Hines v. Caston School Corp., 25A05-9401-CV-22

• Decision Date: 08 June 1995
• Docket Number: No. 25A05-9401-CV-22,25A05-9401-CV-22
• Citation: 651 N.E.2d 330
• Parties: , 101 Ed. Law Rep. 392 James M. HINES, Sr. and Andrea L. Hines, on behalf of their minor son, James M. Hines, Jr., Appellants-Plaintiffs, v. CASTON SCHOOL CORPORATION, Appellee-Defendant.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 330

651 N.E.2d 330

63 USLW 2799, 101 Ed. Law Rep. 392

James M. HINES, Sr. and Andrea L. Hines, on behalf of their minor son, James M. Hines, Jr., Appellants-Plaintiffs, v. CASTON SCHOOL CORPORATION, Appellee-Defendant.

No. 25A05-9401-CV-22.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

June 8, 1995.

Rehearing Denied July 24, 1995.

Franklin A. Morse, II, James M. Lewis, Barnes & Thornburg, South Bend, Richard A. Waples, Peggy A. Hillman, Indiana Civ. Liberties Union, Indianapolis, C. Richard Oren, Rochester, for appellants.

Charles R. Rubright, George T. Patton, Jr., Bose McKinney & Evans, Indianapolis, David J. Wallsmith, Nichols Wallsmith & Weaver, Knox, for appellee.

David J. Emmert, Julie M. Slavens, Indianapolis, for amicus curiae Indiana School Boards Assn.

OPINION

SHARPNACK, Chief Judge.

Among the essential functions of our constitutional law is the resolution of conflicts between the rights of the individual and the interests of the community. This case illustrates how one such conflict may be played out upon a field so small as the ear lobe of a ten year-old boy.

In September, 1991, Jimmy Hines, a fourth-grader, began wearing a single gold stud earring to school at Caston Elementary School in Fulton County. Jimmy had attended Caston Elementary since first grade, but was considered a transfer student because he did not live in one of the four townships constituting the Caston school district. Jimmy and his parents, James and Andrea Hines, lived in Union Township, which had entered into a contract with Caston and two other school districts for the education of the township's children.

Shortly after Jimmy wore his earring to school, the Hineses were asked to meet with Russell Phillips, principal of the school. Phillips informed the Hineses that although the elementary school had no written dress code, the Caston junior and senior high schools, which are housed in the same facility with the elementary school, had a rule prohibiting the wearing of earrings by male students. On November 18, 1991, David M. McKee, superintendent of the Caston School Corporation, sent a letter to the Hineses stating as follows:

"Your son wearing an earring is in violation of the school's policy. The wearing of a bandage over the earring for the purpose of covering it is not acceptable. Upon receipt of this letter, Jimmy is to discontinue wearing the earring at Caston Elementary School. Mr. Phillips has been requested to take appropriate steps to enforce this policy."

Record, p. 213. Jimmy continued to wear the earring, however, and principal Phillips took no action to enforce the superintendent's order.

On July 21, 1992, the Caston Board of School Trustees approved a revised elementary student handbook that included the following provision:

"Students are not to wear jewelry or other attachments not consistent with community standards or that could pose a health or safety hazard to either the student himself or to other students in his presence."

Record, p. 219. The Hineses were notified of the new rule on July 27, 1992. They requested clarification of the rule, and time was allotted to satisfy their request on the agenda of the school board meeting on August 4, 1992. The Hineses failed to attend the meeting.

On August 18, 1992, Jimmy wore his earring on the opening day of school. At 10:00 a.m., he was asked to remove the earring. Upon his refusal to do so, principal Phillips suspended Jimmy from classes for four and one-half days. On August 24, 1992, the Hineses, through counsel, requested a hearing on the suspension. On August 25, 1992, Phillips suspended Jimmy for an additional five days or until he returned to school not wearing the earring.

A hearing on the matter was held on September 9, 1992, with high school principal James Hanna serving as hearing examiner. On September 11, 1992, the hearing examiner issued his findings and recommendation that Jimmy be transferred to either of the two other schools that accept students from Union Township, both of which permit male students to wear earrings. On September 29, 1992, the Caston school board adopted the hearing examiner's findings and recommendation. Rather than transfer to another school, Jimmy stopped wearing the earring to school.

