Hinds v. Biggs
Decision Date | 03 June 1940 |
Docket Number | No. 5166.,5166. |
Citation | 142 S.W.2d 902 |
Parties | HINDS v. BIGGS. |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from District Court, Hutchinson County; Jack Allen, Judge.
Action by E. R. Biggs against Clem Hinds and others, to secure the dissolution of a corporation and for a writ of execution and an injunction wherein defendant filed a cross action. From a judgment for the plaintiff, named defendant appeals.
Reversed and remanded.
Joseph H. Aynesworth and K. H. Dally, both of Borger, for appellant.
H. H. Cooper, of Amarillo, for appellee.
The record shows that the Pharis Oil Company, a Texas corporation, owned an oil and gas lease on certain land, hereafter described, situated in Hutchinson County, Texas. E. R. Biggs and C. M. Humphrys were the owners of all the capital stock of said corporation save and except a nominal share owned by L. B. Cox. The Pharis Oil Company, acting by its president, E. R. Biggs, its vice president, C. M. Humphrys, and its secretary, L. B. Cox, called first party, and E. R. Biggs and C. M. Humphrys as individuals, designated as second parties, entered into a contract on December 26, 1929, with Clem Hinds, called third party, the terms and provisions of which material to a disposition of this appeal are as follows:
On December 30, 1938, the plaintiff, E. R. Biggs, instituted this suit in the District Court of Hutchinson County against the defendants, Pharis Oil Company, H. F. Cypher and Clem Hinds to have the corporation dissolved, its properties adjudged to him as the only stock holder; asked that a writ of execution issue and the property be restored to the possession of plaintiff, and in an amended petition asked that the temporary injunction theretofore issued be perpetuated restraining the defendants from interfering with the enjoyment, occupancy and possession of the premises by plaintiff.
He alleged that the Pharis Oil Company had failed to pay its franchise tax and forfeited its charter to do business on July 2, 1932; that he had acquired all the capital stock of said company; that Clem Hinds failed and refused to pay the $17,500 and the $35,000 in accordance with the provisions of the contract; that he and his predecessors agreed to advance not exceeding $2,000 with which to buy and install additional equipment needed on said lease; that Clem Hinds promised to operate the wells efficiently and use his best efforts to increase the production on the lease; that Hinds took possession of the property under the contract, had never paid exceeding $12,000 thereon and had repudiated the agreement; that by virtue of the breach, default and repudiation of defendant Hinds and the acquisition of the entire stock plaintiff is entitled to a decree adjudging to him possession of the premises for which he has made demand; that the contract stipulated upon default plaintiff and his predecessors should have the right to re-enter and repossess the premises; that the defendant would surrender the property, and all improvements placed thereon by him during his possession should become part of the real property. He attached to and made the contract a part of his petition.
H. F. Cypher disclaimed and the Pharis Oil Company defaulted.
The defendant, Clem Hinds, urged a general demurrer and certain special exceptions which will be hereafter considered; pleaded a general denial, the two and four years statutes of limitation and alleged that on and prior to the execution of the contract, December 26, 1929, the first and second parties fraudulently represented to him that all four of the wells were in good condition except they needed cleaning out, the cost of which would not exceed $2,000, and by such expenditure each of the wells could be made to produce; that the wells were completely cased and they owned all the personal property on the lease; that he was prevented from making any investigation of the lease or the condition of the wells; that plaintiff and his predecessors in title knew of these conditions but by false representations upon which the defendant relied he was induced to execute the contract. In truth and in fact wells Nos. 2 and 3 were without value because three strings of tools had been lost in well No. 2 and could not be gotten out; that the casing in well No. 3 had collapsed and it was impossible to get tools to the bottom thereof; that in an effort to recondition said wells he had expended $4,762.15; that after he executed the contract certain parties who claimed to be the true owners thereof were permitted to remove personal property of the value of $5,592 from the lease by the plaintiff and his predecessors who promised defendant that they would pay him therefor by crediting the reasonable value of such property on the consideration he had agreed to pay, but failed and refused to allow such credit; that wells Nos. 1 and 4 were not completely cased but prior to the signing of the contract casing of the value of $9,282 had been withdrawn from said wells and removed from the lease; that the refusal of the plaintiff and his predecessors to compensate the defendant for the personal property and the casing removed constituted failure of consideration and such amount if allowed would have paid and satisfied the obligations of the defendant. The defendant further alleged that he made valuable improvements upon the lease aggregating the sum of $21,025.54, which increased the value of the lease in that amount and that he was entitled to compensation therefor. His prayer that the plaintiff take nothing by his suit is the only relief he was entitled to under the allegations in his answer. Milliken v. Smoot, 64 Tex. 171; Hughes v....
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