Hilzendager v. Methodist Hospital, 17450
| Decision Date | 28 February 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 17450,17450 |
| Citation | 596 S.W.2d 284 |
| Parties | Gladys HILZENDAGER, Appellant, v. METHODIST HOSPITAL, Appellee. (1st Dist.) |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
W. Jiles Roberts, Houston, for appellant.
Fulbright & Jaworski, Robert J. Swift, Houston, for appellee.
Gladys Hilzendager appeals from the granting of a directed verdict in her suit against Methodist Hospital for injuries sustained while a patient there. Grounds stated in the motion were that 1) there was no evidence to establish a standard of care for treatment or to establish that the hospital had violated any such standard, 2) there was no evidence that the hospital had failed to care for Mrs. Hilzendager properly, 3) there was no evidence that she had suffered any injuries proximately caused by any negligence of the hospital, and 4) the suit was barred by the statute of limitations. Mrs. Hilzendager asserts that there was evidence raising the issues in question and that the statute of limitations did not begin to run on her suit until after settlement of her claim for worker's compensation benefits filed as a result of the injury which originally caused her hospitalization in Methodist. We affirm.
Mrs. Hilzendager was employed as a nurse's aide at Methodist Hospital when she injured her back on July 4, 1972, in the course and scope of her employment. She filed a claim for worker's compensation benefits, and on July 27, 1972, while undergoing treatment for that injury as a patient at the same hospital, she fell from her bed and injured her back again. The protective side rails on her bed were not raised when she fell.
The worker's compensation claim was settled on March 26, 1974, when a final judgment was entered in a district court. Mrs. Hilzendager filed this action against Methodist Hospital on November 14, 1974.
The appellant's only point of error is that the trial court erred in granting a motion for directed verdict.
The first two grounds in the hospital's motion for directed verdict were that Mrs. Hilzendager had failed to establish a standard of care to which the hospital was required to adhere and had failed to show that any such standard was violated or that she was not properly cared for.
It is the duty of a hospital to provide for the care of its patients, and the degree of care required is such reasonable attention for their safety as their mental and physical condition, if known, may require. Harris v. Harris County Hospital District, 557 S.W.2d 353 (Tex.Civ.App.1977, no writ); 40 Am.Jur.2d 869, Hospitals and Asylums § 26.
Mrs. Hilzendager had the burden of establishing that bed rails would ordinarily be provided by a hospital under similar circumstances and of proving that Methodist breached that standard. Wilson v. Scott, 412 S.W.2d 299 (Tex.1967); Hart v. Van Zandt, 399 S.W.2d 791 (Tex.1965); Bowles v. Bourdon, 148 Tex. 1, 219 S.W.2d 779 (1949).
In that regard, Mrs. Hilzendager offered only "the rule pertaining to side rails" taken from Methodist's in-house procedural manual. Its only provisions that possibly apply are that side rails are to be used for for and for
The plaintiff presented no evidence that Methodist's in-house rules reflect the community standard of hospital care. The hospital points out that a particular institution might maintain a higher standard of care in its operations than the prevailing community standard. To apply such a higher standard would be contrary to the established rule which applies the community standard of care and would also discourage individuals and institutions involved in health care from aspiring to maintain exceptional standards of conduct. See Foley v. Bishop Clarkson Memorial Hospital, 185 Neb. 89, 173 N.W.2d 881 (1970). Nevertheless, we believe that the standard of negligent failure to raise side rails is not one requiring special training, insight, or proof. We think the jury was entitled to conclude, without testimony of an expert, that the hospital's rule pertaining to side rails is in keeping with the conduct of a person of ordinary prudence under like circumstances, just as we think it would be unnecessary to offer proof that a hospital should not make its floors slippery.
There is little evidence concerning...
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