Hilton v. Oldsmobile Division, General Motors Corp.

• Decision Date: 18 September 1973
• Docket Number: No. 10,10
• Citation: 390 Mich. 43,210 N.W.2d 316
• Parties: Arthur HILTON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. OLDSMOBILE DIVISION, GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee, and Second Injury Fund, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 316

210 N.W.2d 316

390 Mich. 43

Arthur HILTON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. OLDSMOBILE DIVISION, GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee, and Second Injury Fund, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 10.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Sept. 18, 1973.

Rapaport, Siegrist, Sablich & Mitchell, Lasing, by Joseph F. Sablich, Lansing, for plaintiff-appellee.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., A. C. Stoddard, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lansing, for Second Injury Fund.

Before the Entire Bench.

WILLIAMS, Justice.

Plaintiff underwent a surgical bilateral cataract extraction at the age of ten. Thereafter plaintiff could only differentiate between light and dark and detect some movement. However, with the aid of glasses and contact lenses his vision could be corrected to a 20/25 vision in each eye. Despite this handicap plaintiff worked for defendant from 1947 to 1964.

On November 17, 1964, plaintiff received an injury within the course of his employment resulting in the loss of industrial use of his left leg.

On August 20, 1969, the referee decided that plaintiff had lost his eyes within the meaning of Lindsay v. Glennie Industries, Inc., 379 Mich. 573, 153 N.W.2d 642 (1967), Prior to the loss of his left leg so as to qualify him for differential benefits from the Second Injury Fund under the then worded M.C.L.A. § 412.8a; M.S.A. § 17.158(1). ¹ On Arpil 28, 1972, the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board entered an opinion and order affirming the decision of the referee. The Court of Appeals denied leave on July 28, 1972. We granted leave on November 2, 1972. 388 Mich. 793 (1972).

This case is controlled by Lindsay, supra, and Whitt v. Ford Motor Co., 383 Mich. 726, 178 N.W.2d 917 (1970), and we decide it within the specific limits of those two cases.

The Lindsay case decided two different points. First, in a case of 'first impression,' the 'surgical removal of the natural lense . . . is loss of an eye within the meaning of the amended statute.' (M.C.L.A. § 412.10; M.S.A. § 17.160 as amended by 1956 P.A. 195.) Second, the removal was 'made necessary by an injury arising out of and in the course of claimant's employment.' 379 Mich. 573, 578, 153 N.W.2d 642. In Lindsay, the loss of the eye was the only injury involved and thus had to be employment related in order for the claimant to recover for the specific loss.

In Whitt, this Court held that for compensation the second injury must be an injury arising out of and in the course of claimant's employment. We applied the reasoning of Verberg v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 357 Mich. 636, 99 N.W.2d 508 (1959) and stated:

'The creation of the Second Injury Fund under § 8a is a legislative limitation on the decision of Weaver v. Maxwell Motor Co., Supra, insofar as it allows an employee to recover compensation for total and permanent disability from the Second Injury Fund where the employee has suffered the loss of one member from injuries related or Unrelated to employment covered by the workmen's compensation law and subsequently suffers the loss of another member from causes arising out of and in the course of employment covered by the workmen's compensation law. To this extent it removes the effect of Weaver.' 383 Mich. 726, 731, 178 N.W.2d 917. (Emphasis added.)

The second point decided in Lindsay, namely that the injury resulting in surgery was employment related is not to be construed as a specific limitation and requirement in all cases of bilateral cataract extraction. In Lindsay there was only one injury and in order to be compensable it had to be employment related and is not a specific limitation for that kind of loss.

In Hilton, the bilateral catract extraction was the first of two injuries. The second injury was employment related, satisfying Whitt. Vergerg, discussing the purpose behind the legislative creation of the Second Injury Fund, held the first injury did not have to be employment related. Hence, on the authority of Lindsay as to loss, Verberg as to first injury not having to be employment related, and Whitt requiring as is the case in Hilton that the second injury be employment related, we hold that plaintiff is entitled to compensation for permanent and total disability.

The Second Injury Fund argues that to allow recovery, whereas here the employee had lost vision due to a surgical bilateral cataract extraction, but could work due to glasses and contact lenses, here would mean that the employee would not be entitled to compensation if a subsequent eye injury left him with no corrected vision because he would be deemed to have already lost his sight. We recognize this argument might create a problem, but not being applicable to this case, we will resolve this issue when it comes before the Court.

