Hillsborough County v. HIGHWAY E. & CONST. CO.

Decision Date21 February 1938
Docket NumberNo. 8457.,8457.
PartiesHILLSBOROUGH COUNTY v. HIGHWAY ENGINEERING & CONSTRUCTION CO., Inc.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

W. F. Himes, John B. Sutton, and H. C. Tillman, all of Tampa, Fla., for appellant.

George C. Bedell and Chester Bedell, both of Jacksonville, Fla., and Jno. Bell, of Tampa, Fla., for appellee.

Before FOSTER, HUTCHESON, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.

HUTCHESON, Circuit Judge.

When appellee was here before, as the appellee in United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Highway Engineering & Construction Co., 5 Cir., 51 F.2d 894, 896, it was to contend mightily and with effect that the Temple Terrace Estates paving certificates it held were valid, and that the guaranty company was without defense against them. It is here now arguing the invalidity of two of them with the same vigor and earnestness with which it formerly argued the validity of them all. But decided law, like taught law, is tough law, at least with those who made the decision, and appellee finds the going hard when it attempts to have us now deny, what, on its insistence, we formerly affirmed, the completely validating effect of chapter 10139, Laws of Florida of 1925, and chapter 12207, Laws of Florida 1927. These acts are in terms completely and comprehensively validating. Chapter 10139 validates "all such proceedings, including the making of assessments, issuing of certificates of indebtedness and everything else required or authorized to be done by said chapter 9316, whether heretofore done or hereafter to be done." Chapter 12207 validates "all proceedings, acts and things existing, done, had and taken * * * under said Chapter 9316, for the purpose of carrying out any of the provisions thereof, including all assessments and all certificates of indebtedness, are hereby validated, ratified and confirmed."

Upon full and mature consideration, we said, in the above-cited case:

"It seems clear to us that whatever might have been the legal situation, had the Legislature not by enacting chapter 12207 in effect spread the assessments for itself, given legislative authority and sanction to the work done and the amounts due the contractor for having done it, and legislative validity to the liens securing those amounts, the enactment of that statute has effectively and finally put an end to question. * * *

"We think it cannot be gainsaid that it is no longer a matter for question, that when by a validating act the Legislature ratifies and adopts assessments not spread by it, but which it could have originally spread, these assessments become and thereafter are legislative assessments as truly as though the Legislature had in the first place spread them."

We are still of that opinion, and though the Supreme Court of Florida were, as appellee argues, of a different opinion, we should, regretting to find ourselves in opposition to that court, still give our opinion effect. But we do not find the Florida Supreme Court now in opposition.

When we wrote the former opinion, that court was divided on the question, and since its writing, it has at times, particularly in Hillsborough County v. Temple Terrace Assets Co., 111 Fla. 368, 149 So. 473, apparently taken a view contrary to ours.

As we read its decisions, that court is now not only in agreement in principle with the opinion of its distinguished justice, which we followed in the United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. Case, supra, cf. Town of Gulfport v. Mendels, Fla., 174 So. 8, but in Webb v. Scott, Fla., 176 So. 442, at page 445, it has in terms announced that that view should become the rule in Florida.1

Supported and sustained, in our view of the correctness of our former decision, by these pronouncements of the Florida Supreme Court, we reaffirm what we have formerly affirmed, the completely validating effect of chapter 10139, Laws of Florida of 1925, and chapter 12207, Laws of Florida of 1927. So affirming, we declare as those acts declare, that the certificates of indebtedness in suit are "validated, ratified and confirmed."

But, insists appellee, the contention on which it mainly relies, indeed, the only contention put forward in its pleadings, is not that the validating acts, chapters 10139 and 12207, were not effective to validate in general the Temple terrace assessments, but that the particular assessments for which the certificates in suit were issued were void, because they describe the property assessed as in section 29, instead of as in section 28, where the property improved, and undertaken to be assessed, lies.

It urges upon us that no amount of validation could perfect these assessments, because, by thus describing the property in the proceedings for assessment, an entirely different piece of property from that described in the certificates was attempted to be assessed.

We do not at all agree with appellee. We do not agree that the assessments are invalid for want of description. We particularly do not agree that the validating acts, validating both assessments and certificates, were not fully effective to cure what was, at most, a curable irregularity in the assessment proceedings, in inadvertently using section 29, instead of section 28, as part of the description. Certificate No. 5675 "in part payment for work done on Orange Circle," correctly describes the property as "1314.6 ft. of the W ½ of the SE ¼ of 22- 28- 19 lying south of Orange Circle, as recorded in Plat Book 10 page 69, Temple Terrace Estates Subdivision," and Certificate 5574 "in part payment for work done on St. Andrews Avenue," correctly describes the property as "2643.1 ft. lying in the West ½ of the SE ¼ of Sec. 22, and in the NW ¼ of the NE ¼ of 2728- 19 lying West of St. Andrews Avenue as recorded in Plat Book 10, p. 69 Temple Terrace Estates Subdivision."

The assessments and the required statutory notices of assessments describe the lands in the same way, except that the township number was inadvertently given as "29" instead of "28" in...

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3 cases
  • Thompson v. City of Key West
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • 16 Marzo 1955
    ...170 So. 657; Crawford v. Rehwinkel, 127 Fla. 871, 174 So. 455; City of Fort Myers v. Heitman, supra; Hillsborough County v. Highway Engineering & Const. Co., 5 Cir., 1938, 94 F.2d 419. The principle enunciated in these cases is that even though the description on the assessment rolls is def......
  • Hillsborough County v. Highway Engineering & Const. Co., Inc.
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • 22 Noviembre 1940
  • Highway Engineering Construction Company v. Hillsborough County
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • 25 Abril 1938
    ...858. Supreme Court of the United States April 25, 1938 Mr. George C. Bedell, of Jacksonville, Fla., for petitioner. For opinion below, see 94 F.2d 419. Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied. * Rehearing denied 304 U.S. 589......

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