Hillsdale Cnty. Senior Servs., Inc. v. Hillsdale Cnty.

• Decision Date: 31 May 2013
• Docket Number: Docket No. 144630.,Calendar No. 3.
• Citation: 832 N.W.2d 728,494 Mich. 46
• Parties: HILLSDALE COUNTY SENIOR SERVICES, INC v. HILLSDALE COUNTY.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

494 Mich. 46

832 N.W.2d 728

HILLSDALE COUNTY SENIOR SERVICES, INC

v.HILLSDALE COUNTY.

Docket No. 144630.

Calendar No. 3.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued March 13, 2013.

Decided May 31, 2013.

Brian Kaser, PLC (by Brian A. Kaser, Lansing and Christopher P. Garfield), for Hillsdale County Senior Services Center, Inc., Ella Asaro, Lyle Green, Ruth Green, Donelda Potts, John Potts, and Kerby Rushing.

Cohl, Stoker & Toskey, P.C., Lansing (by David Stoker, Richard D. McNulty, and Sherry L. Hendrington), for Hillsdale County.

Miller, Canfield, Paddock & Stone, PLC, Detroit (by Michael P. McGee, Steven D. Mann, and Emma T. Chen), for Michigan Municipal League, Michigan Townships Association, Michigan Association of Counties, Michigan Association of School Boards, and State Bar of Michigan Public Corporation Law section.

MARKMAN, J.

This case concerns whether the Michigan Tax Tribunal possesses jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claim for mandamus to enforce the terms of a property-tax ballot proposition that provided for the levy of an additional 0.5 mill property tax in Hillsdale County to fund plaintiff Hillsdale County Senior Services, Inc. (HCSS). Because that claim falls within the scope of MCL 205.731(a) as a “proceeding for direct review of a final decision ... of an agency relating to ... rates ... under the propertytax laws of this state,” we conclude that the tribunal possesses exclusive and original jurisdiction. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals, which vacated and reversed the circuit court's judgment for mandamus for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

I. FACTS AND HISTORY

Under the activities or services for older persons act (ASOPA), MCL 400.571 et seq., “[a] local unit of governmentmay appropriate funds to public or private nonprofit corporations or organizations for the purposes of planning, coordinating, evaluating, and providing services to older persons.” MCL 400.573. ASOPA further provides:

A governing body of a local unit of government may submit a millage proposition to the electorate to levy up to 1 mill for services to older citizens. This proposition may be submitted at any election held by the local unit of government, but shall not be submitted at a special election of the local unit of government called solely for the purpose of submitting this millage proposition. [MCL 400.576]

Pursuant to the foregoing provision, the Hillsdale County Board of Commissioners, as defendant's legislative body, submitted a millage proposition to the county's voters in August 2008 to raise funds for the provision of services to older persons by HCSS. The proposition posed the following question:

Shall the limitation on the amount of taxes on the general ad valorem taxes within the County of Hillsdale imposed under Article IX, Section 6, of the Michigan Constitution be increased for said County by .5 mill ($0.50 per $1000 of taxable value) for the period of 2008 to 2022, inclusive, for the intended purpose of planning, coordinating and providing services to older persons by Hillsdale County Senior Services Center, Inc., as provided by Public Act 39 of 1976 [ASOPA]? Shall the county levy such increase in millage for this purpose during such period which will raise in the first year an estimated $676,532?

The proposition was approved at the August 5, 2008 election. Thereafter, in November 2009, HCSS entered into a contract with defendant for the latter to provide services for older persons from January 1, 2009, through December 31, 2010. Hillsdale Co. Senior Servs. Ctr., Inc. v. Co. of Hillsdale, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued January 3, 2012 (Docket No. 301607), 2012 WL 11006, at 2–3. However, in the two fiscal years 2009–2011, for budgetary reasons defendant declined to levy and spend the full 0.5 mill.¹ In response, plaintiffs filed a “Verified Complaint for Mandamus with Request for Temporary Restraining Order, Order to Show Cause, and Request for Preliminary Injunction” in the circuit court, requesting in part that the court:

Issue its permanent Order of Mandamus directing the Defendant, its Board and all of its officers to instruct all pertinent tax billing authorities or agencies (e.g., city or township officials) to levy the full 0.5 mill required by the Proposal, in 2010 and all future years covered by the proposal....

