Hillgartner v. Port Auth. of Allegheny Cty.

• Decision Date: 12 September 2007
• Docket Number: No. 433 C.D. 2006.,433 C.D. 2006.
• Citation: 936 A.2d 131
• Parties: Danielle Stangl HILLGARTNER and Yvette Koerner Blickenderfer, Appellants v. PORT AUTHORITY OF ALLEGHENY COUNTY; Jason Fincke, Chief of Staff, in his individual capacity; Tawnya Moore-Magee, Assistant General Manager of Human Resources, in her individual capacity; Inez Colon, Director of Employment, in her individual capacity and William McArdle, Chief of Transit Police and Security Department, in his individual capacity.
• Court: Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court

936 A.2d 131

Danielle Stangl HILLGARTNER and Yvette Koerner Blickenderfer, Appellants v. PORT AUTHORITY OF ALLEGHENY COUNTY; Jason Fincke, Chief of Staff, in his individual capacity; Tawnya Moore-Magee, Assistant General Manager of Human Resources, in her individual capacity; Inez Colon, Director of Employment, in her individual capacity and William McArdle, Chief of Transit Police and Security Department, in his individual capacity.

No. 433 C.D. 2006.

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued May 8, 2007.

Decided September 12, 2007.

Richard S. Matesic, Pittsburgh, for appellants.

Christopher J. Hess, Pittsburgh, for appellee, Port Authority of Allegheny County.

BEFORE: LEADBETTER, President Judge, and SMITH-RIBNER and SIMPSON, JJ.

OPINION BY Judge SIMPSON.¹

This appeal involves dismissal of a state action alleging gender discrimination in favor of a prior pending federal action by the same plaintiffs also alleging gender discrimination. We examine whether the doctrine of lis pendens applies here.

In July 2003, Danielle Stangl Hillgartner and Yvette Koerner Blickenderfer (collectively, Plaintiffs) filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania seeking damages for alleged gender discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment (federal complaint). The federal complaint also alleged retaliation and a violation of the Equal Pay Act.² During the next two years, the federal case proceeded through discovery to the threshold of trial.

Notwithstanding, in May 2005 the same Plaintiffs filed a second complaint in Allegheny County Common Pleas Court (state trial court) seeking damages for the same constitutional violations (state complaint). Plaintiffs also asserted violations of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA)³ and Article 1, § 28 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.⁴

On Defendants'⁵ preliminary objections, the state trial court dismissed Plaintiffs' state complaint under the doctrine of lis pendens. On appeal, Plaintiffs assert error, claiming the state complaint involves issues not presented in the federal complaint. Plaintiffs further claim the state trial court erred by dismissing their complaint as opposed to staying the state court proceedings. After careful examination of Plaintiffs' arguments, we affirm.

I.

The following facts are not disputed. Since 2000, Plaintiffs worked as telecommunications specialists for Port Authority's Transit Police and Security Department (Police Department). The Police Department also employs transit police officers. In 2001-02, 2003, and 2004, Plaintiffs applied for but were denied promotions to open transit police officer positions.

In January 2002, Plaintiff Hillgartner filed complaints with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (PHRC) and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). She alleged violations of the PHRA and federal statutes resulting from Port Authority's failure to promote her to the position of transit police officer. Plaintiff Blickenderfer filed similar complaints in March 2002.

In July 2003, Plaintiffs filed a federal complaint naming Port Authority and Police Chief as defendants. Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 35a-43a. The federal complaint briefly referenced the status of transit police officers and the qualifications for appointment to the position. In addition, Plaintiffs averred the Police Chief, as final policy maker for Police Department personnel, engaged in discriminatory practices in 2002 by hiring only males for open transit police officer positions and by paying a male dispatcher higher wages for the same work as Plaintiffs performed. Plaintiffs alleged they possessed superior qualifications to the males that were hired, and that they have been denied other promotional opportunities.

Significantly, Plaintiffs' federal complaint alleged a violation of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs also averred a violation of the First Amendment based on defendants' refusal to promote Plaintiffs in retaliation for their complaints of gender discrimination.⁶ Finally, Plaintiffs asserted a violation of the Equal Pay Act. In their prayer for relief, Plaintiffs sought relief in the nature of an injunction enjoining Port Authority from engaging in gender discrimination, compensatory damages, punitive damages and counsel fees.

Subsequently, the PHRC issued Plaintiffs right to sue letters in February 2003. R.R. at 24a-25a. The EEOC then issued dismissal notices in September 2003. R.R. at 88a-89a.

