Hiltgen v. Sumrall

• Decision Date: 02 March 1995
• Docket Number: No. 93-7309,93-7309
• Citation: 47 F.3d 695
• Parties: Maureen HILTGEN, Individually and as Parent and Natural Guardian of Nicole Hiltgen and Molly Hiltgen, Minor Children, and as Personal Representative of Peter J. Hiltgen, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, Cross-Appellant, v. Douglas Leon SUMRALL, et al., Defendants-Appellants, Cross-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 695

47 F.3d 695

Maureen HILTGEN, Individually and as Parent and Natural Guardian of Nicole Hiltgen and Molly Hiltgen, Minor Children, and as Personal Representative of Peter J Hiltgen, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, Cross-Appellant, v. Douglas Leon SUMRALL, et al., Defendants-Appellants, Cross-Appellees.

No. 93-7309.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

March 2, 1995.

Wes W. Peters, Stephen P. Kruger, Upshaw, Williams, Biggers, Page & Kruger, Jackson, MS, for Sumrall & Mason & Dixon Lines.

W. Scott Welch, III, L. Lee Tyner, Jr., Butler, Snow, O'Mara, Stevens & Cannada, Jackson, MS, for Abston.

Wayne Milner, Binder, Milner & Milner, Jackson, MS, Michael Weinstock, Richard J. Capriola, Weinstock & Scavo, Atlanta, GA, for appellees.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi.

(Opinion October 27, 5th Cir., 1994, 36 F.3d 438)

AS AMENDED ON DENIAL OF REHEARING AND SUGGESTION FOR REHEARING EN BANC

Before REYNALDO G. GARZA, DeMOSS and PARKER ^*, Circuit Judges.

ROBERT M. PARKER, Circuit Judge:

Maureen Hiltgen filed this diversity wrongful death action against Douglas Leon Sumrall ("Sumrall"), The Mason & Dixon Lines ("Mason"), and D. Larry Abston ("Abston"), asserting negligence and vicarious liability for an automobile accident that caused the death of her husband, Peter J. Hiltgen, on March 6, 1989. After a trial by jury, the district judge entered judgment on the verdict against all of the defendants, jointly and severally, in favor of the plaintiff on March 5, 1992.

The defendants' post-trial motions were ultimately denied, and this appeal followed. The plaintiff filed a cross-appeal as well, which was contingent only. Since we find no merit in the defendants' appeals, we do not address the points of error raised by the plaintiff.

FACTS

The accident from which this case arose occurred on March 6, 1989 at approximately 10:00 p.m. on Interstate 20 near Leeds, Alabama. Peter Hiltgen was killed instantly when his van slammed into the rear of a tractor-trailer rig driven by Sumrall. Sumrall is a Mississippi resident who was employed by Abston. Abston, also a Mississippi resident, owned the tractor-trailer, which had been leased to Mason for the purpose of carrying a load of plastic pipe from Quitman, Mississippi to Woodstock, Georgia. Mason is a Delaware Corporation with its principal place of business in Tennessee, and an agent in Meridian, Mississippi.

Prior to 10:00 p.m. on March 6, 1989, Sumrall pulled the tractor-trailer into the emergency lane or shoulder on the right-hand side of I-20 East, just outside Leeds, Alabama, near the 144 mile marker. Sumrall testified later that the purpose of this stop was to check his load and urinate. The evidence shows that when Sumrall was prepared to continue his haul to Woodstock, Georgia, he started to accelerate in the emergency lane and slowly brought the tractor-trailer back into the right-hand lane of traffic. The evidence also shows that the tractor-trailer was travelling approximately 20--30 miles per hour at the time of the collision.

Approximately seven miles west of the collision, Franklin Howard and Gordon Simpson, travelling in the same vehicle, had entered traffic on I-20 right behind the van driven by Peter Hiltgen. They testified that the van was not being driven in a reckless manner when they were in a position to observe it prior to the accident. Fifteen to twenty seconds before the collision, the Hiltgen van completed a safe pass of a vehicle driven by Britt Smith. Mr. Smith testified that the van was operating with only one headlight, but that it was being operated in a safe manner in all other respects. The evidence indicates that the Hiltgen van was travelling approximately 65--68 miles per hour immediately prior to the collision.

