Hills v. Shearer
| Decision Date | 04 March 1969 |
| Citation | 245 N.E.2d 253,355 Mass. 405 |
| Parties | Rosamond H. HILLS v. William L. SHEARER, Third. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Marcien Jenckes, Boston, for defendant.
John J. Curtin, Jr., Boston (Richard H. Johnson, Boston, with him), for plaintiff.
Before WILKINS, C.J., and SPALDING, WHITTEMORE, SPIEGEL, and REARDON, JJ.
This bill for declaratory relief was heard on the pleadings, the answer having admitted such facts alleged in the bill as are essential to a determination of the controversy.
On May 3, 1946, the plaintiff and defendant, who were husband and wife but were then living apart, entered into a separation agreement through trustees. The agreement provided in part that the husband should pay the wife $2,000 a month for her support and maintenance; 1 it further provided that 'if divorce proceedings should be begun by the wife, this agreement shall be disclosed to the court in such proceedings, and the court shall be requested to enter a decree adjudicating this agreement to be proper and lawful, confirming the same, and ordering that it be complied with in lieu of any orders relative to property, maintenance or alimony.'
Subsequently, on June 25, 1946, the Probate Court for Middlesex County entered a decree nisi on the wife's libel for divorce. The decree, which became absolute on December 25, 1946, stated 'that the provisions of said agreement as to payments for the support and maintenance of said libellant and said child are adopted as the payments of alimony and for support and maintenance of said child, respectively, which the libellee is hereby ordered to make.' In 1949 the parties, both of whom had remarried, modified the agreement by reducing the husband's monthly payments to $1,000 a month. The agreement was again amended in 1952, but the amount of the monthly support payments was not affected. On May 19, 1965, on the husband's petition, the Probate Court entered a decree reducing the monthly payments from $1,000 to $900. Since that time the husband has paid only $900 a month.
Alleging the existence of an actual controversy, the wife brought this bill in the Superior Court under G.L. c. 231A asking that the court enter a decree declaring that the agreement as amended was a valid and binding contract, the enforceability of which is independent of the decrees entered by the Probate Court. The bill also asked for a determination of the amount due the wife under the agreement and for an order that the husband make payments in the future in accordance with the agreement.
The judge entered a decree declaring that the agreement, as amended, was valid and enforceable and was independent of any decrees of the Probate Court relating to alimony. The husband was ordered to pay the arrears ($3,400) due under the agreement and to pay $1,000 a month thereafter. 2 The husband appealed.
1. In his answer the husband included a 'motion to dismiss' the bill on the ground that the Superior Court had no jurisdiction to determine the controversy, since it involved decrees entered by the Probate Court for Middlesex County. We treat the motion as essentially a plea to the jurisdiction of the court. Lyon v. Lyon, 318 Mass. 646, 63 N.E.2d 459.
The judge did not deal specifically with the plea but the entry of the decree granting the relief sought by the wife was an implied denial of it. There was no error. If the wife was seeking an enforcement of the Probate Court decree, then only that court would have jurisdiction. Lyon v. Lyon, supra, at pages 648--649, 63 N.E.2d 459. Her bill, however, seeks a determination of her contractual rights under the separation agreement; it does not seek to enforce the Probate Court decree. The Superior Court had jurisdiction under G.L. c. 231A to declare the rights of the parties under the separation agreement. As will presently appear, the fact that the Probate Court in its decree 'adopted' the support provisions of the...
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...it could be revised downward at any time, was accepted by a wife as a substitute for an existing agreement.' Hills v. Shearer, 355 Mass. 405, 408-409, 245 N.E.2d 253 (1969), quoting Metcalf v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 288, 292 (1st Cir.1959). The 'general rule [is that] unless the parties exp......
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...by a contract action for any resulting deficiency. Freeman v. Sieve, 323 Mass. 652, 656-657, 84 N.E.2d 16 (1949). Hills v. Shearer, 355 Mass. 405, 245 N.E.2d 253 (1969). Knox v. Remick, 371 Mass. at 435, 358 N.E.2d 432. See Welch v. Chapman, 296 Mass. 487, 488, 6 N.E.2d 438 (1937); Whitney ......
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