Hillsdale Coal & Coke Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co.

• Decision Date: 09 November 1916
• Docket Number: 2446.
• Parties: HILLSDALE COAL & COKE CO. v. PENNSYLVANIA R. CO.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

237 F. 272

HILLSDALE COAL & COKE CO. v. PENNSYLVANIA R. CO.

No. 2446.

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

November 9, 1916

A. L Cole and A. M. Liveright, both of Clearfield, Pa., for plaintiff.

Henry Wolf Bikle and Francis I. Gowen, both of Philadelphia, Pa for defendant.

DICKINSON District Judge.

This case is ruled by the principles of law discussed in Minds v. P.R.R. Co., 237 F. 267, in its larger aspect. The minor questions as set forth in the reasons for a new trial will, because of their number, be grouped into classes and disposed of in the order in which discussed by counsel.

We are in entire accord with that part of the argument of counsel for defendant wherein the essential elements of a case at law are discussed. The point is often made as if it were one of jurisdiction. It is not that, but one of the presence or absence of the elements necessary to make out a case. A plaintiff, who brings his action at law for a cause of action arising under the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Law must (as every plaintiff must) make out his case. If he has been damaged by a car distribution made in accordance with a system or rule of distribution adopted by a railroad carrier and filed with the Commission in accordance with the requirements of the statutes, he has not suffered a legal injury, unless the distribution be one of the character condemned by law. This he must prove, and he can prove it only by a finding of the Commission. In consequence he is driven to go first to the Commission for all the administrative findings. The reason for this lies on the surface of things. When, however, these have been found either on complaint of our supposititious plaintiff or of some one before him, then he may bring his action at law and can recover. He can recover, because he can make out his case first by proving (through the finding of the Commission) that the system of car distribution enforced by the carrier defendant was unjust and discriminatory; and, secondly, that he has been damaged thereby, and to what amount. He is only compelled to go to the Commission when his case depends upon the administrative finding that the rule of car distribution of which he complains is an improper one. If the carrier has adopted and filed a fair and proper rule, or one has been found by the Commission, and the cause of action arises out of an unjust and discriminatory departure from it, causing damage, this fact may be established in an action at law, and no preliminary recourse to the Commission is necessary. The adjudged cases make clear the distinction by which it may be readily determined whether such recourse is necessary.

The distinction indicated is not only consistent with, but is to be found in, the section of the act and the cases to which we have been referred: Section 9, Act to Regulate Commerce; P.R.R. v. Clark, 238 U.S. 456, 35 Sup.Ct. 896, 59 L.Ed. 1406; Proctor v. U.S., 225 U.S. 282, 32 Sup.Ct. 761, 56 L.Ed. 1091; Riddle v. Railroad, 3 Interst.Com.R. 230; P.R.R. v. International, 230 U.S. 184, 33 Sup.Ct. 893, 57 L.Ed. 1446, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 315; P.R.R. v. Puritan, 237 U.S. 121, 35 Sup.Ct. 484, 59 L.Ed. 867; Railroad v. Penn, 137 F. 343, 70 C.C.A. 23. To which may be added Barrett v. Gimbel Bros., 226 Fed.at page 631, 141 C.C.A. 379, the approved ruling being reported in (D.C.) 215 F. 1004, reference to which latter ruling is made merely as an expression of the views of this court already made. This further distinction is, of course, also clear, emphasizing the distinction already made. The complaining party is given an option or choice of the tribunal he will ask to assess his damages. When he has once made his election, he is (again of course) bound by it. He cannot follow an unsuccessful resort to one tribunal by taking the same claim of damages before another. What he can do, and what he must do, are sometimes coupled, and sometimes not. Both of them may be thus summarized:

1. If the question he asks to have determined is an administrative one, he has no option, but must make his complaint to the Commission, and cannot take it elsewhere.

2. If the questions are all and wholly juridical, he has the option (under the rulings of the courts, although the Commission has suggested a different view) of either bringing his action at law or complaining to the Commission.

3. If the questions necessarily arising are some of them administrative and some juridical, then he must first go to the Commission to have the administrative questions determined, but as to the juridical questions he still retains his alternative or optional right.

4. He may first apply to the Commission to have the administrative questions determined, limiting his complaint to this feature, and, if determined in his favor, may bring his action at law, establishing what may be called the administrative facts by putting in evidence the finding of the Commission and proving the juridical facts by any evidence at his command; or--

5. He may include in his complaint to the Commission both the administrative and the juridical elements of his case, and have them determine both and everything involved in his complaint.

If there had been no right of trial by jury involved, the supply of remedies provided by the act would doubtless have been stopped at this point. Because it was involved, Congress saw that something further was required. As the right of trial by jury was not involved in the administrative questions, the findings of the Commission as to them were made to conclude everybody. As the plaintiff would not bring the juridical questions before the Commission, except as a volunteer, the findings of the Commission were made to conclude him. As the defendant was not a volunteer, and as Congress wished to give to the carriers (whether it was a constitutional right or not) the right to a jury trial, the findings of the Commission were not made to conclude them. The carrier was therefore left at liberty to pay or not pay the award as it might elect. If it paid it, the complaint of the plaintiff was satisfied, and of course silenced. If it did not pay it, the plaintiff must have a further remedy, and this rei necessitate must be by a proceeding at law, because in no other way could the carrier be brought before a jury. He is therefore given (or there is restored to him) a right of action at law. To make use (as far as could be done) of the fruits of the labor and time expended in securing the report of the Commission, the findings are made evidence, and the plaintiff is allowed his costs and counsel fees. If, to paraphrase the language of Congress, this action, to which the act of the defendant has driven the plaintiff, is treated in all respects as an action for damages, except that all the findings of the Commission are made evidence, etc., all or nearly all troubling questions are eliminated. If the action is regarded as one to enforce the findings of the Commission, and they are further regarded as binding upon the plaintiff, but open to any attack by the defendant, then a veritable legal chaos reigns.

It will be seen to follow that in such final action the administrative findings must (as in the case of a first action at law) conclude everybody and settle the administrative facts. The facts to be found by the jury must be open ones to the defendant, and (at least may) be alike open to the plaintiff. The simplest view which might be taken of such a proceeding is that it is to be tried (with the exceptional features noted) precisely as the action for damages would have been tried, had the plaintiff gone first to the Commission to determine the administrative facts, and then brought his action; the administrative findings included in the report being treated as such...