Hinds v. Fine

• Decision Date: 25 January 1947
• Docket Number: 36708.
• Citation: 162 Kan. 328,176 P.2d 847
• Parties: HINDS et al. v. FINE.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

176 P.2d 847

162 Kan. 328

HINDS et al. v. FINE.

No. 36708.

Supreme Court of Kansas

January 25, 1947

Appeal from District Court, Sedgwick County; Isaac N. Williams Judge.

Action by Bonny Hinds and others against Ida Fine to recover overcharge under Emergency Price Control Act of 1944. From a judgment for plaintiffs, defendant appeals.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. Justices of the peace have only the jurisdiction conferred by statute.

2. The City Court of Wichita has the general jurisdiction of a justice of the peace.

3. On appeal from the City Court of Wichita the district court has only the jurisdiction of the city court.

4. Whether a state court is a court of competent jurisdiction to hear and determine an action brought pursuant to a federal statute must be determined by the statutes of the state as interpreted by the courts of the state.

5. The attorney's fee provided for in section 205(e) of the Emergency Price Control Act, 56 Stat. 23 as amended by 58 Stat. 632, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 925(e), in favor of one overcharged in violation of a price schedule is in the nature of a penalty for the benefit of the plaintiff.

6. The City Court of Wichita is a court of competent jurisdiction in which a party wronged may bring an action such as that described in the foregoing paragraph of this syllabus to recover the amount of the overcharge plus penalties including an attorney's fee.

7. In an action brought in the City Court of Wichita the plaintiffs appealed to the district court and filed two appeal bonds one signed by one of the plaintiffs and two sureties and the other by the other two plaintiffs and the same two surcties-- held, that the fact that two appeal bonds were filed did not require a dismissal of the appeal.

8. In an action such as that described in the foregoing paragraph of the syllabus, the notice of appeal is examined and held to be sufficient.

Austin M. Cowan, of Wichita (W. A. Kahrs, Robert Nelson and H. F. Hudson, all of Wichita, on the briefs), for appellant.

John Jay Darrah, Dale Kidwell and Robert B. Morton, all of Wichita, for appellees.

William Remy, Deputy Adm'r for Enforcement, David London, Director, Litigation Division, Albert M. Dreyer, Chief Appellate Branch, and Arthur G. Silverman, Sp. Appellate Atty., OPA, all of Washington, D. C., and Leonard M. Cox, Regional Litigation Atty., OPA, of Dallas, Tex., James B. Nash, Dist. Enforcement Atty., and Lawrence J. Wetzel, Sp. Trial Atty., both of Wichita, for Paul A. Porter, Adm'r, OPA, amicus curiae.

SMITH Justice.

This action was commenced in the city court of Wichita to recover judgment for $820 under the terms of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1944. Judgment was for plaintiffs. The defendant has appealed.

The petition in the city court first pleaded section 205(e) of the Emergency Price Control Act, 56 Stat. 23, as amended by 58 Stat. 632, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix § 925(e). The action was brought pursuant to the act, which among other things, provided that where any person violated a price schedule providing a maximum charge the buyer might bring an action on account of the overcharge and that 'In such action, the seller shall be liable for reasonable attorney's fees and costs as determined by the court, * * *' plus whichever of certain sums set out was the greater. Then followed a provision for the recovery of three times the amount of overcharge unless the seller should prove that the overcharge was neither willful nor the result of failure to take practical precautions against the occurrence of the violation. Next it provided that an order as to rents should be regarded as a price control order. The act then contained the following proviso: 'Any action under this subsection by either the buyer or the Administrator, as the case may be, may be brought in any court of competent jurisdiction.' (58 Stat. 641.)

