Brooks v. State

• Decision Date: 05 March 1993
• Citation: 622 So.2d 447
• Parties: Donald Lee BROOKS v. STATE. CR 91-2002.
• Court: Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

Page 447

622 So.2d 447

Donald Lee BROOKS v. STATE.

CR 91-2002.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

March 5, 1993.

Rehearing Denied May 7, 1993.

Certiorari Denied Aug. 6, 1993

Alabama Supreme Court 1921229.

Donald Lee Brooks, pro se.

Danny Ray Miles, Capshaw, for appellant.

James H. Evans, Atty. Gen., and Harry Lyles, Dept. of Corrections, for appellee.

BOWEN, Presiding Judge.

This is an appeal from the denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus in which the appellant claims that he is entitled to retroactive good-time credit. The appellant alleges that Ala.Code § 14-9-41(h) (Supp.1992), upon which the Department of Corrections relied to deny him retroactive good time benefits, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

On December 9, 1988, the appellant was convicted of sodomy in the second degree, a Class B felony, Ala.Code § 13A-6-64(b) (Supp.1992), and sentenced to ten years' imprisonment. At that time, the appellant was not eligible to receive any good-time deductions from his sentence by virtue of Ala.Code § 14-9-41(e) (1982). That section provided that "no person may receive the benefits of correctional incentive time if he or she has been convicted of a Class A felony, or has been sentenced to life, or death, or who has received a sentence for 10 years or more...."

In 1991, the Alabama Correctional Incentive Time Act was amended to provide that "no person may receive the benefits of correctional incentive time if he or she has been convicted of a Class A felony, or has been sentenced to life, or death, or who has received a sentence for more than 15 years...." Act of July 31, 1991, No. 91-637, 1991 Ala. Acts 1201, § 1(e) (codified at Ala.Code § 14-9-41(e) (Supp.1992)) (effective October 29, 1991).

The 1991 amendment extended good-time benefits to all inmates, except Class A felons, who had been sentenced to 15 years or less after October 29, 1991. In addition, it granted eligibility for retroactive good time benefits to those prisoners who had not been earning good time under the prior statute but who would have been entitled to good time under the amended statute. Act No. 91-637, § 1(h), 1991 Ala. Acts at 1204 (codified at Ala.Code § 14-9-41(h) (Supp.1992)). The award of retroactive good time to those eligible was made subject to the discretion of the commissioner of the Department of Corrections. Id.

The appellant, who was convicted of a Class B felony, sentenced to 10 years, and not receiving any good time on the date of the 1991 amendment, would have been eligible for retroactive good-time credit under the 1991 amendment but for the following exception in § 14-9-41(h):

"Deductions for good behavior, work habits and cooperation, or good conduct shall be interpreted to give authorized good time retroactively, to those offenders convicted of crimes committed after May 19, 1980, except those convicted of crimes of the unlawful sale or distribution of controlled substances as enumerated in Title 13A and in former chapter 2 of Title 20, and for any sexual offenses as enumerated in chapter 6, Title 13A...."

The above-emphasized exception rendered the appellant ineligible to be considered for retroactive benefits. It is this "sex offender" exception that the appellant challenges as an unconstitutional denial of equal protection of the laws.

Initially, we note that the law in effect at the time of the commission of the crime governs a prisoner's eligibility for good time. See Warren v. State, 598 So.2d 1058 (Ala.Cr.App.1992). A prisoner sentenced under an earlier, less favorable sentence reduction statute generally has no right to complain of the ameliorative provisions of a later good-time statute. Mitchell v. Rayl, 8 Kan.App.2d 690, 665 P.2d 1117 (1983); Bossie v. State, 488 A.2d 477 (Me.1985). Some courts have even held that a statutory provision for applying the terms of a new, more generous sentence reduction statute to prisoners sentenced before the effective date of that statute results in sentence commutation by the legislative branch, a power usually reserved under state constitutions to the governor. See, e.g., Stewart v. Clarke, 482 N.W.2d 248 (1992). The separation of powers problem can be resolved, however, by legislation making the grant of retroactive good-time benefits subject to the approval of the executive branch, such as the Pardon and Parole Board or the Department of Corrections. See Boston v. Black, 340 N.W.2d 401 (1983).

