Hines v. Wilmington & Weldon R.R. Co.
| Decision Date | 31 October 1886 |
| Citation | 95 N.C. 434,59 Am.Rep. 250 |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | HINES & BATTLE v. THE WILMINGTON & WELDON RAILROAD COMPANY;SAME PLAINTIFF v. SAME DEFENDANT. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
CIVIL ACTIONS, tried before Graves, Judge, on a case agreed, at Spring Term, 1885, of HALIFAX Superior Court.
The facts are substantially the same as in the preceeding cases of McGwigan v. The Railroad, except that in these cases, the freight was shipped from a point within the State to a point within the State, and so the question of inter-state commerce did not arise.
There was a judgment for the plaintiff and the defendant appealed.
Messrs. B. H. Bunn and Jacob Battle, for the @## @plaintiff
.
Messrs. John L. Bridgers and A. W. Haywood, ( Mr. Ernest Haywood was with them), for the defendant .
This action is brought to recover a penalty which, it is alleged, the defendant has incurred by a violation of the statute, ( The Code, §1966), which provides that
The defendant contends first, that this statute is penal, and must, therefore, be construed strictly, and so construed, what it is conceded it did, is not forbidden by the law.
It is an old, but not very precisely defined rule of law, that penal statutes must be construed strictly. By this is meant no more than that the Court in ascertaining the meaning of such a statute, cannot go beyond the plain meaning of the words and phraseology employed in search for an intention not certainly implied by them. If there is no ambiguity in the words or phraseology, nothing is left to construction--their plain meaning must not be extended by inference, and when there is reasonable doubt as to their true meaning, the Court will not give them such interpretation as to impose the penalty. Nor will the purpose of the statute be extended by implication so as to embrace cases not clearly within its meaning. If there be reasonable doubt arising as to whether the acts charged to have been done, are within its meaning, the party of whom the penalty is demanded is entitled to the benefit of that doubt. The spirit of the rule is that of tenderness and care for the rights of individuals, and it must always be taken that penalties are imposed by the legislative authority only by clear and explicit enactments. That is, the purpose to impose the penalty must clearly appear. Such enactments, as to their words, clauses, several parts and the whole, must be construed strictly together, but as well, and as certainly in all respects, in the light of reason.
This rule, however, is never to be applied so strictly and unreasonably as to defect the clear intention of the Legislature. On the contrary, that intention must govern, in construing penal as well as other statutes. This is a primary rule of construction, applicable in the interpretation of all statutes. The meaning of words and sentences shall not be narrowed or strained so as to exclude the meaning intended, and while the purpose of the statute shall not be extended by implication, it shall not, on the other hand, be narrowed so as to abridge the intention that reasonably appears from its words, phraseology and constituent parts. If words and sentences, and parts of sentences, having no very definite signification in their ordinary use, are employed and clearly intended to have a particular and definite meaning and application, and this appears from their particular use, connection and application in the statute, that meaning and application must be accepted as proper and controling. If the intention to impose the penalty certainly appears, that is sufficient, and it must prevail. Otherwise, the legislative intent would or might be defeated by mere interpretation, which can never be allowed. Bacon's Abr. Tit. Statute 9, Rule 9; United States v. Willberger, 5 Whea., 76; Potter's Dwarris on Stats., 245, and note 35, and cases there cited; State v. Midgett, 85 N. C., 539; Coble v. Shoffner, 75 N. C., 43.
Now, applying the rule of construction, thus explained, to the statute above set forth, it clearly appears from its terms, its constituent parts, their bearing upon each other, and taking it as a whole, that its purpose is to prohibit and prevent each railroad corporation, doing the business of transporting freights over its railroads in this State, from charging one shipper of freights, at any time while its current list of charges for carrying freights remains unchanged, a greater amount of compensation for carrying a certain quantity of a certain class of freight a certain distance in a particular direction on its railroad, than it charges another shipper for transporting an equal quantity of the same class of freight an equal length of distance in the same direction on the same railroad, or its branches, whether the transportation for each is over the same, or a different part of the same road, and whether the freight of one shipper is carried a greater distance than that of another, with the exception, that such corporation may make special contracts without restraint, as to rates of compensation with shippers of large quantities of freight, not less than a car load. That is, to state the same differently, the compensation to be charged shippers respectively for carrying an equal quantity of the same class of freight for each, going in the same direction, must be equal in amount for equal distances, no matter on what part of the road, and although the freight of one shipper is to be transported a different and longer distance than that of the other. In such case, the charge to each must be the same for any equal distance. The statute really embodies and prescribes a scheme to prevent discrimination and secure equality and uniformity in charges for transporting freights by railroad companies doing business in this State. An analysis of the material parts of the statute will serve to show that its purpose is what it is thus stated to be.
1. It plainly embraces all railroad corporations, whether incorporated by the laws of this State or not, “operating,” that is, doing the business of transporting freights over their respective railroads in this State. The language used is broad and comprehensive--in no sense, that can reasonably be attributed to it, does it imply exception or limitation. The word “any” is used in the sense of each, every and all. There is nothing in the statute, its terms, nature or purpose, that suggests that it does not embrace every and all such corporations. Nor is there anything in the nature of a foreign railroad corporation doing such business in this State that gives it any legal advantage or immunity in any such respect. When it comes into this State to do business, it at once voluntarily becomes subject to its laws regulating the business of transportation on railroads. Although it may not be the absolute owner of the railroad it uses, except as lessee, it is the temporary owner for the purposes of its business, and answerable as the owner in that respect.
And as to a railroad corporation created by and under the laws of this and an adjoining and other States, it is completely subject to the laws of this State, except as otherwise expressly provided in its charter, because it is a corporation of this State, and within its jurisdiction and control, just as are all other corporations created by its authority, subject to the limitation mentioned.
2. The clause, “to charge for the transportation of any freight,” &c., implies to settle, require or demand of the shipper, as of right, certain compensation for the transportation of any freight already transported, or delivered to the corporation to be transported. As to this, the penalty is incurred when the charge is certainly made against the shipper, in the case provided against by the statute. It cannot be that the compensation charged must first be paid, because it is made unlawful “to charge” otherwise than is allowed. This does not, in any ordinary sense, imply to receive the compensation, and there is nothing that, in terms or by just implication, goes to show that any such meaning was intended. The purpose is to give the penalty at once upon making the charge, and thus the more certainly to prevent the evil intended to be suppressed, and a violation of the statute.
3. The phrase, “a greater amount as toll or compensation,” &c., obviously means to charge one shipper of a certain class of freight over its road, in a particular direction, greater compensation than is charged to another shipper of “an equal quantity of the same class of freight, transported in the same direction, over any portion of same railroad of equal distance,” not necessarily over the same distance, but any equal distance. The words “greater amount,” “an equal quantity,” “in the same direction,” and “of equal distance,” and “over any portion of one railroad of equal distance,” are employed to fix and establish the basis of the equality of the charge allowed to be made. This equality of charge is not limited to the same, but to an “ equal quantity,” not to the same, but to an “ equal distance,” over any part of the same road. These provisions are significant and important, and must receive such...
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