Hilska v. Jones

Decision Date15 December 2003
Docket NumberNo. CIV.A. 02-1042(RMU).,CIV.A. 02-1042(RMU).
Citation297 F.Supp.2d 82
PartiesJouko M. HILSKA, Plaintiff, v. Boisfeuillet JONES Jr. et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Columbia

Jouko M. Hilska, Helsinki, FN, Pro se.

Eric Neil Lieberman, Robert Ernest Leidenheimer, Jr., U.S. Attorney's Office, Washington, DC, Daniel Karp, Allen, Karpinski, Bryant & Karp, Baltimore, MD, Mark E. Nagle, U.S. Attorney's Office, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

DENYING THE FEDERAL DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS AND DISMISSING THE PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS AGAINST THE OTHER DEFENDANTS

URBINA, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

The pro se plaintiff brings this action against myriad federal, private, and foreign defendants, claiming that they wrongfully prevented him from gaining political asylum in the United States by orchestrating a diabolical scheme that resulted in offenses ranging from forgery to attempted murder. Several of the defendants responded to these allegations with motions to dismiss. In resolving those motions, the court allowed the plaintiff additional time to perfect service upon certain defendants and to clarify his claims and jurisdictional grounds against other defendants according to specific instructions. The plaintiff responded to the court's ruling by filing a wave of submissions, none of which conform to the court's instructions or help to clarify the plaintiff's claims. The federal defendants now bring a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, asking the court to dismiss the plaintiff's claims as frivolous. While the court recognizes that the plaintiff's claims appear implausible, the court cannot say that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the matter. Thus, the court denies the federal defendants' motion. The court, however, dismisses the plaintiff's claims against the other defendants because the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate perfected service of process and clarify his claims and jurisdictional grounds in conformity with the court's instructions.

II. BACKGROUND1
A. Factual Background

The pro se plaintiff, a native and citizen of Finland, seeks compensatory relief from a variety of federal, foreign, and private defendants.2 Compl. at 1-3, 7. The plaintiff alleges that the federal defendants are responsible for various misdeeds, including forgery, extortion, assault, destruction of documents, torture, and attempted murder. See generally id.; Pl.'s Aug. 2003 Resps. He also claims that the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS")3 wrongfully deported him from the United States. Compl. at 6. Furthermore, the plaintiff boldly promises that he will reveal "the tragic and premature deaths of five Americans and two Europeans" if the court allows this action to proceed. Id.

The events giving rise to this action originated from three immigration proceedings. The first set of proceedings began sometime in 1995 when the INS denied the plaintiff's application for asylum and subsequently deported him. Id. at 4.

In July 1999, the plaintiff triggered the second set of proceedings by attempting to re-enter the United States. Id. Ex. D. The INS found the plaintiff ineligible to enter the country and referred the matter to the immigration court, whereupon the plaintiff requested political asylum from Finland. Id. At this point, the evidentiary record is in conflict. According to the immigration court, it then denied the plaintiff's request for asylum. Id. According to the plaintiff, however, the immigration court initially granted him asylum, but the President later invalidated that decision. Id. at 5. In July 2000, the INS once again deported the plaintiff from the United States. Id.

The third and final set of proceedings began in December 2000, when the plaintiff reentered the United States. Id. at 5-6. Authorities arrested and eventually deported him in June 2001. Id.

B. Procedural History

On May 28, 2002, the plaintiff filed his complaint against a host of defendants. Almost four months later, the plaintiff filed an affidavit documenting his efforts to serve a summons and copy of the complaint on each of the defendants via registered mail.4 Pl.'s Return of Service/Aff. at 1, Exs. 1-17.

On September 23, 2002, private defendant Boisfeuillet Jones Jr. filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5) or (6), asserting both that the plaintiff did not properly effect service on him and that the complaint failed to include any allegations against him. Def. Jones's Mot. at 2. On December 2, 2002, having obtained an extension of time from the court, federal defendants President Bush, Attorney General Ashcroft, Senator Clinton,5 former President Clinton, United States Immigration Judge Jill H. Dufrense, and INS Deportation Officer Thomas asked the court to dismiss the claims against them pursuant to Rules 8(a) and 12(b)(6). In the alternative, the federal defendants requested that the plaintiff provide a more definite statement of his claims under Rule 12(e).

On January 13, 2003, the court issued an order directing the plaintiff to respond to the motions to dismiss and advising him that the court may treat the motions as conceded if he failed to file a response by February 7, 2003. Order dated Jan. 13, 2003. On March 3, 2003, after learning that the plaintiff had mailed a response to the defendants, the court directed the plaintiff to file that response with the court by March 14, 2003. Order dated Mar. 3, 2003. On March 17, 2003, the plaintiff late-filed a response ("March 17th response").6 The Clerk of the Court then mailed a copy of the March 17th response to the relevant defendants to ensure that it was consistent with the copy that they had received from the plaintiff. Notice dated Apr. 24, 2003. Those defendants notified the court of discrepancies between the March 17th response and the response that they had received, and provided the court with a copy of the latter. Defs.' Notice dated Apr. 30, 2003. After determining that the plaintiff's March 17th response did not match the one he served on the defendants, the court struck the March 17th response and substituted it with the actual response that the defendants had provided. Order dated May 12, 2003.

