Whitt v. Ford Motor Co., 9
| Decision Date | 19 August 1970 |
| Docket Number | No. 9,9 |
| Citation | 178 N.W.2d 917,383 Mich. 726 |
| Parties | Jackson WHITT, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee, and Second Injury Fund, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Goodman, Eden, Robb, Millender, Goodman & Bedrosian, by Morton A. Eden, Detroit, for plaintiff-appellee.
Wright Tisdale, Dearborn, for defendant-appellee; James L. Hill, F. A. Lux, John M. Hammerly, Detroit, Mich., of counsel.
Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor Gen., A. C. Stoddard, Rodger G. Will, Asst. Attys. Gen., Lansing, Mich., for Second Injury Fund.
Before the Entire Bench, except T. G. KAVANAGH, J.
Plaintiff lost the sight of his right eye on May 1, 1958, as the result of an October 5, 1956 injury which arose out of and in the course of his employment with Ford Motor Company. His employer paid him workmen's compensation benefits at the weekly rate for the required number of weeks provided by the statute then in effect. 1 After the expiration of the weekly period, his employer continued to pay compensation benefits to him until April 30, 1966, the balance of a 500-week period from October 5, 1956, the date of injury, based on the premise that plaintiff was 'totally disabled' from performing work in which he was engaged at time of injury. Plaintiff continued to work for Ford Motor Company until January 25, 1960.
On February 1, 1965, five years after the termination of his employment with Ford, plaintiff lost the sight of his other eye. The loss of sight of the second eye did not take place during employment.
A referee in the Workmen's Compensation Department found that the plaintiff lost the total and permanent sight of his right eye on May 1, 1958, as the result of an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment with Ford Motor Company on October 5, 1956; that he suffered a like loss of the sight of his left eye on February 1, 1965, which loss was not the result of a personal injury arising out of and in the course of his employment. The referee found plaintiff was totally and permanently disabled and awarded him compensation for disability, payable entirely from the Second Injury Fund, from the date of such disability, which he found to be February 1, 1965.
The Second Injury Fund filed a claim for review of the referee's decision with the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board. The Board entered a decision and order affirming the factual findings of the referee but modified the award of compensation to the extent that the Second Injury Fund was held liable only for differential benefits from September 1, 1965 until April 30, 1966, the end of the 500-week period during which the employer had paid compensation. The Appeal Board also ordered the entire compensation to be paid by the Second Injury Fund after April 30, 1966.
The Second Injury Fund was denied leave to appeal by the Court of Appeals. The case is here on leave granted by this Court on March 25, 1969, 381 Mich. 812.
Appellant frames the issue before this court as:
Is an individual who suffered the permanent loss of sight of an eye as the result of an injury which occurred in the course of his employment, and who subsequently suffered the permanent loss of sight of the other eye from causes unrelated to his employment, entitled to total and permanent disability benefits under section 9(a), part 2 of the Workmen's Compensation Act ()?
The Second Injury Fund argues that workmen's compensation benefits are predicated upon the injured worker having received a personal injury arising out of and in the course of his employment. 2
The Second Injury Fund further argues that the legislature provided for sequential injuries only in section 8a, part 2 of the act, 3 which grants compensation from the Second Injury Fund to the individual who has suffered the loss of one member from an injury related or unrelated to employment, and subsequently suffers the loss of another member from an injury related to employment. It further argues that the adoption of this provision in section 8a of part 2 was to induce employers to employ handicapped individuals and reduce the harshness of the rule of Weaver v. Maxwell Motor Co. (1915), 186 Mich. 588, 152 N.W. 993.
Plaintiff argues that both his condition of 'total disability' and of 'permanent and total disability' are directly related to his work. He further argues that to be compensable under section 9 of part 2 of the act, the second injury need not occur during employment, but that it is sufficient if the first injury is a substantial contributing factor to the resulting 'total and permanent disability.'
Plaintiff contends that his condition of 'permanent and total loss of sight of both eyes' was substantially contributed to by the work-connected loss of his first eye, and that but for the loss of his first eye he would not have 'permanent and total loss of sight of both eyes.'
Plaintiff relies on section 10, part 2 of the Workmen's Compensation Act 4 for his definition of 'total and permanent disability,' which provided in part:
'Total and permanent disability, compensation for which is provided in section 9 hereof, means:
'(1) Total and permanent loss of sight of both eyes.'
Plaintiff meets this test of 'total and permanent disability.'
Weaver v. Maxwell Motor Co., Supra, holds that where petitioner lost his left eye due to a work-connected injury, and where the right eye had been lost previously as the result of a noncompensable injury, the employer would be liable only for compensation for the partial incapacity resulting from the work-connected injury.
The purpose behind the legislative creation of the Second Injury Fund under section 8a is expressed in Verberg v. Simplicity Pattern Company (1959), 357 Mich. 636, at page 643, 99 N.W.2d 508, at page 512:
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Komendera v. American Bar and Cabinet Mfrs., 15
...suffered by an employee of a part of his body need not have been employment related nor compensable in nature. Whitt v. Ford Motor Co., 383 Mich. 726, 178 N.W.2d 917 (1970); Hilton v. Oldsmobile Division, 390 Mich. 43, 210 N.W.2d 316 (1973). Thus by his ruling in Verberg Justice Dethmers Su......
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Miller v. Sullivan Milk Products, Inc.
...This Court held he was not entitled to total and permanent disability benefits for the loss of two legs. In Whitt v. Ford Motor Company (1970), 383 Mich. 726, 178 N.W.2d 917, plaintiff lost his right eye at work and five years later lost the sight of the other eye due to a non-occupational ......
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DeGeer v. DeGeer Farm Equipment Co., 9
...Supreme Court's holdings in Paulson, supra; Miller v. Sullivan Milk Products, Inc., 385 Mich. 659, 189 N.W.2d 304; Whitt v. Ford Motor Co., 383 Mich. 726, 178 N.W.2d 917; and the Court of Appeal's holdings in Lockwood v. Continental Motors Corp., 27 Mich.App. 597, 183 N.W.2d 807, and Kozlow......
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Hilton v. Oldsmobile Division, General Motors Corp.
...1972. We granted leave on November 2, 1972. 388 Mich. 793 (1972). This case is controlled by Lindsay, supra, and Whitt v. Ford Motor Co., 383 Mich. 726, 178 N.W.2d 917 (1970), and we decide it within the specific limits of those two The Lindsay case decided two different points. First, in a......