Randel v. U.S. Dept. of Navy

• Citation: 157 F.3d 392
• Decision Date: 15 October 1998
• Docket Number: No. 97-30954,97-30954
• Parties: 78 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 265, 75 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 45,815 Colburn P. RANDEL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, John H. Dalton, Secretary, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)

Page 392

157 F.3d 392

78 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 265,

75 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 45,815

Colburn P. RANDEL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, John H. Dalton Secretary, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 97-30954.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Oct. 15, 1998.

Iris A. Tate, Wilkerson, Tate & Williams, New Orleans, LA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Glenn Kenneth Schreiber, Asst. U.S.Atty., New Orleans, LA, Anthony R. Crouse, General Counsel of the Navy, Washington, DC, for Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.

Before REYNALDO G. GARZA, HIGGINBOTHAM and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.

EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff, Colburn Randel, appeals the district court's dismissal of his Title VII action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Randel contends that the district court erred in determining that (1) he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to his claim of racial discrimination, and (2) he did not timely appeal his claim for reprisal. Concluding that the district court is correct with respect to the racial discrimination claim, but incorrect with respect to the reprisal claim, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I

Colburn Randel worked as a computer specialist for the Naval Research Personnel Center. Beginning in 1994, Randel initiated the first of two proceedings against his employer, John H. Dalton, Secretary of the Department of the United States Navy ("the Navy") alleging discrimination in violation of Title VII.

The first proceeding ("Randel I") began in March 1994, when Randel filed an Equal Employment Opportunity ("EEO") complaint of racial discrimination against his supervisor. In June 1994, this complaint was referred to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") for review. The EEOC did not render a decision within 180 days, and therefore, on April 19, 1995, Randel filed his complaint in federal district court. See 5 U.S.C. § 7702(e)(1).

The second proceeding ("Randel II") began on October 14, 1994, one month after the Navy fired Randel allegedly for excessive unexcused absences. Believing that he suffered from major depression due to his work environment, and that he was entitled to sick leave for this disability, Randel appealed his removal to the Merit Systems Protection Board ("MSPB"). Before the MSPB, Randel claimed that the Navy unlawfully fired him, and alleged specifically that his termination constituted both reprisal for his prior EEO complaint and disability discrimination. This appeal to the MSPB did not contain a claim of racial discrimination. The MSPB upheld the Navy's decision to fire Randel, and on June 13, 1995, Randel appealed the MSPB's decision to the EEOC. See 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1).

On August 25, 1995, before the EEOC reached a decision in Randel II, Randel filed an amended complaint in Randel I asserting a claim of disability discrimination. Thus, Randel asked the district court to decide his disability discrimination claim as part of Randel I, even though the same claim remained pending before the EEOC in Randel II. The district court concluded that Randel had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, and dismissed Randel I for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

On August 8, 1996, the EEOC issued its decision in Randel II. The EEOC reached two conclusions. First, it concurred with the MSPB that the Navy did not fire Randel in reprisal for filing the EEO complaint for racial discrimination. Second, it found that contrary to the MSPB's prior determination, the Navy had discriminated against Randel because of his disability. Additionally, the EEOC explained that its decision was final and that upon receipt of its decision Randel had "the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court, based on the decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board, WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS. ..." The EEOC then referred the case to the MSPB pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(5)(B). ¹ In an opinion and order dated November 12, 1996, the MSPB adopted the EEOC's decision finding disability discrimination, and notified Randel that he had a right to file a civil action in United States District Court within thirty days after receiving its order.

On December 13, 1996--thirty days after receiving the MSPB order--Randel appealed the decision of the EEOC, as confirmed by the MSPB, to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. Randel's petition sought relief on both his reprisal and racial discrimination claims. The Navy moved for dismissal, factually attacking the district court's subject matter jurisdiction. The district court granted the motion for two reasons. First, the district court held that because Randel did not appeal until ninety-seven days after the August 8th EEOC decision he failed to timely appeal his reprisal claim. Second, it found that Randel never raised a claim of racial discrimination in any of the proceedings in Randel II, and therefore failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. For these reasons, the district court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over both Randel's reprisal claim and his claim of racial discrimination. Randel appealed timely.

