People v. Washington

• Decision Date: 29 July 2021
• Docket Number: 160707
• Citation: 508 Mich. 107,972 N.W.2d 767
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Gregory Carl WASHINGTON, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

508 Mich. 107

972 N.W.2d 767

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Gregory Carl WASHINGTON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 160707

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued on application for leave to appeal on April 7, 2021

Decided July 29, 2021

Dana Nessel, Attorney General, Fadwa A. Hammoud, Solicitor General, Kym L. Worthy, Prosecuting Attorney, Jon P. Wojtala, Chief of Research, Training, and Appeals, and Jospeh D. Shopp, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.

John F. Royal for defendant.

Willie Curtis in propria persona, amicus curiae.

Aaron Cyars in propria persona, amicus curiae.

Cedric Rowe in propria persona, amicus curiae.

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH

Clement, J.

At issue in this case is whether the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction when it resentenced defendant in 2006 pursuant to a Court of Appeals order while defendant's application for leave to appeal that order was still pending in this Court.

We hold that it did. We also hold that the trial court did not err 10 years later in 2016 when it granted defendant relief on this ground, which was raised in defendant's successive motion for relief from judgment.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In November 2004, defendant, Gregory C. Washington, was convicted of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317 ; two counts of assault with intent to commit murder (AWIM), MCL 750.83 ; possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b ; and felon in possession of a firearm (felon-in-possession), MCL 750.224f. The trial court sentenced defendant as a second-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.10, to 40 to 60 years’ imprisonment for the second-degree murder conviction; the 40-year minimum sentence was a 12-month upward departure from the sentencing guidelines range. The trial court also sentenced defendant to concurrent life sentences for each AWIM conviction, to 2 to 7½ years’ imprisonment for the felon-in-possession conviction, and to a mandatory consecutive 2 years’ imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction.

The Court of Appeals previously described the relevant procedural history of this case as follows:

On January 7, 2005, defendant appealed as of right his convictions and sentences on a number of grounds.² Relevant here, defendant challenged the propriety of the trial court's upward departure from the sentencing guidelines range for second-degree murder without stating on the record "substantial and compelling reasons" for the departure as required under MCL 769.34(3).³ In a June 13, 2006 unpublished opinion, [the Court of Appeals] affirmed defendant's convictions, but agreed that "the trial court did not satisfy MCL 769.34(3) when imposing a sentence outside the prescribed sentencing guidelines range." People v. Washington , unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued June 13, 2006 (Docket No. 260155), p. 8 . [The Court of Appeals] remanded for resentencing, directing the trial court to reconsider the propriety of its sentence and articulate substantial and compelling reasons for any departure as required by MCL 769.34(3). Id. at 8-9.

On August 8, 2006, defendant filed an application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court. On October 4, 2006, while the application was still pending, the trial court resentenced defendant pursuant to [the Court of Appeals’] June 13, 2006 opinion and remand, imposing identical sentences and offering a number of justifications for the departure. The Supreme Court denied defendant's application for leave to appeal on December 28, 2006. People v. Washington , 477 Mich. 973 (2006).

On December 4, 2006, about three weeks before the Supreme Court denied defendant's initial application, defendant filed in [the Court of Appeals] a delayed application for leave to appeal the resentencing order, again arguing that the trial court failed to articulate on the record the required "substantial and compelling reasons" for the upward departure from defendant's sentencing guidelines for second-degree murder. [The Court of Appeals] denied defendant's application "for lack of merit." People v. Washington , unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered May 4, 2007 (Docket No. 274768). Defendant filed an application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court on June 28, 2007, which that Court denied.

People v. Washington , 480 Mich. 891 (2007).

Several months later, on March 25, 2008, defendant filed a motion for relief from judgment in the trial court pursuant to MCR 6.502, raising claims of (1) insufficient evidence, (2) denial of his right to present an insanity defense, (3) ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and (4) ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. On July 9, 2008, the trial court denied defendant's motion under MCR 6.508(D)(3) for failure to demonstrate good cause for not raising the issues in a prior appeal and failure to show actual prejudice. [The Court of Appeals] denied defendant's July 8, 2009 delayed application for leave to appeal the trial court's decision, People v. Washington , unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered October 19, 2009 (Docket No. 292891), and the Michigan Supreme Court denied defendant leave to appeal [the Court of Appeals’] denial, People v. Washington , 486 Mich. 1042 (2010).