The petition then alleged that the plaintiffs were tenants of the defendant in an apartment at an agreed rental of $60 per month; that the maximum registered rental price for that apartment was $40 a month; that by reason of the overcharges defendant had collected an excess over the maximum required rent in the amount of $20 per month for seven months or $140 and that plaintiffs were entitled to judgment against the defendant for three times the amount of the overcharge, or $420, and reasonable attorney's fees. The prayer was for judgment for $420 and for attorney's fees in the amount of $250. At the trial in city court defendant's demurrer to the plaintiff's evidence was sustained. The plaintiffs appealed to the district court. The notice of appeal stated that plaintiffs appealed from the judgment, orders, rulings and decisions of the court in the action and specifically from the judgment sustaining the demurrer. Two appeal bonds were filed--one was signed by Bonnie Hinds and Wanda Nixon, plaintiffs, and Gerald H. Grange and Julia Gay Nielson, sureties, and the other was signed by Bonnie Hinds, Frankie N. Storm, another plaintiff, and the same sureties. The plaintiffs filed a motion in the district court to require the defendant to file written pleadings. This motion was sustained. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for the reason that it was not made in the manner provided by law. That motion was overruled. The defendant's answer contained allegations to the effect that she had not made an overcharge and that if she had it was not willful on her part. She also alleged that plaintiffs did not appeal from the Wichita city court in the manner provided by law, and that plaintiffs' notice of appeal they appealed from the court's ruling on the demurrer, and did not state whether it was from the ruling on the demurrer to the original bill of particulars or her demurrer to the evidence, and that they did not say they appealed from the final judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' case. She also alleged that plaintiffs had posted two appeal bonds and because of the foregoing the appeal did not conform to the statutes and was void and the action should be dismissed.

At the trial the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiffs in the amount of $340. It answered special questions to the effect that it allowed plaintiffs $140 on account of overcharge and $200 as attorney's fees.

Motion for a new trial was overruled. Judgment was entered for the plaintiffs in the amount of the verdict. The defendant has appealed.

The defendant set out 11 specifications of error. The principal one, however, is that the court erred in not dismissing the action on motion of the defendant since it did not have power, sitting as a justice of the peace court, on appeal from such court to determine and render judgment for attorney's fees, as it was a court of limited statutory jurisdiction on which the statutes did not confer power to fix and allow attorney's fees. There was a further specification of error that the district court erred in not dismissing plaintiffs' appeal because the appeal was not made and perfected in the manner provided by law. This specification was based on the fact that two separate appeal bonds were filed instead of one, and that in their notice of appeal plaintiffs stated they were appealing from the order of the city court sustaining a demurrer to the evidence rather than from a final judgment.

We shall first notice the argument of the defendant that the district court did not have power, sitting as a justice of the peace, on appeal from such court to give judgment for attorney's fees.

All parties concede that where a matter is appealed to the district court from the justice court the district court takes only such jurisdiction and power as the justice had in the first instance. See McCracken v. Wright, 159 Kan. 615, 157 P.2d 814, also Ohio Hydrate & Supply Co. v. H. W. Underhill Construction Co., 141 Kan. 213, 40 P.2d 337 .

The Emergency Price Control Act provides that the action to recover for overcharge and attorney's fees may be brought in any court of competent jurisdiction. We have held that such an action even though it is provided for by a federal statute may be brought in one of our state courts provided the court possesses the requisite jurisdiction of the subject matter and jurisdiction to give the relief sought, in other words, is a 'Court of competent jurisdiction.' See Thomas v. Chicago B. & Q. R. Co., 127 Kan. 326, 273 P. 451, 64 A.L.R. 322, also Graves v. Armstrong Creamery Co., 154 Kan, 365, 118 P.2d 613.

Whether a particular state court has jurisdiction of the subject matter and to grant the relief prayed for depends upon the local law. The question was considered in several cases reported as Second Employers' Liability Cases (Mondou v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co.), 223 U.S. 1, 32 S.Ct 169, 177, 56 L.Ed. 327, 38 L.R.A.,N.S., 44. These were several actions for damages brought against different common carriers in state courts pursuant to the Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 51 et seq. In considering the question of whether congress could provide that rights could be enforced in a state court the Supreme Court of the United States said: 'We are quite unable to assent to the view that the enforcement of the rights which the congressional act creates was originally intended to be restricted to the Federal courts. The act contains nothing which is suggestive of such a restriction, and in this situation the intention of Congress was reflected by the provision in the general jurisdictional act, 'That the circuit courts of the United States shall have original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several states, of all suits of a civil nature, at common law or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum or value of two thousand...