II

This appeal involves the district court's denial of subject matter jurisdiction over Randel's claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. We review the district court's determinations of disputed fact under the "clearly erroneous" standard. See MDPhysicians & Assoc., Inc. v. State Bd. of Ins., 957 F.2d 178, 180-81 (5th Cir.1992)(citing Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir.1981)). Questions of law we review de novo. See Stults v. Conoco, Inc., 76 F.3d 651, 654 (5th Cir.1996).

As a precondition to filing suit in federal court, Title VII specifically requires a federal employee claiming discrimination to exhaust his administrative remedies. See Brown v. General Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 832, 96 S.Ct. 1961, 1965, 48 L.Ed.2d 402 (1976)("Initially, the complainant must seek relief in the agency that has allegedly discriminated against him."). The complainant also must file his complaint in a timely manner. See Tolbert v. United States, 916 F.2d 245, 247 (5th Cir.1990). If the claimant fails to comply with either of these requirements then the court is deprived of jurisdiction over the case. See id.

A

The Navy contends that Randel failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to his claim of racial discrimination. The EEO charge filed in Randel II makes no reference to race discrimination. It is confined to reprisal and disability discrimination. Randel maintains nonetheless that the EEOC's and the MSPB's findings of no reprisal necessarily include a finding of no racial discrimination. We disagree. To recover on his reprisal claim Randel had to prove that the Navy fired him because he complained to the EEOC; he did not " 'need [to] ... prove the underlying claim of discrimination which led to [his] protest.' " Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1566 (11th Cir.1997); see also Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074, 1085 (3d Cir.1996)(noting that "a plaintiff need not prove the merits of the underlying discrimination complaint, but only that 'he was acting under a good faith, reasonable belief that a violation existed' ") (citations omitted); Balazs v. Liebenthal, 32 F.3d 151, 158 (4th Cir.1994)(stating that "[i]t is further generally held that to sustain a suit for retaliation it is not necessary that the plaintiff prove that the underlying claim of discrimination was true"). Randel's racial discrimination claim is separate and distinct from his reprisal claim, and accordingly, he must exhaust his administrative remedies on that claim before seeking review in federal court. See Williams v. Little Rock Mun. Water Works, 21 F.3d 218, 223 (8th Cir.1994)(noting that plaintiff's race discrimination claim was "separate and distinct from her claims of retaliation" before the EEOC); see also Shannon v. Ford Motor Co., 72 F.3d 678, 685 (8th Cir.1995)(citing Williams, and noting that even though the plaintiff in Williams mentioned her unexhausted discrimination claim in her retaliation complaint, "this reference to her previous complaint was not enough to exhaust, for Title VII purposes, the discrimination claim"). Thus, we agree with the district court that, in relation to the racial discrimination claim, Randel failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction.

B

The district court's conclusion that Randel did not appeal timely his reprisal claim is, however, a different matter. According to the district court, Randel "should have filed the appeal within thirty days of the August 8, 1996 ruling by the EEOC." The district court reasoned that because the EEOC and the MSPB agreed as to the reprisal claim on August 8, 1996, the EEOC's decision on that claim became a final appealable decision. Randel argues that a final agency decision did not exist until November 12, 1996, when the MSPB and the EEOC agreed on both his reprisal and disability claims. We must decide, therefore, whether the EEOC's finding of no reprisal became final on August 8, 1996, for purposes of appeal, even though Randel's disability discrimination claim remained unresolved until November 12, 1996. In other words, we must decide whether the EEOC's August 8th decision operated to sever Randel's reprisal claim from the rest of his complaint. We find that our reasoning in Gomez v. Department of the Air Force, 869 F.2d 852 (5th Cir.1989) controls the resolution of this issue.

In Gomez, the plaintiff filed a complaint with the EEOC against the Secretary of the Department of the Air Force ("the Air Force"), alleging discrimination based on national origin and handicap. The EEOC...