Hilsabeck v. State
Decision Date | 14 August 1984 |
Docket Number | 3 Div. 915 |
Citation | 477 So.2d 465 |
Parties | Michael L. HILSABECK v. STATE. |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Joan Van Almen of DeMent & Wise, Montgomery, for appellant.
Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen., and Louis C. Colley, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Michael L. Hilsabeck pleaded guilty in Jefferson Circuit Court to charges of first degree rape and burglary. He was sentenced to two concurrent fifteen year terms of imprisonment. Following this sentence, Hilsabeck petitioned the Circuit Court of Montgomery County for a writ of habeas corpus. The petition was based primarily upon his statutory ineligibility for correctional incentive time or so-called "good time." From the trial court's denial of that petition, Hilsabeck appeals.
The central issue in this appeal is whether the Alabama Correctional Incentive Time Act, 1980 Ala. Acts 80-446 [now codified at § 14-9-41, Code of Alabama (Supp.1982) ], violates state constitutional requirements for passage of legislation or federal and state equal protection and due process guarantees. Due to the technical nature of portions of Hilsabeck's arguments, it is necessary to discuss the background and operation of 1980 Ala. Acts 80-446. This law established four classifications within which all inmates of Alabama prisons are classified for purposes of computation and administration of Correctional Incentive Time (CIT):
Further, sub-section (c)(5) states that "No inmate may reach any class without first having gone through and meeting the requirements of all lower classifications."
The statute also expressly establishes the amounts of Correctional Incentive Time deductions available for each class:
The crux of the controversy in this appeal, however, lies in the statutory provision which precludes certain inmates from enjoying the benefits of Correctional Incentive Time. Sub-section (e) states:
As the statute provides, Class IV inmates are, for various reasons, not entitled to CIT. Prisoners who have entered the system and have not yet been classified, but are ultimately to be placed in a higher class, are temporarily placed in Class IV. The majority of Class IV inmates, however, are so classified due to their refusal to work, disciplinary infractions, or for reasons related to their sentences in light of sub-section (e).
Testimony of Department of Corrections officials indicated that due to the distinctive eligibility criteria of the various classes, the Department's computerized record keeping system had to be programmed to reflect whether a prisoner is entitled to earn CIT under the statute. Director of Classifications, John E. Nagle, Jr., testified that numerical degrees one through nine were assigned to individual prisoners to facilitate the computerized system. The various numerical degrees designate whether an inmate is currently eligible or will eventually become eligible for CIT. Those prisoners precluded from the benefits of CIT by sub-section (e) of Act 80-446 are sub-classified in "group nine" of Class IV. At the other end of the spectrum, however, "group one" inmates may earn CIT in accordance with their respective higher class under the terms of the statute. The other numerical sub-classifications have similar meaning within the system.
Alabama is by no means alone in its efforts to install a fair and equitable system for reducing the sentences of worthy inmates, thereby providing the prison system with an effective method of control, while limiting certain serious offenders' eligibility for CIT. Our survey of the applicable laws throughout the United States revealed that all but four states have some form of sentence reduction or good time plan. We have discovered nine states which have adopted "behavioral classification" systems similar to Alabama's. 1 See Jacobs, Sentencing By Prison Personnel: Good Time, 30 U.C.L.A. L.Rev. 217 (1982). [We have adopted certain terminology from Professor Jacobs's comprehensive article, recognizing its particularly useful descriptiveness.]
These "behavioral classification" systems establish specific categories to which inmates of an institution are assigned. An inmate's classification is related to his record of conduct or his "demonstration of responsibility in the performance of assignments; and a demonstration of a desire for self improvement." See Va.Code § 53.1-200 (1982).
Each class of inmates within such a system has a specific amount of good time to be awarded each month to inmates who are assigned to that class. Generally, the amount of good time awarded in each class is directly related to the eligibility criteria for prisoners' membership in the class. Higher classes have more stringent eligibility requirements, but award greater amounts of good time to qualifying inmates. Lower classes have less rigid eligibility criteria and correspondingly smaller good time awards.
All of the states utilizing a "behavioral classification" system have at least one class or category of prisoners which is not entitled to earn good time deductions. This ineligibility for good time deductions may result from the prisoner's violations of disciplinary rules of the institution, or from administrative necessity (such as new inmates entering prison who are waiting to be classified). Ineligibility may also stem from a statutory directive based upon the length of the prisoner's sentence or the seriousness of the offense for which he was convicted. See e.g. Ala. Code § 41-9-41 (Supp.1982); and Tenn.Code Ann. § 41-21-229 (Supp.1982).
In the circuit court hearing on his petition for writ of habeas corpus, appellant Hilsabeck testified that his Class IV assignment and ineligibility for good time sentence reduction was strictly a matter of the length of his sentence. The record bears this out. Although the statute also provides for inmates to be classified in Class IV for unwillingness to work or as a result of disciplinary violations, appellant has repeatedly expressed a willingness to work and has not been the subject of disciplinary proceedings. His Class IV status, therefore, results solely from the length of his sentence.
In his appeal, Hilsabeck raises five constitutional grounds for reversal of the judgment of the Circuit Court of Montgomery County denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus. At the outset, we recognize that the trial court is due to be affirmed for appellant's failure to include an oath verifying the factual allegations of his petition. Ala.Code § 15-21-4; Barker v. State, 437 So.2d 1375 (Ala.Crim.App.1983); O'Such v. State, 423 So.2d 317 (Ala.Crim.App.1982). In the interest of judicial economy, however, and fully aware that the technical...
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