While it is clear, in the present case, that the legislature need not have granted retroactive good time to any prisoners, the fact that it granted those benefits to some but not to all prisoners similarly situated implicates the Equal Protection Clause.

"Constitutionally, the mere fact that a government is under no obligation to provide a benefit does not excuse its invidious discrimination among potential recipients after the decision has been reached to establish the benefit. To paraphrase one commentator [L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 279 n. 20 (1978) ]: Tolerance for discretion in the granting of benefits does not imply tolerance for their discretionary distribution."

J. Gobert & N. Cohen, Rights of Prisoners § 10.02 at 294-95 (1981) (footnotes omitted).

An equal protection challenge to a system awarding good time to some but not to all inmates requires that a court "inquire only whether the challenged distinction rationally furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose." McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 270, 93 S.Ct. 1055, 1059, 35 L.E.2d 282 (1973). In Hilsabeck v. State, 477 So.2d 465 (Ala.Cr.App.1984), affirmed, 477 So.2d 472 (Ala.1985), this Court stated that in analyzing equal protection challenges to the Alabama Correctional Incentive Time Act,

"we utilize the 'rational basis' test prescribed by the United States Supreme Court. Under this test, we must determine (1) whether the classification furthers a proper governmental purpose and (2) whether the classification is rationally related to that purpose."

Hilsabeck, 477 So.2d at 471 (citations omitted). In Gaines v. Huntsville-Madison County Airport Authority, 581 So.2d 444 (Ala.1991), the Alabama Supreme Court observed that the "rational basis" test

" ' "employs a relatively relaxed standard reflecting the Court's awareness that the drawing of lines that create distinctions is peculiarly a legislative task and an unavoidable one.... Dandridge v. Williams, [397 U.S. 471, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970) ]."

" 'In applying this "relaxed" standard to the instant case, we look to see if, under any perceivable set of facts, the statutory discrimination ... is relevant to and justified by a permissible legislative purpose.' "

Gaines, 581 So.2d at 448 (quoting Chandler v. Hospital Authority of Huntsville, 500 So.2d 1012, 1016 (Ala.1986)).

In Hilsabeck, we held that because the state "has an interest in closely supervising and controlling the parole or early release of serious offenders," there was a rational basis for "treat[ing] persons sentenced to ten years or longer ... differently [from] those sentenced to lesser terms." 477 So.2d at 471. See also Thornton v. Hunt, 852 F.2d 526, 527 (11th Cir.1988) (wherein the court held that denial of good time to prisoners sentenced to more than ten years "was rationally related to the legitimate purpose of preventing the early release of serious offenders").

In Thomas v. State, 552 So.2d 875, 877 (Ala.Cr.App.), affirmed, 552 So.2d 878 (Ala.1989), this Court observed that it was rational to deny good-time benefits to both Class A felons and to inmates who had been sentenced to ten years or more because the latter group "received a sentence in the Class A felony range," and could therefore be considered serious offenders.

"The minimum sentence for a Class A felony is 10 years, Alabama Code 1975, § 13A-5-6. Class A felons ... are ... ineligible for good time because the legislature obviously deemed the nature of their offenses too serious to merit the benefits of good time sentence reduction. It is reasonable to assume that the legislature also concluded that anyone who received a sentence in the Class A felony range would also not merit beneficial treatment."

Thomas, 552 So.2d at 877. Based on the foregoing authorities, it is clear that the length of a prisoner's sentence indicates the seriousness of his offense and constitutes a rational basis for denying him good-time credits.

In addition to the length of sentence, the legislature may properly take into account other factors in determining which classes of inmates are eligible for good time. As the Alabama Supreme Court observed in Gaines, 581 So.2d at 448, "the drawing of lines that create distinctions is peculiarly a legislative task." If the distinctions have a rational basis, courts will not interfere with legislative line-drawing in this area. "[Good time] has become a 'valuable privilege' which ... the State may grant or not to inmates as a class as it sees fit." H. Kerper & J. Kerper, Legal Rights of the Convicted 485 (1974) (emphasis and brackets in original).

Using the foregoing rationale, this Court has previously held that there is a legitimate legislative purpose for treating sex offenders differently from other inmates. See Bryant v. State, 494 So.2d 874, 875 (Ala.Cr.App.1986) (regulation permitting consideration of past sex-related crimes reasonable in...