Hines v. Clarke Chambers & Another

• Decision Date: 29 December 1881
• Parties: Dennis W. Hines v. Clarke Chambers and another
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

11 N.W. 129

29 Minn. 7

Dennis W. Hines v. Clarke Chambers and another

Supreme Court of Minnesota

December 29, 1881

Appeal by plaintiff from an order of the district court for Steele county, Buckham, J., presiding, refusing a new trial. The case is stated in the opinion.

A. C Hickman and Burlingame & Crandall, for appellant.

The justice having no jurisdiction of the case, his acts were void, and all the proceedings in connection therewith were likewise void. Constitution of Minn. Art. 6, § 8; Barber v. Kennedy, 18 Minn. 216; Gates v Neimeyer, 54 Iowa 110; Galley v. County of Tama, 40 Iowa 49; Mattison v. Baucus, Hill & Denio, 321; Elderkin v. Spurbeck, 1 Chand. 69, S. C. 2 Pinney, (Wis.) 129.

Wheelock & Sperry and Amos Coggswell, for respondents.

OPINION

Dickinson, J.

The defendants are respectively the sheriff and deputy sheriff of Steele county. One Colter commenced an action in justice's court against one Sever Johnson, in which a writ of attachment was issued and delivered to the said deputy sheriff, by virtue of which he levied upon the property which is the subject of this action. This plaintiff brought this action in the nature of replevin to recover the property, he claiming to be the owner of it. The complaint alleges the official character of the defendants, and that the property was taken under the writ of attachment. Defendants justify under the writ, averring the property to be that of the attachment defendant Johnson, and impeaching plaintiff's title as fraudulent as to the creditors of Johnson. The jury found a verdict for the defendants. A new trial was denied, and this appeal taken.

The property appears to have been transferred from Johnson to this plaintiff before the levy in question. The evidence however, was sufficient to warrant the jury in finding such transfer fraudulent as to creditors. The grounds upon which reversal is sought are: (1) The justice had not jurisdiction in the action; (2) the writ of attachment was void on its face; and (3) error upon the trial in receiving in evidence the complaint and docket entry of the judgment in the justice's court. We will consider the first and third points together.

It was necessary for the defendants in this action, wherein they are justifying their possession under process against Johnson and seeking thus to maintain a special right of property and to avoid the sale from Johnson to plaintiff as fraudulent, to show not only process fair on its face, and issued by a court or magistrate having authority to do so, but the existence of an indebtedness from Johnson to Colter; for, as between the parties to the sale, it would be an effective transfer of the property, and only creditors of the vendor could impeach it. Braley v. Byrnes, 20 Minn. 435; Damon v. Bryant, 2 Pick. 411; James v. Van Duyn, 45 Wis. 512. The complaint in the action in justice's court, and the record of a judgment thereon, would have been evidence in this action against the officer of such indebtedness, if the justice had jurisdiction to render such judgment. Blackman v. Wheaton, 13 Minn. 326. If, however, the justice had not jurisdiction, the judgment would be void and no evidence of such indebtedness.

Upon the trial Colter was called as a witness for the defendants, and testified that he sold the property in question to Johnson for $ 100, and took a note for the payment, which was dated at the time of the sale -- November 22, 1878, -- and was due in one year; that Johnson had never paid it, excepting one year's interest. This evidence was in no way disputed, and no other evidence relating to the indebtedness was presented, unless it be the complaint and judgment in the action in justice court. Such record evidence was objected to, upon the ground that it showed that the justice had not jurisdiction in the action. The evidence objected to may have been offered either for the purpose of proving an indebtedness from Johnson to Colter, the parties to that action, or for the purpose of showing that the indebtedness shown by the testimony of Colter to have existed was the same debt upon which the action had been brought, or it may have been offered for both purposes. It was proper to offer the complaint, for the purpose of so identifying the debt with the cause of action sued upon, even though the complaint showed that the justice had not jurisdiction to proceed. We shall further advert to that subject hereafter. The fact of indebtedness was conclusively established by the undisputed evidence of Colter, so that it must have been found as a fact in the case by the jury; Spaulding v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 33 Wis. 582, 591; and, in so far as the documentary evidence may have borne upon that question, it could have worked no prejudice to the plaintiff, although it did show that the judgment was void for want of jurisdiction.

We are of the opinion that the complaint in justice court does show prima facie, that the action was prosecuted for the recovery of the very debt which Colter...