Hilton v. The Sheridan Coal Company

• Decision Date: 07 March 1931
• Docket Number: 29,589
• Parties: LLOYD H. HILTON, Appellee, v. THE SHERIDAN COAL COMPANY, Appellant
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

297 P. 413

132 Kan. 525

LLOYD H. HILTON, Appellee, v. THE SHERIDAN COAL COMPANY, Appellant

No. 29,589

Supreme Court of Kansas

March 7, 1931

Decided January, 1931.

Appeal from Crawford district court, division No. 1; LELAND M RESLER, judge.

Judgment affirmed.

SYLLABUS

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.

1. MASTER AND SERVANT--Liability of Third Person Procuring Discharge--Evidence. In an action by a coal miner in the employment of the lessees and operators of defendant's coal mine for damages caused by his discharge from that employment through the wrongful intermeddling of defendant, evidence was competent to prove statements made by defendant's superintendent of mines to the effect that the mine owners and insurance carriers had agreed to rid the coal district of "compensation hounds," meaning workmen who had suffered injuries in the course of their dangerous occupation and had received awards therefor under the workmen's compensation act.

2. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT--Authority of Agent--Sufficiency of Evidence. The authority of a superintendent of coal mines to speak and act for his employer may be sufficiently established by facts and circumstances, notwithstanding a want of direct evidence of his appointment and a verified denial of such authority.

3. MASTER AND SERVANT--Liability of Third Person Procuring Discharge--Cancellation of Compensation Insurance as Defense. The fact that the insurance company which carried the risks involved in the operation of a coal mine under the workmen's compensation law might cancel such insurance if a workman drawing compensation for permanent partial disability were retained in the employment of the lessees operating the coal mine gave no justification for defendant owner of the mine to coerce those lessees to discharge the workman; and defendant was liable in damages for its unwarranted intermeddling with the relations of plaintiff and his employers whereby plaintiff was discharged and prevented from obtaining employment elsewhere in that community for about three years.

4. SAME--Instructions. Errors assigned on instructions given and refused considered and not sustained.

5. SAME--Award Not Excessive. Verdict for $ 2,000 actual damages and $ 4,000 exemplary damages awarded to plaintiff against defendant for wrongfully coercing plaintiff's employer to discharge him, considered in the light of the evidence and circumstances disclosed by the record, and held, an objection to the verdict as excessive is not sustained.

C. O. Pingry, P. E. Nulton and G. L. Stevenson, all of Pittsburg, for the appellant.

Sylvan Bruner, of Pittsburg, O. C. Mosman, Clay C. Rogers and Paul A. Buzard, all of Kansas City, Mo., for the appellee.

OPINION

DAWSON, J.:

This was an action for damages for wrongfully inducing plaintiff's employer to discharge him.

The significant facts, in brief, were these: The defendant, The Sheridan Coal Company, owned eleven coal mines in southeastern Kansas, one of which was familiarly known as No. 19 Sheridan. Defendant leased this mine to three partners, Cunningham, Giovanni and Steele, who operated it under the name of the C. & G. Coal Company. About 190 workmen were employed in and about this mine. One of these was this plaintiff, Lloyd H. Hilton, aged 25 when this lawsuit was tried. He had been a coal miner for seven or eight years. In 1925, in the course of his employment, Hilton received an injury to his right foot and ankle, and on account thereof he received compensation from his employers, the C. & G. Coal Company, of some $ 2,000 in cash and an award of $ 6 per week for permanent partial incapacity. Prior to his injury plaintiff's task in the coal mine had been "tailing a motor"--whatever that is. When he returned to work his employers gave him the job of running a motor which relieved him from standing on his injured foot and gave him better pay--$ 8 per day instead of $ 7.50, his former wages.

This defendant, notwithstanding it had leased this coal mine where plaintiff was employed to the C. & G. Coal Company, exercised a good deal of supervisory authority over the mine and over its lessees. Defendant's superintendent of mines, one Ed. Roberts, instructed the mine surveyors where entries should be made, gave directions about the employment and discharge of C. & G. workmen, repeatedly reminded the lessees that the coal operators and insurance carriers had agreed to rid the southeastern Kansas coal field of all "compensation hounds"--meaning workmen who had been hurt in the mines and had received awards therefor under the workmen's compensation act. Roberts repeatedly warned the lessees that if they employed such workmen their insurance would be canceled, and if they did not carry insurance, as their lease contract obligated them to do, their lease would be canceled by the defendant coal company.