On December 1, 1992, the Hineses filed their complaint against the Caston School Corporation for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. The case was tried before the court on August 2, 1993. On September 30, 1993, the court ruled in favor of the Caston School Corporation, stating that the rule prohibiting male students from wearing earrings was proper and should not be enjoined from enforcement. The trial court held that the Hineses "not only failed to show that there was no basis for the governmental policy," but that the Caston Schools had "showed affirmatively that their policy was not irrational or arbitrary." Record, p. 200-01. The court found further that

"[t]he enforcement that bars males from wearing earrings is in keeping with legitimate educational goals of the Caston School District; the plaintiffs have failed to show that the rule is arbitrary while the school has shown a nexus between this rule and its goals."

Record, p. 202.

We note that the trial court entered a general judgment accompanied by a memorandum discussing the facts of the case, the applicable law, and the court's reasoning. Under Ind.Trial Rule 52(A)(1), a trial court is required to make special findings of fact without request in granting or refusing preliminary injunctions. We will treat the trial court's memorandum as special findings, and we may not set aside the findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous, with due regard given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. T.R. 52(A).

The Hineses present one issue for our review, which we restate as whether the trial court erred in finding that the Caston Elementary School's rule prohibiting the wearing of earrings by boys did not violate Jimmy's constitutional rights under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. ¹

It is well-settled in American jurisprudence that neither teachers nor students shed their constitutional rights "at the schoolhouse gate." Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Com. Sch. Dist. (1969), 393 U.S. 503, 506, 89 S.Ct. 733, 736, 21 L.Ed.2d 731.

"In our system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism. School officials do not possess absolute authority over their students. Students in school as well as out of school are 'persons' under our Constitution. They are possessed of fundamental rights which the State must respect, just as they themselves must respect their obligations to the State."

393 U.S. at 510, 89 S.Ct. at 738. In determining whether the trial court erred, our task is to examine the earring ban in light of the constitutional standards applicable under each of the constitutional provisions invoked by the Hineses.

I

The essence of the Hineses' due process argument is that Jimmy's fundamental right to the possession and control of his own person in matters of personal appearance is denied by the earring ban.

In Kelley v. Johnson (1976), 425 U.S. 238, 96 S.Ct. 1440, 47 L.Ed.2d 708, the United States Supreme Court assumed the existence of a liberty interest within the Fourteenth Amendment in matters of personal appearance. Id., 425 U.S. at 244, 96 S.Ct. at 1444. Prior to Kelley, the nature of this liberty interest had been explored in a trilogy of Seventh Circuit opinions addressing students' challenges to public school hair-length regulations ² and in numerous decisions in other federal circuits. ³ We need not declare the existence of such a liberty interest for the purposes of this opinion; nonetheless, we find persuasive the sentiments of the Eighth Circuit:

"We believe that, among those rights retained by the people under our constitutional form of government, is the freedom to govern one's personal appearance. As a freedom which ranks high on the spectrum of our societal values, it commands the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. [citation omitted] The importance attached to such personal freedom has been long recognized. Writing in 1891, Justice Gray said:

No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law. As well said by Judge Cooley, 'The right to one's person may be said to be the right of complete immunity: to be let alone.' [Union Pacific Railway Company v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251, 11 S.Ct. 1000, 1001, 35 L.Ed. 734 (1891).]"

Bishop v. Colaw (8th Cir.1971), 450 F.2d 1069, 1075. Thus, we will assume for the sake of argument that Jimmy possesses a constitutional right to freedom in matters of his personal appearance via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

We note that the Hineses stipulated at trial that they do not seek to establish that Jimmy's wearing of an earring is protected speech under the First Amendment. This is of consequence in that Jimmy's constitutionally protected liberty interest in personal appearance must not be confused with his constitutionally protected freedom of expression. Under the standards of First Amendment jurisprudence, a restriction on free expression can be no greater than is essential to the furtherance of a substantial government interest. See United States v. O'Brien (1968), 391 U.S. 367, 377, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 1679, 20 L.Ed.2d 672. Under the due process standard set forth in Kelley, "the test is whether the challenger can demonstrate that there is no rational connection between the policy and accomplishment of a public purpose." Pence v. Rosenquist (7th Cir.1978), 573 F.2d 395, 398 (citing Kelley, 425 U.S. at 247, 96 S.Ct. at 1445-46). ⁴ Thus a rational basis test...