Hinchliffe v. American Motors Corp.
| Decision Date | 21 July 1981 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | , 32 UCC Rep.Serv. 1132 Lorraine HINCHLIFFE et al. v. AMERICAN MOTORS CORPORATION et al. |
Alan L. Robertson, Jr., New Britain, with whom was Jason E. Pearl, New Britain, for appellants (plaintiffs).
Philip S. Walker, Hartford, with whom, on the brief, was Jon E. Hayden, Hartford, for appellees (defendants American Motors Corp. and American Motors Sales Corp.).
Robert N. Wienner, Hartford, with whom, on the brief, was Jane A. H. Arnold, Bloomfield, for appellee (defendant Lipman Motors, Inc.).
Robert M. Langer and Arnold B. Feigin, Asst. Attys. Gen., filed a brief as amici curiae.
Before BOGDANSKI, C. J., and PETERS, HEALEY, PARSKEY and ARMENTANO, JJ.
This lawsuit arose from the plaintiffs' purchase of a new American Motors Jeep Wagoneer. The plaintiffs commenced this action with a six-count complaint, alleging fraud, breach of implied and express warranties, and violations of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes §§ 42-110a through 42-110q. 1 After the plaintiffs presented their evidence at trial, the defendants moved for a judgment of dismissal, claiming that the plaintiffs had failed to make out a prima facie case on all counts. See Practice Book § 302. The trial court found that no ascertainable damages had been proved and granted the defendants' motion. The plaintiffs have appealed, claiming that the court erred in concluding that no prima facie case had been established under either a warranty theory or CUTPA. Our resolution of this issue makes it unnecessary for us to address the plaintiffs' claim that it was error to refuse to admit into evidence a receipt signed by the plaintiff, David Hinchliffe, for repair work done to the Jeep Wagoneer.
A motion for judgment of dismissal has replaced the former motion for nonsuit for failure to make out a prima facie case. Compare Practice Book § 302 with Practice Book, 1963, § 278; see Lukas v. New Haven, --- Conn. ---, p. --- n.3, 439 A.2d 949 (42 Conn.L.J., No. 46, pp. 25, 27 n.3) (1981). When such a motion has been granted, the question is whether sufficient facts were proved to make out a prima facie case. Pignatario v. Meyers, 100 Conn. 234, 239-40, 123 A. 263 (1924). To state it another way, a judgment of dismissal is proper "when the evidence produced by the plaintiff, if fully believed, would not permit the trier in reason to find the essential issues on the complaint in favor of the plaintiff." Minicozzi v. Atlantic Refining Co., 143 Conn. 226, 230, 120 A.2d 924 (1956). The evidence offered by the plaintiff is to be taken as true and interpreted in the light most favorable to him, and every reasonable inference is to be drawn in his favor. Ace-High Dresses, Inc. v. J. C. Trucking Co., 122 Conn. 578, 579, 191 A. 536 (1937). A party has the same right to submit a weak case as he has to submit a strong one. Fritz v. Gaudet, 101 Conn. 52, 53, 124 A. 841 (1924). See Lukas v. New Haven, supra, --- Conn. at --- - ---, 439 A.2d 949, 26-27; Crowell v. Palmer, 134 Conn. 502, 505, 58 A.2d 729 (1948); Maltbie, Conn.App.Proc. §§ 215 and 217; Stephenson, Conn.Civ.Proc. (2d Ed.) § 192f. We review the plaintiffs' claims notwithstanding the absence of a memorandum of decision; see Practice Book § 3060B; because the only issues before us concern whether, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, a prima facie case has been made out.
At trial the plaintiffs established the following facts: In April, 1976, they were in the market for a motor vehicle capable of hauling their camper trailer. On April 23 1976, they purchased a new Jeep Wagoneer from the defendant Lipman Motors, Inc. The motor vehicle was manufactured by the defendant American Motors Corporation, and was sold to Lipman Motors, Inc. by the defendant American Motors Sales Corporation. It was warranted for twelve months or 12,000 miles, whichever occurred first. Both during and after this period, the plaintiffs experienced problems with the fuel delivery system, the air conditioning, the transmission, the electrical system, the cooling system and the back door.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff; Minicozzi v. Atlantic Refining Co., supra, 143 Conn. 229-30, 120 A.2d 924; the evidence also demonstrated that what the defendant American Motors Corporation had advertised as "full-time four-wheel drive" was actually a system for transmitting power to the wheels using a limited slip differential mechanism. The slipping ability of the differential allowed the wheels to turn at different speeds while the vehicle was cornering. This same trait, which made possible the "full-time" characteristic of the vehicle, however, also resulted in the loss of traction under certain circumstances. When these wheel spinning episodes occurred, the vehicle could be extricated by activating an emergency "lock-out" device operated by a switch in the glove compartment. This device allowed the slip differential to be bypassed, and the vehicle then assumed the characteristics of conventional four-wheel drive vehicles. The plaintiffs claim that this evidence was sufficient to make out a prima facie case and contend that the trial court erred in ruling otherwise. We agree.
