Hillhouse v. Jennings

• Decision Date: 18 April 1901
• Citation: 38 S.E. 599,60 S.C. 373
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: HILLHOUSE . v. JENNINGS.

38 S.E. 599

60 S.C. 373

HILLHOUSE .

v.JENNINGS.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

April 18, 1901.

statute of frauds—agreement not to BE performed within one year—contract for services—part performance.

1. A parol contract for one year's services, to begin on a future date after the making of the contract, is within the statute of frauds, and is not actionable as between the parties.

2. The defense that the contract sued on is within the statute of frauds may be made by a motion to exclude plaintiff's testimony, though the bar of the statute is not pleaded.

3. A party who elects to sue on a parol contract for services, which is within the statute of frauds, cannot recover for a balance due for services ptrformed before his discharge. Gary, A. J., dissenting.

4. Damages cannot be recovered for breach of a parol contract which is within the statute of frauds.

Appeal from common pleas circuit court of Greenville county; O. W. Buchanan, Judge. Action by E. Y. Hillhouae against L. J. Jennings. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Carey, McCullough & Martin, for appellant.

Haynesworth, Parker & Patterson, and Shuman & Mooney, for respondent

POPE, J. The plaintiff's complaint contained two causes of action, based upon a verbal contract between the plaintiff and defendant for the former to serve the latter for one year from the 21st day of November, 1898. The plaintiff's duties under such contract were to manage the defendant's store at Riverview, in Greenville county, S. C, and to attend to certain minor matters of business connected with defendant's farming interests, near by. The salary to be paid the plaintiff was $25 a month for the term of one year, payable monthly. The plaintiff alleged in his complaint that he rendered the services contracted for until the 19th June, 1899, when he was discharged by the defendant, and that when defendant discharged the plaintiff, on 19th June, 1899, he owed the plaintiff the sum of $8.50 for his services under said contract, which the defendant refused to pay. The complaint as to the second cause of action showed the foregoing facts by its allegations, and, besides, alleged that defendant, without just cause, and against the solemn protest' of the plaintiff, discharged the plaintiff from his further services under such contract on the 19th June, 1899; that the breach by the defendant of his contract with the plaintiff caused the loss of his salary of $25 per month from 19th June, 1898, to 21st November, 1899, to wit, the sum of $126.66. He prayed judgment for $135.16.

In defendant's answer: "For a defense to the first cause of action: (1) He denies each and every allegation of the complaint relative to the first cause of action, except such as are hereinafter admitted. (2) He alleges that he was engaged in the mercantile business at Riverview, in county of Greenville, state aforesaid, and carried there a considerable stock of goods, and had a large custom or trade; that the defendant resided in the city of Greenville, but paid occasional visits to said store. (3) He admits that in November, 1898, he employed the plaintiff, and he alleges that under the terms of employment the plaintiff was to have personal charge of the said business, and personally conduct and manage the same, under the orders and directions of the defendant, and that he was to sell the goods in said store and wait on defendant's customers in a careful and business-like manner, and keep proper books of account, and personally to transact all of the business incident thereto, and he was also to feed and attend to defendant's live stock in said place. The defendant denies that the term of employment was for one year, and alleges that it was for no definite period, but during the will of both parties; that for said services the defendant agreed to pay to the plaintiff twenty-five dollars per month, together with the use of a certain dwelling house, and firewood for domestic purposes. (4) The defendant admits that he did discharge the plaintiff in the month of June, and he alleges that he did this for the following reasons, to wit: The plaintiff did not attend to the said business in a manner satisfactory to the defendant but, on the contrary, was careless and negligent in the management thereof, and as a result there was considerable loss to the defendant in the capital invested in said business and in the custom or trade that he had at said place. The plaintiff in many respects disobeyed the instructions and commands of the defendant as to the management of said business, to the injury of the defendant, as he verily believes. That for these reasons the defendant discharged plaintiff, without malice and without any desire to injure him, but solely for the reason that the defendant deemed it best for the interest of his business to do so. (5) The defendant did not discharge said plaintiff on said 19th day of June, 1900, without warning, but had given plaintiff notice more than a month prior to said date to take stock and turn over the premises to defendant. (6) That defendant does not owe the plaintiff the sum of eight dollars and fifty cents, as alleged in the complaint, or any other sum. (7) That plaintiff occupied a house belonging to defendant at said Riverview for three months after plaintiff had ceased to work for defendant, to wit, from June 19, 1899, to September 19, 1899, paying no rent and rendering no compensation of any sort to defendant therefor, and refusing to surrender same, though demand for such surrender was repeatedly made by defendant, which house was reasonably worth five dollars per month rent; and defendant hereby sets forth this debt of fifteen dollars as a counterclaim to plaintiff's first cause of action. For a defense to the second cause of action: (1) He denies each and every allegation of the complaint relative to the second cause of action, except such as are hereafter admitted. (2) He alleges that he was engaged in the mercantile business at Riverview, in the county of Greenville, state aforesaid, and carried there a considerable stock of goods, and had a large custom or trade; that the defendant resided in the city of Greenville, but paid occasional visits to said store. (3) He admits that in November, 1898, he employed the plaintiff, and he alleges that under the terms of employment the plaintiff was to take personal charge of the same business, and personally conduct and manage the same, under the orders and directions of the defendant; that he was to sell the goods in said store and wait on defendant's customers in a...