Shortly after the van passed Mr. Smith's vehicle, Smith, Howard, and Franklin saw the rear of the van suddenly jump in the air, and then saw the van veer off into the median. All three witnesses testified that at the time of the collision they could not tell what the van had run into. In addition, all three testified that they did not see the tractor-trailer rig or its lights prior to the accident even though, in their opinion, they were in a position to have seen the tractor-trailer if it had had its lights on. The evidence also shows that Hiltgen did not take any action to avoid the collision, indicating that he did not see the tractor-trailer in time to react.

Prior to trial, the district court ruled that Alabama law would be applied to the negligence claim against Defendant Sumrall. Thus, the defendants asserted the affirmative defense of contributory negligence, which, if proven, provides a complete bar to the plaintiff's recovery under Alabama law. ¹ The district court also ruled that Mississippi law would apply to the vicarious liability claim against Defendant Abston because the employment relationship between Sumrall and Abston was entered into in the State of Mississippi.

Also prior to trial, Defendant Abston moved for summary judgment, arguing that he could not be held vicariously liable for Sumrall's actions because the trip-lease and Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulation 49 C.F.R. Sec. 1057.12 provided that during the term of the lease, Mason was deemed to have exclusive possession, control, and use of the equipment, and in addition that there was no evidence that Abston retained sufficient control over Sumrall to render Abston liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior. The district court denied Abston's motion, holding that a genuine issue of material fact existed with regard to Abston's control over Sumrall.

The parties presented physical evidence, lay testimony, and expert testimony. At the close of all the evidence, the defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The district judge denied this motion and submitted the matter to the jury by use of a special verdict form. The jury found that Sumrall had been negligent and that his negligence was a proximate cause of the collision. The jury also found that Peter Hiltgen had been negligent, but found that Hiltgen's negligence was not a proximate cause of the collision. In addition, the jury found that Abston was liable for Sumrall's negligence. ² Having found against all of the defendants, the jury then awarded the plaintiff $1,500,000.00. ³ The district court entered judgment on the jury verdict.

Following judgment, the defendants renewed their motions for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b), and moved alternatively for a new trial under Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Initially, the district court decided to grant the defendants' motion for a new trial on the grounds that the verdict was based in part on the incompetent testimony of plaintiff's expert witness. However, upon motion for reconsideration by the plaintiff, the court held that any error in admitting the testimony of the plaintiff's expert witness had been waived by the defendants when they failed to raise a contemporaneous objection. Therefore, the court withdrew its order granting the defendants' motion for new trial. In addition, the district court was very clear that the defendants' renewed motions for judgment as a matter of law were denied.

After the court withdrew its order granting a new trial on the bases of erroneously admitted evidence, the court considered the defendants' motion for new trial based on the excessiveness of the jury's punitive damages award and request for remittitur. The court held a hearing to review the propriety of the award, as required by Alabama law, ⁴ and held that the amount awarded by the jury was not excessive.

On appeal, the defendants make the following arguments: 1) that the evidence is not legally sufficient to support the jury verdict and thus they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law; 2) that the jury's verdict is contrary to the great weight of the evidence and thus they are entitled to a new trial; 3) that improper jury instructions and reading of certain stipulations misled the jury and thus they are entitled to a new trial; and 4) that the jury's punitive damages award is excessive and thus they are entitled to a new trial on the damages issue or a remittitur of the jury's verdict. In addition, Defendant Abston argues that as a matter of law he is not vicariously liable for Sumrall's actions.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

A motion for judgment as a matter of law (previously, motion for directed verdict or J.N.O.V.) in an action tried by jury is a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury's verdict. On review of the district court's denial of such a motion, the appellate court uses the same standard to review the verdict that the district court used in first passing on the motion. Bridges v. Groendyke Transp., Inc., 553 F.2d 877 (5th Cir.1977). A jury verdict must be upheld unless "there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find" as the jury did. Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a)(1).

This court has consistently applied this standard to show appropriate deference for the jury's determination.

A jury may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence, and those inferences may constitute sufficient proof to support a verdict. On appeal we are bound to view the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the jury's determination. Even though we might have reached a different conclusion if we had been the trier of fact, we are not free to reweigh the evidence or to re-evaluate credibility of witnesses. We must not substitute for the jury's reasonable factual inferences other inferences that we may regard as more reasonable.

Rideau v. Parkem Indus. Services, Inc., 917 F.2d 892, 897 (5th Cir.1990) (citations omitted).

The defendants address two distinct points, arguing that the evidence is insufficient to...