Not long after plaintiff Hilton returned to work following his injury and award of compensation, Superintendent Roberts of the defendant company had a conversation with Cunningham, one of the lessees, employers of plaintiff. Cunningham testified:

"He said, 'How is Hilton doing?' I said, 'He is doing just fine.' So he said, 'Well, Tom, I am afraid you are going to have to get rid of him.' I said, 'Why?' He said, 'The insurance company is going to cancel your policy.' He used this language: He said that, 'The state law provides that you must carry insurance.' I said 'Yes.' He said, 'We have a section in the lease that you must carry it.' I said, 'Ain't I complying with it?' He said, 'But I am telling you that you must get rid of that fellow.' He said, 'The insurance company will make you.' He said, 'The operators and the insurance companies are going to clean Kansas out of these compensation hounds.'"

Plaintiff's employers were reluctant to discharge him and his retention was the subject of repeated bickerings with Roberts. Cunningham testified:

"Mr. Roberts said . . . 'You have got that old compensation hound back here again, have you?' I said, 'The boy is suiting me all right; he is doing his work all right.' . . . About a month afterwards, he (Roberts) spoke to me about it. . . . He said, 'I see you still have young Hilton working here. Don't you know that the insurance companies won't allow you to keep him here?' I said, 'I don't see why. They settled with him and he is able to work. He is doing his work. He absolutely satisfies me. I have nothing against the boy.' . . . Roberts, Steele and I had a very heated conversation. He said if I didn't fire that man Hilton that my insurance would be taken away from me and my lease canceled. He said that he would see that the lease was canceled and that my insurance was taken away. He characterized young Hilton as a compensation hound, and he also referred to another man that I had there in the same way, and he forced me to fire another man by the name of William Brackston. . . . Every time he seen the Hilton boy, he would fly to pieces. He said that if I didn't discharge him that the Sheridan Coal Company would cancel my lease and I would also lose my insurance. . . .

". . . He said the operators and insurance companies in Kansas were going to get rid of all the compensation hounds."

It was also shown that shortly thereafter plaintiff's employers consulted about what they must do in view of Superintendent Roberts' threats, and under his coercion they discharged plaintiff.

Thereafter the young man made persistent but unsuccessful efforts throughout the entire southeastern Kansas coal district to obtain employment. After three years' enforced idleness as a coal miner, he brought this lawsuit.

On the issues joined, the cause was tried before a jury, which returned a verdict in plaintiff's favor for $ 2,000 actual damages and $ 4,000 punitive damages.

Judgment was entered accordingly, and defendant appeals.

Error is assigned in the admission of evidence touching Roberts' statements that the coal-operating companies and insurance companies had gotten together and were going to get rid of the compensation hounds. Those statements were competent to show that Roberts' employer, the Sheridan Coal Company, was back of Roberts' conduct in coercing plaintiff's employers to discharge him. They were also competently probative to show why it was impossible for plaintiff to get other employment at his trade as a miner in the southeastern Kansas coal district.

It is urged, however, that there was no evidence to show that Roberts had authority to speak for the Sheridan Coal Company. Whoever happened to know the fact that the coal operators and insurance companies had decided to prevent the employment of workmen who had been awarded compensation would be a competent witness on that point. Moreover, it was sufficiently shown to carry the question of agency to the jury whether Roberts, defendant's superintendent of mines, had authority to speak and act for the Sheridan Coal Company, and the fact that such authority was denied was not conclusive. It is not common in damage suits that responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of his employee can be proved by formal grant of authority. Ordinarily it has to be established by significant facts and relevant circumstances. In Wilson v. Haun, 97 Kan. 445, 155 P. 798, it was said:

"To establish the relation of agency an express appointment and an acceptance thereof is not essential, but it may be implied from other facts, such as the statements of the parties, their conduct and the relevant circumstances." (Syl. P 1.)

See, also, Fritchen v. Mueller, ante, p. 491.

Defendant's next contention is a much more candid one than the error based on the argument that Superintendent Roberts had no authority to speak and act for the defendant in procuring plaintiff's discharge....