Hilyard v. Johnston
| Decision Date | 29 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | 354721 |
| Parties | BRANDY HILYARD, Petitioner-Appellant, v. DAVID JOHNSTON, Respondent-Appellee. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Ingham Circuit Court Family Division LC No. 19-003659-UF
Before: Fort Hood, P.J., and Markey and Gleicher, JJ.
Petitioner appeals by right the order vacating the registration of her out-of-state support order, changing the case-type code on the file to allow enforcement to take place in a tribunal that had personal jurisdiction over respondent, and denying petitioner's request for attorney fees. We affirm.
The parties were divorced in 2005 while living in New York. The New York Supreme Court for the County of Cattaraugus granted petitioner sole legal and physical custody of the parties' two children and ordered respondent to pay $581 per month in child support. A provision of the judgment indicated that, if respondent terminated support payments payment would increase to $830 per month. The judgment of divorce did not provide for an end date for the payments although under New York law, child support payments continue until the child turns 21. NY Fam Ct Act § 413(1)(a).
In 2010, petitioner moved with the children to Michigan. In 2016, respondent registered the judgment of divorce in Ingham Circuit Court and moved to prevent petitioner from taking the children on vacation to Mexico, which the court denied. On November 14, 2019, the day after the parties' youngest child turned 18, respondent sent a letter to petitioner stating that he was stopping the child support payments because the parties had verbally agreed when they signed the judgment of divorce that support payments would stop when both children turned 18. On that basis, petitioner registered the New York child support order with the Ingham Circuit Court and served respondent with notice of the registration. The circuit court confirmed the registration on December 16, 2019.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition to enforce the support order, arguing that the parties had not agreed to terminate support payments when the children turned 18, and that New York law required the payments to continue until the children turned 21. The circuit court held a hearing on the petition and determined that the court did not have personal jurisdiction over respondent. Petitioner argued that only respondent could assert personal jurisdiction as a defense, and noted that respondent failed at that time to participate in the proceedings. However, the court determined that MCL 552.2301(2) of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) allowed the court to determine whether it had personal jurisdiction over a nonregistering party before the out-of-state support order could be registered. The court determined that the out-of-state support order had not been properly registered and vacated the December order confirming the registration. The court also ordered the case-type caption to be changed from an incoming registration of an out-of-state order to an outgoing request for another state to enforce the order, and denied petitioner's request for attorney fees because petitioner was not a prevailing party.
Petitioner argues that the trial court could not sua sponte raise the issue of personal jurisdiction and, alternatively, that the court could have exercised personal jurisdiction over respondent pursuant to Michigan's long-arm statute, MCL 600.705. We disagree.
Whether a court has personal jurisdiction over a party is a question of law, which we review de novo. Poindexter v Poindexter, 234 Mich.App. 316, 319; 594 N.W.2d 76 (1999). We also review de novo issues of statutory interpretation, Saginaw Ed Ass'n v Eady-Miskiewicz, 319 Mich.App. 422, 440; 902 N.W.2d 1 (2017), as well as the application of the law to the facts of the case, Wilcoxon v City of Detroit Election Comm, 301 Mich.App. 619, 632; 838 N.W.2d 183 (2013).
Petitioner first argues that MCL 552.2301(2) does not grant the circuit court authority to sua sponte address the issue of personal jurisdiction because only respondent could raise the issue. We disagree.
A court must have personal jurisdiction over a party to obligate a party to comply with its orders. Yoost v Caspari, 295 Mich.App. 209, 221; 813 N.W.2d 783 (2012). A defense that a trial court lacks personal jurisdiction over a party or property is waived unless a party raises it in accordance with applicable court rules. Electrolines, Inc v Prudential Assurance Co, Ltd, 260 Mich.App. 144, 163-164; 677 N.W.2d 874 (2003); MCR 2.111(F)(2). However, "a court at all times is required to question sua sponte its own jurisdiction (whether over a person, the subject matter of an action, or the limits on the relief it may afford) . . . ." Straus v Governor, 459 Mich. 526, 532; 582 N.W.2d 53 (1999).
The UIFSA, MCL 552.1101 et seq., governs the procedure for establishing, enforcing, and modifying child and spousal support orders when more than one state is involved in the proceedings. MCL 552.2301(2) provides:
An individual petitioner or a support enforcement agency may initiate a proceeding authorized under this act by filing a petition in an initiating tribunal for forwarding to a responding tribunal or by filing a petition or a comparable pleading directly in a tribunal of another state or a foreign country that has or can obtain personal jurisdiction over the respondent. [Emphasis added.]
MCL 552.2306 provides:
If a petition or comparable pleading is received by an inappropriate tribunal of this state, the tribunal shall forward the pleading and accompanying documents to an appropriate tribunal in this state or another state and notify the petitioner where and when the pleading was sent.
To interpret statutory language, we begin with the plain language of the statute, which is the best indicator of the Legislature's intent. Jesperson v Auto Club Ins Ass n , 499 Mich. 29, 34; 878 N.W.2d 799 (2016). "We must give effect to every word, phrase, and clause in a statute and avoid an interpretation that renders nugatory or surplusage any part of a statute." Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). "If the language of a statute is unambiguous, the Legislature must have intended the meaning clearly expressed, and the statute must be enforced as written." Shinholster v Annapolis Hosp, 471 Mich. 540, 549; 685 N.W.2d 275 (2004) (quotation marks and citation omitted). "Statutory provisions must be read in the context of the entire act, giving every word its plain and ordinary meaning." Driver v Naini, 490 Mich. 239, 247; 802 N.W.2d 311 (2011).
With the above in mind, although generally a party must raise a defense of personal jurisdiction in a responsive pleading or else the defense is waived for that party, Electrolines, Inc, 260 Mich.App. at 164; MCR 2.111(F)(2), this does not interfere with the court's continuing obligation to sua sponte question its own jurisdiction, Straus, 459 Mich. at 532. The plain language of MCL 552.2301(2) and MCL 552.2306 is mandatory, not permissive, and makes it clear that the trial court has an obligation to determine whether it has personal jurisdiction over the parties before an out-of-court custody order can be registered. Therefore, the trial court did not err by addressing the issue of personal jurisdiction sua sponte.[1]
Petitioner contends that the trial court could have exercised jurisdiction over respondent under Michigan's long-arm statute, MCL 600.705. We disagree.
MCL 552.2201 specifically describes how a trial court may obtain limited personal jurisdiction over a nonresident individual in child support enforcement proceedings. Petitioner concedes that the trial court could only exercise limited personal jurisdiction over respondent under MCL 552.2201(h), which provides that a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident individual if "[t]here is any other basis consistent with the constitutions of this state and the United States for the exercise of personal jurisdiction." We agree with the trial court's conclusion that this subsection includes application of Michigan's long-arm statute, MCL 600.705.
Legislative long-arm statutes grant courts authority to exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresident parties in specific circumstances based on the nature, character, and types of contacts that exist. WH Froh, Inc v Domanski, 252 Mich.App. 220, 226; 651 N.W.2d 470 (2002). "A personal jurisdiction analysis is a two-fold inquiry: (1) do the defendant's acts fall within the applicable long-arm statute, and (2) does the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant comport with the requirements of due process." Id. (citation omitted). Michigan's long-arm statute, MCL 600.705, provides, in relevant part:
Petitioner contends that, because respondent hired a Michigan attorney in 2016, registered the judgment of divorce with the circuit court at that time, and moved to prevent petitioner from taking the children to Mexico, he transacted business in the state under MCL 600.705(1). However, the trial...
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