Hilliard v. Jefferson Parish

• Decision Date: 08 January 2014
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 13–171.
• Citation: 991 F.Supp.2d 769
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana
• Parties: Heather HILLIARD v. Jefferson PARISH, et al.

991 F.Supp.2d 769

Heather HILLIARD

v.Jefferson PARISH, et al.

Civil Action No. 13–171.

United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana.

Jan. 8, 2014.

Dale Edward Williams, Law Office of Dale Edward Williams, Jack Etherton Truitt, Truitt Law Firm, Covington, LA, for Heather Hilliard.

Thomas P. Anzelmo, McCranie, Sistrunk, New Orleans, LA, Deborah Cunningham Foshee, Elliot Ross Buckley, Jr., Jefferson Parish Attorney's Office, Harahan, LA, Kevin Paul Kress, Shantell L. Payton, McCranie, Sistrunk, Guice Anthony Giambrone, III, Craig R. Watson, Blue Williams, LLP, Metairie, LA, for Jefferson Parish, et al.

ORDER AND REASONS

JANE TRICHE MILAZZO, District Judge.

Before the Court are Motions to Dismiss filed by Defendants John Young (R. Doc. 8), Richard Hart (R. Doc. 16) (collectively the “Individual Defendants”), and Jefferson Parish (R. Doc. 7). For the reason stated more fully below, the Motions are GRANTED IN PART. The following claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted: (1) Plaintiff's claims under Title VII against the Individual Defendants; (2) Plaintiff's claims for punitive damages against Jefferson Parish for an alleged violation of Title VII; (3) Plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (4) Plaintiff's claims against the Individual Defendants under the Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law (“LEDL”), La.Rev.Stat. § 23:301 et seq.; and (5) Plaintiff's negligent retention claims.

BACKGROUND

This is an employment discrimination and sexual harassment action filed by Plaintiff Heather Hilliard against Jefferson Parish, Jefferson Parish President John Young (“Young”), and Jefferson Parish Deputy Chief Operating Officer Richard Hart (“Hart”). Plaintiff worked for Jefferson Parish as a senior administrative assistant from December 13, 2010, until May 24, 2012. During the course of her employment, Plaintiff alleges Hart harassed her by using “sexually offensive language and ma[king] vulgar comments.” This harassment allegedly commenced in February 2011 and persisted for several months. Plaintiff complained of Hart's behavior to Jefferson Parish supervisors from March 2011 to December 2011. In June of that year, Young transferred some of Plaintiff's job responsibilities to Hart, thereby forcing her to work directly under Hart's supervision. The harassment continued.

Jefferson Parish eventually investigated Plaintiff's complaints. A report was issued on February 10, 2012, which allegedly concluded Hart violated Jefferson Parish policy by engaging in persistent acts of “gender harassment.” Hart resigned two days later.

On March 1, 2012, Plaintiff received her first employment evaluation. The evaluation was deeply critical of her job performance. On March 24, 2012, Jefferson Parish terminated Plaintiff's employment.

On July 20, 2012, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination against Jefferson Parish with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). Plaintiff filed the instant law suit on February 26, 2013. Despite alleging that she satisfied all prerequisites for her Title VII claim, it is undisputed that Plaintiff had not received a “right to sue” letter at the time she filed her complaint. In fact, Plaintiff did not receive the letter until December 11, 2013—several months after Defendants filed the instant Motions.

LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead enough facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). A claim is “plausible on its face” when the pleaded facts allow the court to “[d]raw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. A court must accept the complaint's factual allegations as true and must “draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Lormand v. U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232 (5th Cir.2009). The Court need not, however, accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual allegations. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949–50.

To be legally sufficient, a complaint must establish more than a “sheer possibility” that the plaintiff's claims are true. Id. “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action’ ” will not suffice. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1955). Rather, the complaint must contain enough factual allegations to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of each element of the plaintiffs' claim. Lormand, 565 F.3d at 255–57. The Court's review “is limited to the complaint, any documents attached to the complaint, and any documents attached to the motion to dismiss that are central to the claim and referenced by the complaint.” Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir.2010).

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Plaintiff has asserted federal claims under Title VII, the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”),¹ and Section 1983. She also asserts state law claims for employment discrimination under the LEDL, and negligent retention. The Court addresses each claim separately.

I. Title VII Claims

Defendants argue Plaintiff's Title VII claims are premature, because she had not received a right to sue letter at the time she filed suit. Should the Court disagree, Defendants offers two arguments in the alternative: (1) the Individual Defendants argue that individual employees are not subject to liability under Title VII; (2) Jefferson Parish argues that a Plaintiff may not recover punitive damages from apolitical subdivision. The Court first addresses the prematurity argument.

A. Whether Plaintiff's Title VII Claims are Premature

Defendants contend Plaintiff's Title VII claims are subject to dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Plaintiff counters that any procedural default was cured by the issuance of the December 11, 2013, right to sue letter.² For the following reasons, the Court agrees with Plaintiff.

“Employment discrimination plaintiffs must exhaust administrative remedies before pursuing claims in federal court.” Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378–79 (5th Cir.2002). A plaintiff meets this requirement if he (1) files a timely charge with the EEOC, and (2) receives a right to sue letter. Id. The question before the Court is whether the exhaustion requirement in Title VII is merely a condition precedent subject to equitable modification, or whether it is jurisdictional, the failure to comply with which mandates dismissal. The answer lies somewhere in the thicket of a particularly thorny intra-circuit split. Compare Pinkard v. Pullman–Standard, a Div. of Pullman, Inc., 678 F.2d 1211, 1215 (5th Cir.1982) (“We hold that receipt of a right-to-sue letter is a condition precedent to a Title VII claim rather than a jurisdictional prerequisite.”), and Julian v. City of Hous., Tex., 314 F.3d 721, 725 n. 3 (2002) (“Our Title VII cases hold that ‘receipt of a right-to-sue letter is not jurisdictional but a condition precedent subject to equitable modification.’ ”) (quoting McKee v. McDonnell Douglas Technical Servs. Co., Inc., 705 F.2d 776, 777 n. 2 (5th Cir.1983)), and Taylor, 296 F.3d at 379 (“[The] filing of an EEOC charge is not a jurisdictional prerequisite.”), with Tolbert v. U.S., 916 F.2d 245, 247 (5th Cir.1990) (“[I]t is the well-settled law of this circuit that each [Title VII] requirement is a prerequisite to federal subject matter jurisdiction.”), and Randel v. U.S. Dep't of Navy, 157 F.3d 392, 395 (5th Cir.1998) (“If the claimant fails to comply with either of the[ ] [Title VII] requirements then the court is deprived of jurisdiction over the case.”), and Filer v. Donley, 690 F.3d 643, 648 (5th Cir.2012) ( “The court correctly held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the other [Title VII] allegations as to which [the plaintiff] failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.”); see also Pacheco v. Mineta, 448 F.3d 783, 788 n. 7 (5th Cir.2006) (acknowledging the split in authority).

Because neither the Supreme Court nor the Fifth Circuit sitting en banc has addressed the effect of a Title VII plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies, see Pacheco, 448 F.3d at 788 n. 7, this Court is bound by the earliest panel decision on point. See U.S. v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 445 F.3d 771, 789 (5th Cir.2006). That decision was rendered in 1982 by a divided panel in Pinkard.

Two of the plaintiffs in Pinkard brought suit a mere four days after filing charges with the EEOC. 678 F.2d at 1215. Neither plaintiff had received a right to sue letter from the EEOC at the time suit was filed. Id. The EEOC issued the letters approximately six months later. Id. The district court nonetheless dismissed the Title VII claims for want of subject matter jurisdiction, because the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies before filing suit. Id.

On appeal, the Pinkard Court addressed the precise issue before the Court today: “whether the receipt of a right-to-sue letter is a jurisdictional prerequisite, which if not satisfied deprives federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction or whether the requirement is a condition precedent subject to equitable modification.” Id. at 1216. After an extensive review of the relevant jurisprudence, the court held that the receipt of a right-to-sue letter is a condition precedent, “which on proper occasion may be equitably modified.” Id. Applying this general principle to the facts before it, the court held that “receipt of a right-to-sue letter subsequent to the commencement of a Title VII action, but while the action remains pending” cures the initial failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Id. at 1218–19. Accordingly, the district court's dismissal of the Title VII claims was reversed. Id. at 1219.

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