With respect to the two CUTPA counts contained in the complaint, the trial court confined its ruling on the defendants' motion for judgment of dismissal to the question of "ascertainable loss." If, however, the plaintiffs failed to produce sufficient evidence to support a finding that the defendants' conduct constituted an unfair or deceptive trade practice, then the court's decision would be correct, albeit for a different reason than that stated. Lewis v. Scoville, 94 Conn. 79, 86, 108 A. 501 (1919); Maltbie, Conn.App.Proc. § 36. Interpreted in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs; Ace-High Dresses, Inc. v. J. C. Trucking Co., supra; the evidence relating to the first CUTPA count could support a conclusion that the representation that the vehicle had "full-time four-wheel drive" was deceptive under General Statutes § 42-110b(a).
With respect to the other CUTPA count, however, the plaintiffs have not sustained their evidentiary burden. In this count, the plaintiffs claim that the defendants committed an unfair or deceptive trade practice by failing to disclose that certain component parts of the Jeep were not manufactured by American Motors. Because nothing in the record before us suggests that the defendants either affirmatively misrepresented or had a duty to disclose the specific manufacturing history of the component parts, the plaintiffs have not shown that the defendants engaged in an unfair or deceptive trade practice in this respect.
Thus the principal issue on this appeal is whether a plaintiff must prove actual damages in a particular amount in order to pursue an action under CUTPA. The trial court held that, in order to withstand a motion for judgment of dismissal under Practice Book § 302, the plaintiffs had to prove that they suffered actual damages in a particular amount. In so ruling, it relied on the provision of General Statutes § 42-110g(a) which allows "(a)ny person who suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal, as a result of the use or employment of a method, act or practice prohibited by section 42-110b, (to) bring an action in the judicial district in which the plaintiff or defendant resides or has his principal place of business or is doing business, to recover actual damages." (Emphasis added.) We hold that the words "any ascertainable loss" as used in this section do not require a plaintiff to prove a specific amount of actual damages in order to make out a prima facie case. Accordingly, the decision of the trial court is reversed.
Our conclusion finds initial support in the language chosen by the legislature when it framed § 42-110g(a). Where drafters meant "actual damages," they employed those exact words. 2 The use of different terms within the same sentence of a statute plainly implies that differing meanings were intended. See Johnston v. Hartford, 96 Conn. 142, 150-51, 113 A. 273 (1921). Moreover, the inclusion of the word "ascertainable" to modify the word "loss" indicates that plaintiffs are not required to prove actual damages of a specific dollar amount. "Ascertainable" means "capable of being discovered, observed or established." Scott v. Western International Sales, Inc., 267 Or. 512, 515, 517 P.2d 661 (1973).
"Loss" has been held synonymous with deprivation, detriment and injury. Black's Law Dictionary. It is a generic and relative term. United States v. City National Bank of Duluth, 31 F.Supp. 530, 533 (D.Minn.1939). "Damage," on the other hand, is only a species of loss. Id., 532. The term "loss" necessarily encompasses a broader meaning than the term "damage." Id.
Whenever a consumer has received something other than what he bargained for, he has suffered a loss of money or property. That loss is ascertainable if it is measurable even though the precise amount of the loss is not known. CUTPA is not designed to afford a remedy for trifles. In one sense the buyer has lost the purchase price of the item because he parted with his money reasonably expecting to receive a particular item or service. When the product fails to measure up, the consumer has been injured; he has suffered a loss. In another sense he has lost the benefits of the product which he was led to believe he had purchased. That the loss does not consist of a diminution in value is immaterial, although obviously such diminution would satisfy the statute. To the consumer who wishes to purchase an energy saving subcompact, for example, it is no answer to say that he should be satisfied with a more valuable gas guzzler.
Under CUTPA, there is no need to allege or prove the amount of the...
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