interpretation. Sorenson v. St. Paul Ramsey Med. Ctr., 457 N.W.2d 188, 190 (Minn. 1990).
Appellants argue that their application should be approved because respondents failed to deny their request within the 60-day time limit. Minn. Stat. § 15.99, subd. 2(a). The agency's 60-day time limit begins upon the agency's receipt of a written request containing all required information. Minn. Stat. § 15.99, subd. 3(a). However, the agency may extend the 60-day time limit Minn. Stat. § 15.99, subd. 3(f).
Respondents were required to act within 60 days of appellants' July 10, 2003 application, but respondents' August 8 written notice provided that they would require up to an additional 60 days. Appellants argue that respondents were then required to act within 60 days of the August 8 notice. However, the notice did not state that respondents would approve or deny the application within 60 days from the date of the notice, and appellants' interpretation of Minn. Stat. § 15.99, subd. 3(f) would interrupt and cut short respondents' initial 60-day period. Further, Minnesota courts have interpreted the time in which to render a decision to no longer than 120 days.
In Moreno v. City of Minneapolis, 676 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. App. 2004), this court referred to the time limit in Minn. Stat. § 15.99 by stating: "The time limit in subdivision 2 may be extended up to a total of 120 days if, before the end of the initial 60-day period, the city provides written notice of the extension to the applicant." Cf. Manco of Fairmont, Inc. v. Town Bd. of Rock Dell Twp., 583 N.W.2d 293, 296 (Minn. App. 1998) (), review denied (Minn. Oct. 20, 1998). Respondents had 120 days from either July 10, 2003, or July 16, 2003, if appellants' application was not complete until respondents received the survey. Respondents timely denied appellants' application on October 10, 2003.
Appellants argue that respondents can grant an extension based only on extenuating circumstances. However, the Minnesota Supreme Court has held that Minn. Stat. § 15.99, subd. 3(f) does not limit an extension for extenuating circumstances, "it merely requires that the reasons be stated." Am. Tower, L.P. v. City of Grant, 636 N.W.2d 309, 314 (Minn. 2001). The August 8 notice provided that respondents required an extension for the county attorney to review the application and advise the board. Respondents did not need extenuating circumstances and their stated reason satisfies the statutory requirement.
Appellants argue that respondents violated Minn. Stat. § 15.99, subd. 2(a) by failing to state in writing the reasons for the denial "at the time that it denie[d] the request." In Demolition Landfill Servs., LLC v. City of Duluth, 609 N.W.2d 278, 279 (Minn. App. 2000), review denied (Minn. July 25, 2000), the city council voted and rejected a motion for a special-use permit for a landfill within the statutory time limit; however, the council's written denial occurred outside of the 120-day time limit. This court concluded that under Minn. Stat. § 15.99, simultaneous written reasons for a denial are mandatory. Demolition Landfill, 609 N.W.2d at 282. This court later addressed the issue of "whether an absence of simultaneous written reasons for a timely denial can be cured before the deadline by a subsequent denial with simultaneous written findings." Concept Props., LLP v. City of Minnetrista, 694 N.W.2d 804, 826-27 (Minn. App. 2005), review denied (Minn. July 19, 2005). In Concept Properties, the city council timely denied an application, but failed to make written findings. Id. at 827. Two weeks later, the council met again, denied the application and set forth simultaneous written reasons for the denial within the time limit. Id. Unlike Demolition Landfill, the council denied the application a second time and issued simultaneous written findings before the response deadline. Id.
This case is similar to Concept Properties. On September 12, 2003, respondents denied appellants' application by finding Tract B unbuildable and in joint ownership, but did not make written findings. On October 10, 2003, respondents met, denied appellants' request and provided simultaneous written reasons for the denial before the response deadline. Thus, respondents complied with ...
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