Hilliard v. State, 34536

Citation87 Ga.App. 769,75 S.E.2d 173
Decision Date13 March 1953
Docket NumberNo. 2,No. 34536,34536,2
PartiesHILLIARD v. STATE
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

Syllabus by the Court.

Where the defendant entered a plea of guilty to a void accusation and the court rendered judgment thereon and pronounced sentence, the defendant's motion in arrest of such judgment, timely presented, was improperly overruled by the trial court.

On August 12, 1952, during the August term, 1952, of the City Court of Lexington, in the County of Oglethorpe, an accusation was sworn out against Hughes Hilliard, charging that the defendant 'in said county, on the 11th day of August, in the year of our Lord, Nineteen Hundred and Fifty Two, did then and there, unlawfully, and with force and arms, personally have in his possession apparatus usable for the distilling and manufacturing of alcoholic, spirituous, vinous and malt liquors and beverages, contrary to the laws of said State, the good order, peace and dignity thereof.' To this accusation Hilliard, on September 13, 1952, entered a plea of guilty. The court passed this sentence: 'Whereupon, it is considered, ordered and adjudged that the defendant * * * pay a fine of One Thousand Dollars, and that said defendant be confined in the common jail of said county for the term of six months, to be computed from this date. Upon the completion of said jail sentence, or by the revocation of the same, it is ordered that said defendant be put to work and labor on the public works camp, or such other place as the Department of Corrections of said State shall designate, for the term of twelve (12) months, to be computed from the completion or revocation in any way of the jail sentence herein imposed. Provided, however, that upon payment of said fine, and not otherwise, said jail sentence shall be ineffective, but the payment of said fine shall in no way affect the sentence to Public Work Camp herein imposed.' Immediately after pronouncing the above sentence orally, the judge left the bench and the courtroom, without recessing or adjourning said court, and went directly to the office of the clerk of said court, which was on the first floor of the courthouse. The defendant's counsel, Fred A. Gillen, for the purpose of making a motion to allow the plea of guilty to be withdrawn, followed the judge, and immediately made such motion. The judge stated, 'Have you been misled by the court?' Attorney Gillen stated that he had not been misled by the court or any officer thereof, but that he 'was surprised.' The judge then stated: 'Under no circumstances will the plea be allowed withdrawn.' Thereupon, the defendant, on said date, before adjournment of the court filed his motion in arrest of judgment on the grounds (1) it appears from the record that no valid and sufficient accusation was filed against him; (2) that such accusation could not, after plea and sentence, be amended so as to charge the defendant with any offense under the law of the State and the rules prescribed by the act of 1899, p. 403, for the City Court of Lexington, and said judgment and sentence are in violation of the 8th Amendment to the United States Constitution, which provides: 'Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted', and are in violation of the corresponding provisions of the State constitution. Code, § 1-808; Code Ann. § 2-109, Const. art. 1, § 1, par. 9. On October 27, 1952, the defendant made a written motion to set aside and vacate said judgment and sentence and enter a plea of not guilty, which the court denied. On the same day the defendant sued out a bill of exceptions to the Supreme Court of this State, in which he assigned error on the order denying his motion in arrest of the judgment and denying to him 'the right to withdraw said plea of guilty.' The defendant also assigned error in the bill of exceptions upon the order overruling the motion filed by him on October 27, 1952. The Supreme Court transferred the case to this court, on the ground that no constitutional question was involved.

Fred A. Gillen, Lexington, for plaintiff in error.

E. P. Shull, Solicitor, Lexington, for defendant in error.

GARDNER, Presiding Judge.

As we view the questions presented by the record now before this court, we are confronted with this question: Can a defendant be lawfully sentenced in a misdemeanor case, where he enters a plea of guilty to an accusation which is void, in that therein no offense is charged? This brings up for determination whether or not the accusation stated an offense. Code, § 58-209 provides: 'It shall be unlawful for any * * * individual to knowingly permit or allow any one to have or possess or locate on his premises any apparatus for the distilling or manufacturing of the liquors and beverages specified in section 58-201. When any such apparatus is found or discovered upon said premises the same shall be prima facie evidence that the person in actual possession had knowledge of the existence of the same, and upon conviction therefor, shall be punished as for a misdemeanor, the burden of proof in all cases being upon the person in actual possession to show the want of knowledge of the existence of such apparatus on his premises.' It seems that the gravamen of the offense charged under this statute is to knowingly have, possess or locate on one's premises such apparatus. The accusation should even describe the premises. See Johnson v. State, 152 Ga. 270(2), 109 S.E. 673. The apparatus must be found on the defendant's premises and in his possession or control or in the control or possession of some one permitted by him to have the same. See Johnson v. State, supra; Johnson v. State, 79 Ga.App. 210, 53 S.E.2d 498, 499. In the latter case this court ruled: 'The gravamen of the offense making penal the possession of an apparatus for illegally distilling alcoholic liquors as provided in Code, § 58-209, is knowingly having upon one's premises such an apparatus or knowingly permitting or allowing another to do so. Accordingly an accusation charging that the defendant 'did unlawfully have and possess an apparatus for the distilling and manufacturing of spirituous, vinous, malted, fermented and intoxicating liquors and beverages, said apparatus consisting of one 75 gallon copper still, one thumper keg, and 240 gallons of mash,' is subject to demurrer because it fails to allege that the defendant knowingly had the same on his premises, or that he knowingly permitted another to do so.' (Italics ours.) In the body of the decision this court said: 'The gravamen of the offense is knowingly having upon one's premises an apparatus for the illegal manufacturing of alcoholic beverages. * * * This statute does not make penal the possession of such apparatus other than on the premises of the defendant. The possession of such an apparatus other than on one's premises is not unlawful.' ...

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  • Walker v. State
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • November 7, 1968
    ...Criminal Law § 495 (1965); Brisson v. Warden of Connecticut State Prison, 25 Conn.Sup. 202, 200 A.2d 250 (1964); Hilliard v. State, 87 Ga.App. 769, 75 S.E.2d 173 (1953).3 I.C. § 19-4201 and 19-4215; Higheagle v. State, 91 Idaho 921, 435 P.2d 261 (1967); Carey v. State, 91 Idaho 706, 429 P.2......
  • Jackson v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • May 15, 2017
    ...to the legality of the indictment. See, e.g., Ponder v. State , 121 Ga.App. 788, 789, 175 S.E.2d 55 (1970) ; Hilliard v. State , 87 Ga.App. 769, 771-772, 75 S.E.2d 173 (1953) ; and Rambo v. State , 25 Ga.App. 390, 103 S.E. 494 (1920), each of which was cited as authority in State v. Howell ......
  • Smith v. Hardrick
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • December 4, 1995
    ...not prevent the defendant from asserting that the facts alleged in the accusation do not constitute a crime."); Hilliard v. State, 87 Ga.App. 769, 773, 75 S.E.2d 173 (1953) (same); see United States v. Bell, 22 F.3d 274, 275 (11th Cir.1994) ("Although a guilty plea waives many objections to......
  • Fortson v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • September 13, 1957
    ...Ga.App. 270, 108 S.E. 121; Sanders v. State, 59 Ga.App. 748, 2 S.E.2d 144; Smith v. State, 64 Ga.App. 312, 13 S.E.2d 96; Hilliard v. State, 87 Ga.App. 769, 75 S.E.2d 173.' When a judge, in the exercise of his discretion, refuses to allow a defendant to withdraw a plea of guilty the judge th......
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