Hines v. Richardson

• Decision Date: 27 May 1921
• Docket Number: (No. 2386.)
• Parties: HINES, Director General of Railroads v. RICHARDSON.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

232 S.W. 889

HINES, Director General of Railroads v. RICHARDSON.

(No. 2386.)

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Texarkana.

May 27, 1921.

Rehearing Denied June 9, 1921.

Appeal from District Court, Henderson County; John S. Prince, Judge.

Action by Lelia A. Richardson against Walker D. Hines, Director General of Railroads. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Richard Mays, of Corsicana, for appellant.

Campbell & Sewell, of Palestine, for appellee.

HODGES, J.

In July, 1919, Frank Richardson, the 17 year old son of the appellee, was killed while crossing the track of the Cotton Belt Railroad in the town of Athens. His mother sued, and recovered a judgment for the sum of $13,674. That judgment included $12,562 as the value of the pecuniary aid which the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of receiving from her deceased son after he arrived at the age of 21 years and the net value of the services he would have rendered before arriving at that age, $50 as the value of services rendered by physicians in attending Frank Richardson after his injuries, $462 expended for funeral expenses, and $600 as damages to the automobile in which he was riding. The evidence showed that Frank Richardson was killed under substantially the following circumstances:

A freight train consisting of about 35 cars arrived at the depot in Athens a short time before the accident. The train stopped so that the caboose was left standing partly on the crossing of what is known as Common street, which runs north and south. The train was uncoupled about 7 cars east of the caboose, and during the switching which followed the disconnected cars remained stationary for several minutes. While those cars were standing upon the track, Frank Richardson undertook to cross from the south side of the railroad to the north, going behind the caboose. He was riding in an automobile, and just as his car got on the track the freightcars were shoved back, striking and wrecking his car and inflicting injuries from which he died soon afterwards. The immediate cause of the cars being moved was the impact of the engine in recoupling the train. The depot at which the train had stopped was situated between Prairieville street on the east and Common street on the west; the two streets being about an ordinary city block apart. On this occasion Richardson came from Prairieville street, going west on a street almost parallel with and near to the railroad. He stopped for a few minutes' conversation at a garage about 75 feet south of the depot and 165 feet a little southeast of the crossing where he was killed. This garage was on the south side of the street on which Richardson was traveling. After leaving the garage he went west, turning a little north with the usual route of travel, and approached the crossing at an oblique angle. There were no intervening objects to obstruct his view of the railway track. The rear end of the train was standing still. The front end, which had been detached, was east of the depot building, and evidently was then moving west for the purpose of making the coupling.

The case was submitted to a jury on special issues, and the following is the substance of the findings made: (1) The caboose was standing so as to occupy about 3 feet of the crossing. (2) Sufficient room for free passage of an automobile was left behind the caboose. (3) The employees of the defendant in charge of the train suddenly and negligently moved it back, causing it to strike the automobile and kill the deceased. (4) The train was put in motion without having any person at or near the crossing for the purpose of keeping a lookout, and notifying those who undertook to cross that the train was about to be moved, and the train was moved without any such notice or warning. (5) In making the coupling more force and speed were used than would have been used by an ordinarily prudent person under the same circumstances. (6) These different acts of negligence were proximate causes of the injuries. (7) Frank Richardson was not guilty of contributory negligence at the time he drove his automobile on the railroad track. (8) Frank Richardson looked and listened for the purpose of discovering the movement of the train before he went on the track. (9) An ordinarily prudent person would not, under those circumstances, have looked and listened for the movement of the train. (10) Frank...