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[A]ppropriate the full amount of the proceeds of the levy to [HSSC] for the provision of services to the older population of the County of Hillsdale.The circuit court ruled in pertinent part that “the Plaintiffs' Writ for Mandamus shall be granted and Defendant shall levy the entire 0.5 mill forthwith, to be reflected on the December, 2010, tax notices and every year hereafter until 2022, inclusive, as set forth in the voter approved ballot proposal.” ² Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the case because it falls within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Tax Tribunal.³ The Court of Appeals agreed with defendant and vacated the circuit court's judgment. Plaintiff then applied for and was granted leave to appeal to this Court. Hillsdale Co. Senior Servs. Ctr., Inc. v. Co. of Hillsdale, 493 Mich. 852, 820 N.W.2d 771 (2012).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law reviewed de novo. Elba Twp. v. Gratiot Co. Drain Comm'r, 493 Mich. 265, 278, 831 N.W.2d 204 (2013). Issues of statutory interpretation are also reviewed de novo. Id.

III. ANALYSIS

This Court is charged with determining whether the circuit court or the Tax Tribunal possesses subject-matter jurisdiction over this case. As always, we begin by considering the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions.

A. STATUTORY TEXT

The jurisdiction of the circuit court is governed by Const. 1963, art. 6, § 13, which provides:

The circuit court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters not prohibited by law; appellate jurisdiction from all inferior courts and tribunals except as otherwise provided by law; power to issue, hear and determine prerogative and remedial writs; supervisory and general control over inferior courts and tribunals within their respective jurisdictions in accordance with rules of the supreme court; and jurisdiction of other cases and matters as provided by rules of the supreme court.

MCL 600.605 further provides:

Circuit courts have original jurisdiction to hear and determine all civil claims and remedies, except where exclusive jurisdiction is given in the constitution or by statute to some other court or where the circuit courts are denied jurisdiction by the constitution or statutes of this state.

MCL 205.731 provides an exception for jurisdiction in tax cases:

The tribunal has exclusive and original jurisdiction over all of the following:

(a) A proceeding for direct review of a final decision, finding, ruling, determination, or order of an agency⁴ relating to assessment, valuation, rates, special assessments, allocation, or equalization, under the property tax laws of this state.

(b) A proceeding for a refund or redetermination of a tax levied under the property tax laws of this state.

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(e) Any other proceeding provided by law.

Thus, for the tribunal to have jurisdiction pursuant to MCL 205.731(a), four elements must be present: (1) a proceeding for direct review of a final decision, finding, ruling, determination, or order; (2) of an agency; (3) relating to an assessment, valuation, rate, special assessment, allocation, or equalization; (4) under the property tax laws. Where all such elements are present, the tribunal's jurisdiction is both original and exclusive.

The instant appeal is a proceeding for direct review of a “final decision”—the board's decision not to levy and spend the full 0.5 mill. The board constitutes an “agency” pursuant to the definition set forth in MCL 205.703(a). And the issue here is one arising “under the property tax laws.” See MCL 400.576 (specifically allowing defendant to “levy up to 1 mill [property tax] for services to older citizens”); Const. 1963, art. 9, § 6 (governing property taxes).⁵ Thus, the central issue in this case is whether the board's decision not to levy and spend the full 0.5 mill “relat[es] to assessment, valuation, rates, special assessments, allocation, or equalization.”

None of the listed terms is statutorily defined, so we begin by consulting a dictionary. Koontz v. Ameritech Servs., Inc., 466 Mich. 304, 312, 645 N.W.2d 34 (2002). On initial review of this list, “rates” appears to be the most relevant term under the facts of this case. “Rate” means “the amount of a charge or payment with reference to some basis of calculation.” Random House Webster's College Dictionary (1997). During the pertinent time periods, the board levied 0.15 and 0.25 mills, although plaintiffs claim that the ballot proposition mandated a 0.5 mill levy. Thus, the heart of the dispute pertains to the “amount of a charge” by defendant to its property taxpayers. Although plaintiffs conceded at oral argument that this case does pertain to rates, ⁶ they argued to the contrary in their briefs on the grounds that the ballot proposition could achieve only two ends: either it absolutely required the levy of the full 0.5 mill or it required nothing. However, despite plaintiffs' all-or-nothing approach, the instant dispute does involve rates for the simple fact that both “all” and “nothing” constitute rates—0 percent and 100 percent of the full 0.5 mill—and in any case, defendant did levy and spend portions of the 0.5 mill: 30 percent of the 0.5 mill in 2009–2010 and 50 percent of the 0.5 mill in 2010–2011. Plaintiffs simply argue that defendant is required to levy and spend more—that defendant must levy a larger “amount of charge,” 100 percent of the full 0.5 mill. Accordingly, this case does pertain to “rates.” ⁷ Thus, all four elements of MCL 205.731(a) are satisfied, and the tribunal possesses...