With the briefing complete, on July 11, 2003, the court granted federal defendant Dufrense's motion to dismiss and the other federal defendants' alternative motion for a more definite statement. Hilska v. Jones, 217 F.R.D. 16, 24 (D.D.C.2003). The court, however, allowed the plaintiff until August 4, 2003 to clarify his claims against the remaining federal defendants and to provide the jurisdictional grounds as to the foreign defendants, and gave the plaintiff until August 21, 2003 to produce adequate proof of service upon the private defendants. Id. at 22-27. Toward that end, the court specifically directed the plaintiff to answer in a filed response the following five questions pertaining to the remaining federal defendants:

(1) What are the specific wrongful acts committed?

(2) Who of the remaining federal defendants committed each of those alleged wrongful acts?

(3) On which date did each of these acts occur?

(4) Where did each of these acts occur? [and]

(5) Is the plaintiff suing President Bush, Attorney General Ashcroft, Senator Clinton, former President Clinton, and INS Deportation Officer Thomas in their official capacities?

Id. at 25-26. The court cautioned the plaintiff not to go beyond the scope of these questions and notified him that the court would likely dismiss his claims should he fail to comply with the court's instructions. Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b); Proctor v. Millar Elevator Serv. Co., 8 F.3d 824, 826 (D.C.Cir.1993); Saad v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., Inc., 456 F.Supp. 33, 36 (D.D.C.1978)).

In August 2003, the plaintiff submitted no less than 14 responses, purporting to demonstrate perfected service and to clarify his claims and jurisdictional grounds.7 See generally Pl.'s Aug. 2003 Resps. On October 24, 2003, the federal defendants filed a motion to dismiss in light of these new responses, this time pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). On October 28, 2003, the court gave advance notice to the plaintiff that his failure to respond to the Rule 12(b)(1) motion by November 4, 2003 could result in a judgment in favor of the federal defendants. Notice dated Oct. 28, 2003. To date, the plaintiff has failed to file a response. The court now addresses the federal defendants' Rule 12(b)(1) motion and also determines whether it should dismiss the case as to the other defendants.

III. ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standards
1. Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and the law presumes that "a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994); St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288-89, 58 S.Ct. 586, 82 L.Ed. 845 (1938). Because "subject-matter jurisdiction is an `Art. III as well as a statutory requirement[,] no action of the parties can confer subject-matter jurisdiction upon a federal court.'" Akinseye v. District of Columbia, 339 F.3d 970, 971 (D.C.Cir.2003) (quoting Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702, 102 S.Ct. 2099, 72 L.Ed.2d 492 (1982)). On a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the court has subject-matter jurisdiction. Evans v. B.F. Perkins Co., 166 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir.1999); Rasul v. Bush, 215 F.Supp.2d 55, 61 (D.D.C.2002) (Kotelly, J.) (citing McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 182-83, 56 S.Ct. 780, 80 L.Ed. 1135 (1936)). The court may dismiss a complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction only if "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim...

To continue reading

Request your trial
5 cases
  • Gutch v. Federal Republic of Germany
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • July 27, 2006
    ...that pro se litigants are held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers"); See also Hilska v. Jones, 297 F.Supp.2d 82, 90 (D.D.C.2003) (granting a pro se plaintiff 15 months to correct improper service because of the plaintiff's pro se status and because the pla......
  • Richards v. Duke University
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • March 30, 2007
    ...Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the court has jurisdiction. See Hilska v. Jones, 297 F.Supp.2d 82, 86 (D.D.C. 2003); McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. Of Indiana, 298 U.S. 178, 182, 56 S.Ct. 780, 80 L.Ed. 1135 (1936). "Because subject m......
  • Garlington v. Dist. of Columbia Water & Sewer Auth.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • July 1, 2014
    ...of pro se plaintiff's claim for failure to serve process); Bloem, 24 F.Supp.3d at 103–05, 2014 WL 946185, at *5 ; Hilska v. Jones, 297 F.Supp.2d 82, 90 (D.D.C.2003) (dismissing, without prejudice, suit where pro se plaintiff never complied with extended deadline to serve defendants). Courts......
  • Riles v. GEITHNER, Civil Action No. 09-0214 (PLF).
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • July 2, 2009
    ...factual allegations even arguably serve to remove his claims from the realm of the "essentially fictitious." Compare Hilska v. Jones, 297 F.Supp.2d 82, 89 (D.D.C.2003) (claims held implausible, but not fictitious or frivolous). The Court assumes, for purposes of this Memorandum Opinion, tha......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT