Hillsborough Inv. Co. v. Wilcox

• Decision Date: 07 May 1943
• Citation: 13 So.2d 448,152 Fla. 889
• Parties: HILLSBOROUGH INV. CO. v. WILCOX et al.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

13 So.2d 448

152 Fla. 889

HILLSBOROUGH INV. CO. v. WILCOX et al.

Florida Supreme Court

May 7, 1943

Rehearing Denied June 2, 1943.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Manatee County; W. T Harrison, judge.

Paul Game of Tampa, for appellant.

George L King, of Bradenton, for appellees.

CHAPMAN, Justice.

The record in this case discloses that Helen M. Wilcox, a widow, during the year 1925, acquired by purchase a home for the sum of $7,000 located in Bradenton, Florida, and described as Lot 3 of Block 2 of the Emma Harris Addition to the said City. Helen M. Wilcox, during the Florida land boom in 1925, moved from the State of Massachusetts to the State of Florida. She had two children--one an afflicted daughter, Maude E. Wilcox, who died in April, 1935, and a son, Leroy S. Wilcox, a World War Veteran, who received wounds in the discharge of overseas duties, which required continuous treatment, and he was confined, from time to time, in government hospitals. He married in the Fall of 1934, and took his wife and continued to live with his mother, Helen M. Wilcox, a widow and sister Maude E. Wilcox, at the mother's home in Bradenton, Florida. He and his wife lived in the home at the time of the institution of this suit. The afflicted daughter died in April, 1935, and Helen M. Wilcox, widow, died in October, 1937.

The homestead status of the aforesaid property is conceded from the year 1925 continuously until an uncertain date between 1935 and 1937. On March 22, 1929, the Citizens Bank & Trust Company obtained a judgment for the sum of $2,293.47, in the Circuit Court of Manatee County, Florida, against Helen M. Wilcox. Subsequently a liquidator was appointed for the bank and on December 1, 1938, the judgment was transferred or assigned to the Hillsborough Investment Company, appellant here.

It is contended by counsel for appellant that the aforesaid property lost its homestead status on an uncertain date between April, 1935, and October, 1937, and immediately on said date the judgment became a lien upon the real estate. The Chancellor heard the testimony and decreed that the described real estate did not lose its homestead status; neither did the judgment so acquired against Helen M. Wilcox ever become a lien against the above described property.

Section 1 of Article X of the Constitution of Florida provides that a homestead to the extent of 160 acres of land or the half of one acre within the limits of a city or town, 'owned by the head of a family residing in this State' (Florida) shall be exempt from forced sale under process of any court. Section 2 of Article X, supra, recites that the exemption provided for in Section 1 'shall inure to the widow and heirs of the party entitled to such exemption, and shall apply to all debts, except as specified in said section.' In the case of Clark v. Cox, 80 Fla. 63, 85 So. 173, we held that where a homestead is acquired it can be waived only by abandonment or by alienation in the manner provided by law. See Lanier v. Lanier, 95 Fla. 522, 116 So. 867. The temporary absence from the homestead of the head of the family in search of health, pleasure or for business reasons, will not deprive it of the homestead status.

It is the duty of the courts when considering statutory and organic provisions applicable to homestead exemption to liberally construe the same in the interest of the family home, but these beneficent provisions should at no time be interpreted so as to make them instruments of fraud or unjust impositions upon the rights of creditors. See Jones v. Carpenter, 90 Fla. 407, 106 So. 127, 43 A.L.R. 1409; Read v. Leitner, 80 Fla. 574, 86 So. 425; Hill v. First Nat. Bank, 79 Fla. 391, 84 So. 190, 20 A.L.R. 270. Equity has complete jurisdiction over homesteads and exemptions. See Bennett v. Bogue, 88 Fla. 109, 101 So. 206.

Who is the head of a family within the meaning of the constitution, exempting homesteads from forced sale, must be determined from the facts of each case; there is no rule or invariable test, based solely upon dependence, especially legal dependence. See De Cottes v. Clarkson, 43 Fla. 1, 29 So. 442; Jetton Lbr. Co. v. Hall, 67 Fla. 61, 64 So. 440, 51 L.R.A.,N.S., 1121.

The case of Cumberland & Liberty Mills v. Keggin, 139 Fla. 133, 190 So. 492, involved property claimed as a homestead and exempt from forced sale. James W. Keggin owned homestead real estate on which he resided with his wife and two sons. The wife died, but the sons, both above 21 years of age, continued to reside or live with their father on the homestead. One of the sons later married and thereafter, with his family, lived with his father on the homestead and was so living at the time of the father's death, the other son having moved away from the place about the time of his brother's marriage. The son moving away conveyed his interest in the homestead to his married brother then residing or living on the homestead. The two sons were the sole heirs of their deceased father. The homestead was offered for sale under an execution based on a judgment obtained against James W. Keggin.

We held that there was a continuity in the family relationship of two or more persons then living on the homestead so as to make them a family and bring the property sought to be sold under execution under the exemption provisions of the Constitution and the homestead inured to the heirs of the judgment debtor.

Leroy S. Wilcox testified that he had resided continuously on the homestead property from 1932 until called as a witness on February 24, 1941. The family, prior to his marriage in December, 1934, consisted of the mother, Helen M. Wilcox, Maude E. Wilcox, his sister, and himself. His wife upon marriage in December, 1934, constituted an additional member of the family. On March 20, 1935, his sister, Maude E. Wilcox, went from Bradenton, Florida, to Quincy, Massachusetts, and died there around the 2nd of April, 1935. The mother owned a hotel in Quincy, Massachusetts and each Summer would go from Bradenton to Quincy and personally operate the hotel from June to Labor Day. She later lost the hotel by the foreclosure of a mortgage. She died in Bradenton, Florida, in October, 1937, at the age of 84 years, and the body was sent to Massachusetts for burial. She claimed Bradenton, Florida, as her home, where she received the most of her mail from 1925 until her death in 1937. The mother paid most of the household expenses. Helen M. Wilcox paid taxes on the property for the years 1928 to 1937, and the tax receipts for 1935, 1936 and 1937 disclose the allowance of homestead exemptions.

Mrs. Martha Osborne, a resident of Bradenton, an acquaintance and neighbor of the Wilcox family since 1926 or 1927, testified that the mother, daughter and son and his wife lived on the property as a family; that death removed the sister and subsequently the mother, but Leroy Wilcox never had any other home. It was the custom of Helen M. Wilcox during her lifetime, for business reasons, to spend each Summer in Massachusetts, and a roomer stayed in the Wilcox home for a short time.

Miss Alma Parker lived on adjoining property to the Wilcox family. She had known Helen M. Wilcox for 12 years and Leroy Wilcox for 10 years. She had been acquainted for several years with other mebers of the family. She testified that Helen M. Wilcox spent the Winters at her home in Bradenton and each Summer, or a part thereof, for business reasons, was spent in Massachusetts; and the parties lived together in their home in Bradenton for this period of time as one family.

Counsel for appellant contends that it is clearly established by the evidence that Helen M. Wilcox was not the head of a family, nor was she residing in the State of Florida between the dates of 1935 and 1937, and that there was an abandonment by her of her claims during this period to the homestead exemption recognized by the provisions of Section 1 of Article X or the Constitution and the conclusions or findings of fact on these disputes and conflicts appearing in the testimony as made by the Chancellor are not sustained by substantial evidence in the record and the findings of fact constitutes reversible error.

Emphasis is placed on facts established by appellant appearing in the record, viz.: (1) Death and burial of Maude E. Wilcox at Quincy, Massachusetts in April, 1935, and payment of funeral bill to John Hall Funeral Home; (2) application of Helen M. Wilcox for a wine and beer license at Quincy (the application reciting that she is a voter of Quincy, Mass.); (3) an interview in June, 1935, with Helen M. Wilcox at 1 Bell Street, Quincy, Massachusetts, and Leroy S. Wilcox was residing at the same address; (4) plaintiff's Exhibit No. 30; (5) dependency statement dated January, 1936, signed at 1 Bell Street, Quincy, Mass.; (6) foreclosure of mortgage against her at Quincy, Mass., during 1936; (7) application for old age pension when she recited she had lived at Quincy for 37 years; (8) pleading in a suit brought against her at Quincy; (9) statement of Leroy S. Wilcox made at 1 Bell Street, Quincy, to the effect that his mother was dependent on him for support; (10) contents of death certificate made at Bradenton for the transportation of the body of Helen M. Wilcox back to Quincy, Mass. for burial.

The above facts when considered in connection with the testimony of Leroy S. Wilcox, Mrs. Osborne and Miss Parker to the effect that Helen M. Wilcox spent each Summer, or a part thereof, in Quincy, Mass., in connection with business interests, viz., the operation of her hotel from June to Labor Day of each year, explain many of the apparent conflicts. The daughter left Bradenton on March 20, 1935, and died at Quincy, Mass., on April 2, 1935, and the costs of burial are easily...