After extensive discovery in the federal action which included subsequent hiring rounds in 2003 and 2004, the federal action was set for trial on May 11, 2005. Despite the impending trial, however, Plaintiffs sought leave to amend their federal complaint in February, 2005. In particular, they sought to include causes of action for violations of the PHRA and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17. Plaintiffs did not, however, seek to amend their federal complaint to include specific averments of gender discrimination during the 2003 or 2004 hiring rounds. Also, Plaintiffs did not seek to add Moore-Magee and Colon as defendants.

Based on the passage of time, the federal court denied Plaintiffs' leave to amend request a month before the scheduled trial date. Specifically, the federal court concluded the statute of limitations barred Plaintiffs' Title VII claim. As to Plaintiffs' claims under the PHRA, the federal court found no justifiable reason for Plaintiffs' 18-month delay in seeking amendment of the federal complaint after the EEOC issued its dismissal notices. R.R. at 100a-103a.

On May 9, 2005, two days before the scheduled trial, Port Authority and Police Chief filed a second summary judgment motion asserting immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.⁷ The federal court denied the motion, and Port Authority and Police Chief appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The Circuit Court affirmed and, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in late 2006. Stangl v. Port Auth. of Allegheny County, 181 Fed. Appx. 231 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 664, 166 L.Ed.2d 513 (2006). Presumably, the federal case is now ready for trial.

As a result of Defendants' belated immunity defense, Plaintiffs filed the instant state complaint in May 2005. In that complaint they reasserted their claims of gender discrimination against Port Authority and Police Chief during the 2002 hiring round. Consistent with state fact pleading requirements, Plaintiffs also detailed similar discriminatory conduct in 2003 and 2004 in violation of the PHRA. The remaining causes of action in the state complaint include an alleged violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, actionable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,⁸ against Defendants. R.R. at 15a-19a (Counts II-IV). As in the federal action, Plaintiffs aver Defendants retaliated against them in violation of the First Amendment. R.R. at 19a-21a (Count V). Finally, Plaintiffs allege Defendants violated Article 1, § 28 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. R.R. at 21a (Count VI). Like the federal complaint, Plaintiffs' state complaint seeks compensatory and punitive damages for discrimination under various legal theories. R.R. at 22a.

Defendants filed preliminary objections. The relevant objections for purposes of this appeal challenge Plaintiffs' complaint on grounds of a prior pending action, failure to state a cause of action under the Pennsylvania Constitution, and Plaintiff Hillgartner's failure to state a cause of action against Moore-Magee and Colon for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. R.R. at 26a-33a.

In support of their objection based on a prior pending action, Defendants maintain Plaintiffs' causes of action in the state complaint are based on a common factual background and involve identical legal theories presented in the federal action, namely the alleged failure to hire Plaintiffs in 2002, 2003, and 2004, and thus, must be brought in a single action pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. No. 1020(d),⁹ which generally prohibits splitting causes of action. R.R. at 29a-30a. Defendants further assert Plaintiffs' claims are precluded by res judicata and collateral estoppel. Id. Defendants also object to Plaintiffs' Pennsylvania constitutional claim on the ground there is no private cause of action for an alleged violation of Article 1, § 28. In their final challenge, Defendants argue Plaintiff Hillgartner failed to allege any adverse actions by Moore-Magee and Colon that would support a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 violation.

At oral argument on the preliminary objections, Plaintiffs' counsel acknowledged the state complaint is a precautionary measure to preserve Plaintiffs' viable state court actions in response to Defendants' belated immunity defense in the federal action. R.R. at 210a; 218a. With this in mind, the state trial court granted Defendants' preliminary objections "based on the pending federal action and the untimely PHRA claims." Original Record (O.R.) at Item 12.

On appeal to this Court, Plaintiffs assign error in the state trial court's dismissal for lis pendens. More specifically, they assert the state action involves claims not at issue in the federal action; the state trial court failed to recognize that the alleged 2003 and 2004 discriminatory acts are separate and distinct transactions not raised in the federal complaint; and the state trial court should have stayed, rather than dismissed, the state action.

II.

Our Supreme Court first recognized the doctrine of lis pendens in Hessenbruch v. Markle, 194 Pa. 581, 593, 45 A. 669, 671 (1900) (quoting Harrisburg v. Harrisburg City Passenger Ry. Co., 1 Pa. D. 192 (C.P. Dauphin 1892)) and enunciated a three-prong test for its application:

A plea of former suit pending must allege that the case is the same, the parties the same, and the rights asserted and the relief prayed for the same; and, whether the truth of the plea can be ascertained by...