Hilliard v. Chew

• Decision Date: 17 April 1899
• Citation: 25 So. 489,76 Miss. 763
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: HIRAM E. HILLIARD ET AL. v. GEORGE CHEW

25 So. 489

76 Miss. 763

HIRAM E. HILLIARD ET AL. v. GEORGE CHEW

Supreme Court of Mississippi

April 17, 1899

March 1899

FROM the chancery court, second district, of Coahoma county, HON A. H. LONGINO, Chancellor.

George Chew, the appellee, was complainant in the court below Hilliard and others, appellants, were defendants there. The suit sought to perpetually enjoin a judgment, rendered against Chew in appellants' favor, before a justice of the peace of district four of the county. It was tried upon an agreed statement of facts in these words, viz.: "The complainant was a resident householder and freeholder of beat five of Coahoma county, Mississippi, at the time of service and judgment against him before J. P. Rilly, a justice of the peace in beat four, as alleged in the original bill in this case. That the debt so sued on was contracted in beat five. At the time of the institution of said suit against the complainant by the defendants herein, and at the time of said judgment, there was an acting justice of the peace competent and qualified to try said suit in said beat five. That personal service was had against the defendant in said suit in beat four, where he was at the time suit was filed and summons issued, and was severed by a constable of said beat four in beat four."

The decree of the court below perpetuated the injunction which had been issued upon the filing of the bill, and the defendants appealed to the supreme court. The opinion contains a further statement of the facts.

Affirmed.

Butt &amp Butt, for appellants.

Defendant Chew admits that he owed the debt and does not tender the money. He who seeks equity must do equity. On exactly the same ground this court refused relief in Dean v. Robertson, 64 Miss. 195.

The only thing set up in the bill for which the complainant seeks extraordinary relief by injunction is simply a personal right which he could have set up in the court of the justice of the peace upon a plea in abatement and had that question determined by his honor the magistrate. If need be he could have appealed to the circuit court, and, perchance, to the supreme court.

The record in the justice court does not show that Chew lives in another beat. The justice court had full powers to try the question. Of course the case might be different if the justice court had no jurisdiction of the cause of action and of Chew. Not so in this case. The record shows all the jurisdictional facts. If Chew had appeared and pleaded in bar it would have been a waiver of all pleas in abatement, and just so when he declined to plead at all. No fraud is charged in the bill.

It is conclusively true that Chew owed the debt and likewise that the court had jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the person at the time the judgmeut was rendered, and it is conclusively true that the judgment is good and must stand as rendered by the justice court. Everything appears of record making the judgment conclusive against Chew. A judgment is not merely prima facie evidence of its validity, but is conclusive when the record shows jurisdiction over the person and subject-matter, and...