Hills v. Hart

• Decision Date: 13 July 1914
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: HILLS v. HART et al.

91 A. 257

88 Conn. 394

HILLS

v. HART et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

July 13, 1914.

Appeal from Superior Court, Hartford County; William S. Case, Judge.

Proceedings for the probate of the will of Julia G. Hills, deceased. From a decree of the probate court, an appeal was taken to the superior court by Stuart F. Hills, where there was judgment setting aside parts of the will, and permitting the remainder to stand, and A. Elijah Hart and another, executors, appeal. Reversed, and new trial ordered.

Joseph L. Barbour and Lewis Sperry, both of Hartford, for appellants. William M. Maltbie, Albert C. Bill, and Hugh M. Alcorn, all of Hartford, for appellee.

WHEELER, J. Mrs. Hills died June 22, 1912; her will was executed November 13, 1911, and probated July 9, 1912. She was a widow, 65 years of age, having three adult children, Louis, Stuart, and Mrs. Hinkley. The will gave to Mrs. Hinkley her personal and household effects and a savings bank deposit of about $680; to Stuart $2,000; to a long-time domestic servant $1,000; and in the fifth paragraph it disposed of the residue, giving in the second clause two-thirds thereof to Mrs. Hinkley, and in the third clause it disposed of the remaining one-third, giving $1,500 to Louis and his wife and daughter, and the balance in trust, the income of which should go to Louis for life, with remainder to his daughter.

The jury found that the third clause of the will and the second paragraph of the fifth clause of the will had been procured by the undue influence of Mr. and Mrs. Hinkley, and were not the will of Mrs. Hills. From the decree entered upon this verdict, the defendant executors appeal.

In our discussion we shall consider in the main the facts which are conceded and those most favorable to the plaintiff which the jury might reasonably have found upon the evidence.

The burden of proving the issue of undue influence was upon the contestant. He alleged it; he must prove it by a fair preponderance of the evidence.

The fact that there existed a relation of personal confidence between Mrs. Hinkley and her mother raised no legal presumption of undue influence, and did not place upon her the burden of proving that the will had not been procured by undue influence as alleged.

Confidence, close and continuing, should exist between parent and child. It is the child's privilege to anticipate some share of the parent's estate. He may use all fair and honest methods to secure his parent's confidence and obtain a share of his bounty. From such a relationship alone, the law will never presume confidence has been abused and undue influence exercised. Lockwood v. Lockwood, 80 Conn. 513, 523, 69 Atl. 8; Mooney v. Mooney, 80 Conn. 446, 452, 68 Atl. 985; Dale's Appeal, 57 Conn. 127, 144, 17 Atl. 757.

The distinction between a legatee who is a child and one who is a stranger, being the religious adviser, business agent, attorney, or physician of the testatrix, is marked. The law casts the burden of showing the absence of undue influence upon the legatee holding such fiduciary relation; otherwise it remains with the party alleging it.

Mrs. Hills was, at the time she executed her will on November 11, 1911, and long prior thereto, in good physical and mental health, and so continued until a few days of her death, which occurred June 22, 1912. She was a woman of quick and active mind, of strong intelligence, fair education, broad information, widely traveled, keenly observant, of retentive memory, and deeply interested in all current events. She possessed good reasoning powers and reached her conclusions by a logical sequence of reasoning; she was a strong thinker, very independent in her judgment and positive in her opinions; she had had unusual business experience for a woman, and held religious views, liberal and catholic. She regulated her own life, dominated her household, and managed her business affairs with such sagacity, courage, and success that the competency her husband left her had more than doubled, although she had provided for her children and self generously.

She had the legal right to make her own will as she pleased. Neither judge nor jury have the power to make one for her, even though they may think they can treat her family connections with greater justice. Sturdevant's Appeal, 71 Conn. 392, 397, 42 Atl. 70.

It is not inconceivable that a testatrix of this character, even in the strength of her vigor, may have been unduly influenced; it is, however, certain such a conclusion, so foreign to her true character, should not be reached upon surmise, or suspicion, or inferences drawn from inconsequential facts, but should rest on the safe foundation of material facts proven, and inferences which fairly and convincingly lead to that conclusion.

The circumstances surrounding the making and execution of Mrs. Hills' will furnish no evidence whatever of undue influence.

The will makes an unequal distribution among the children, yet one which is neither unnatural nor in dissonance with the testatrix's expressed intent.

There were special reasons for leaving Louis' share in trust Mrs. Hinkley was an only daughter, who had always lived with her mother, and her mother had frequently declared her purpose of giving her the largest share of her estate. Stuart had inherited and still retained a share of his father's estate, and was capable of earning and did earn a fair living.

The jury might have found from the testimony of Stuart that some time prior to January, 1911, a former will of Mrs. Hills existed under which, assuming the estate was then as much as at the decease of Mrs. Hills, Mrs. Hinkley would have received about $27,000, and Stuart and Louis about $15,000 each.

Under a former will admittedly made in January, 1911, Stuart received $5,000; Louis and Mrs. Hinkley about $28,000 each.

Under the will before us Stuart received $2,000, Louis about $19,000, or $9,000 less than by the January will, and Mrs. Hinkley about $40,000, or $12,000 more than by the January will.

If the verdict stands, Louis would get over $32,000, and $13,000 of this would be free from a trust, Mrs. Hinkley would get nearly $15,000, and Stuart would get over $13,000.

It is conceded that Mrs. Hills never departed from her setttled purpose to leave the body of Louis' share in trust, and to give Mrs. Hinkley a larger share than either of the sons.

The verdict reverses her intention and gives Louis over twice as much as Mrs. Hinkley, and gives him about $13,000 free from the trust.

In the...