On June 22, 2016, after exhausting all available postconviction relief, defendant filed his second motion for relief from judgment—the motion giving rise to the instant appeal. Defendant challenged his sentences on jurisdictional grounds, arguing that the trial court's October 4, 2006 order after resentencing was invalid because the court lacked jurisdiction to resentence defendant while his application remained pending before the Michigan Supreme Court. In response, the prosecution argued that defendant's successive motion for relief from judgment was clearly barred by MCR 6.502(G), which prohibits successive motions for relief from judgment unless there has been a retroactive change in the law or new evidence has been discovered. In a November 22, 2016 written order and opinion, the trial court indicated its agreement with the prosecution's argument but noted that the prosecution had failed to address the jurisdictional issue, which "may be raised at any time." The trial court concluded that under MCR 7.215(F)(1)(a), MCR 7.305(C)(6)(a), and relevant caselaw, it had lacked jurisdiction to enter the October 4, 2006 judgment of sentence. The trial court granted defendant's motion, vacated defendant's sentences, and ordered resentencing.⁴

² Defendant's issues on appeal included ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to raise an insanity defense and failure to file a motion for a new trial based on the assertion that defendant's convictions were against the great weight of the evidence, violation of a sequestration order by the prosecution's witnesses, and prosecutorial misconduct.

³ On the date of defendant's sentencing, MCL 769.34(3) provided that "[a] court may depart from the appropriate sentence range established under the sentencing guidelines ... if the court has a substantial and compelling reason for that departure and states on the record the reasons for departure." MCL 769.34(3) was later struck down in People v. Lockridge , 498 Mich. 358, 391-392, 870 N.W.2d 502 (2015), and the substantial and compelling reason requirement was replaced with a requirement that a departure be reasonable.

⁴ Defendant also requested that, on resentencing, the trial court determine the applicable guidelines range for both defendant's second-degree murder conviction and his AWIM convictions and take them into account pursuant to Lockridge , 498 Mich. 358 . The trial court concluded that defendant was not entitled to any relief under Lockridge because the rule articulated in that case does not retroactively apply to sentences on collateral review. Defendant does not challenge this decision on appeal.

People v. Washington , 321 Mich App 276, 279-282, 908 N.W.2d 924 (2017).]

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's order. Id. at 278, 908 N.W.2d 924. The Court held that "[i]t is indisputable that the trial court lacked jurisdiction" to perform the 2006 resentencing because of the trial court's violation of MCR 7.215(F)(1)(a) and MCR 7.305(C)(6)(a) —i.e., because the trial court resentenced defendant before the Court of Appeals’ 2006 remand order was final. Id. at 284, 908 N.W.2d 924. The Court also rejected the prosecutor's argument that the trial court's mistake was merely procedural, reasoning that this Court had characterized a similar error as a jurisdictional error in People v. Swafford , 483 Mich. 1, 6 n 5, 762 N.W.2d 902 (2009). Id. at 285, 908 N.W.2d 924. Because the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction when it resentenced defendant, the Court concluded that the trial court's resentencing was void. Id.

With regard to the manner in which defendant's argument was raised—a successive motion for relief from judgment—the Court of Appeals agreed with the prosecutor that MCR 6.502(G)(2) provides only two exceptions to the prohibition of successive motions for relief from judgment and that neither of the two exceptions encompasses errors in subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. at 286, 908 N.W.2d 924. However, the Court disagreed that the trial court impermissibly created a third exception to the successive-motion bar through its order vacating the judgment of sentence and ordering resentencing. Id. Instead, the Court reasoned that the trial court had properly used its "inherent power to ‘recognize its lack of jurisdiction or any pertinent boundaries on its proper exercise’ " of power. Id ., quoting People v. Clement , 254 Mich App 387, 394, 657 N.W.2d 172 (2002).

The prosecutor applied for leave to appeal in this Court, and we heard oral argument on the application in October 2018. People v. Washington , ––– Mich. ––––, 905 N.W.2d 597 (2018). We vacated the previous judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded back to...