Further, the Lindsay Court recognized:

'. . . that substituting an artificial lens has 'restored' vision to the otherwise sightless eye. We point out that a specific loss award is not made as compensation for diminution of use of the involved organ or member. It is not awarded to compensate for loss of earnings or earning capacity. It is awarded irrespective of either fact or both. If ophthalmological advances and refinements in the use of contact lens has in fact rendered the amended statute inconsonant with its original legislative intent, it is the province of the legislature to say so. We construe the statute in the plain meaning of its wording.' 379 Mich. 573, 578, 153 N.W.2d 642, 644.

Thus the fact that vision can be corrected does not change the holding that there was a total loss caused by the surgical removal of the natural lens.

The order of the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board is affirmed. No costs, a public question being involved.

T. M. KAVANAGH, C.J., and BRENNAN, SWAINSON and LEVIN, JJ., concur.

T. G. KAVANAGH, J., concurs in the result.

COLEMAN, Justice (dissenting).

The facts are fairly stated in the majority opinion. Of particular import are the facts that plaintiff, when ten years old, had cataracts removed from both eyes, but continues to have 20/25 vision in each eye with the use of contact lenses and glasses. In 1964, he received a work-related injury resulting in the loss of industrial use of his left leg and claims benefits from the Second Injury Fund based upon that loss plus the earlier cataract removal.

The foregoing decision is said to be controlled by Lindsay v. Glennie Industries, Inc., 379 Mich. 573, 153 N.W.2d 642 (1967) and Whitt v. Ford Motor Co., 383 Mich. 726, 178 N.W.2d 917 (1970). I accept the decision in Whitt, ¹ but not in Lindsay. Therefore, this opinion is directed at the legal conclusion reached in Lindsay and the progression to the instant case.

The Lindsay court, treating the fact situation 'as one of first impression' held that 'the surgical removal of the natural lens made necessary by an injury arising out of and in the course of claimant's employment is loss of an eye within the meaning of the amended statute.' (p. 578, 153 N.W.2d p. 644) In reality, the question of what constitutes the 'loss of an eye' within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act is one of venerable history and was not new to this Court. The Act provides in M.C.L.A. § 412.10(a)(16); M.S.A. § 17.160(a)(16) as follows:

'. . . for the purpose of this act 80% Loss of Vision of 1 eye shall constitute the total loss of that eye.' (Emphasis added.)

The Second Injury Fund, created in 1943, M.C.L.A. § 412.8a; M.S.A. § 17.158(1) provides:

'(I)f an employee has at the time of injury permament disability in the form of the loss of a hand or arm or foot or leg or eye and at the time of such injury incurs further permanent disability in the form of the loss of a hand or arm or foot, or leg or eye, he shall be deemed to be totally and permanently disabled and shall be paid, from the funds provided in this section, compensation for total and permanent disability. . . .'

Second Injury Fund argues that the loss of an eye must be interpreted as directed by M.C.L.A. § 412.10(a)(16); M.S.A. § 17.160(a)(16) Supra (i.e., 80% Loss of Vision) and that plaintiff has 20/25 vision with lenses and glasses, the same as when he was hired. Plaintiff argues that, although that may be true, his vision without the use of the lenses and glasses qualifies him for payments from the fund.

It is important to review this question historically in order to determine what precedent may have evolved over the years and if it has developed an orderly and practical process. Sometimes precedent does not keep stride with changing times or newly-recognized needs and so there should be a departure. If such a departure is contemplated, future consequences and extensions should be considered lest the law 'grow like Topsy'.

As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes said, 'it is not enough to know where we stand. We must know where we are going.'

At this point, however, I direct your attention to where we have been as to this question since the Workmen's Compensation Act was enacted in 1912. Later, we should look towards where we are going.

A review of cases involving the 'loss of an eye' reveal some which are only peripheral but more which develop the interpretation of the term as related to employment. All are relevant to the developing law.

Weaver v. Maxwell Motor Co., 186 Mich. 588, 152 N.W. 993 (1915) established a policy which this Court in Whitt correctly said was ameliorated by enactment of the Second Injury Fund. Plaintiff there suffered the loss of one eye in a work-related accident, prior to passage of the workmen's compensation law. He subsequently lost the other eye in another industrial accident. The Court said total incapacity could not be attributed to the latter accident and thus awarded compensation based solely on the loss of the one eye, although he had no vision in either eye.

In Cline v. Studebaker Corp., 189 Mich. 514; 155 N.W. 519; 1916 C LRA 1139 (1915), plaintiff lost 90% Of his sight in an industrial accident. However, when...