Hing v. Maricopa County
| Decision Date | 28 April 2011 |
| Docket Number | 1 CA-TX 10-0001 |
| Parties | ROBERT ONG HING and ALICE Y. HING, his wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. MARICOPA COUNTY, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
See Ariz. R. Supreme Court 111(c); ARCAP 28(c);
(Not for Publication-Rule 28, Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure)
The Honorable Dean M. Fink, Judge
AFFIRMED
Stockton & Hing
by Gregory Ong Hing
Attorneys for Appellants
Scottsdale
William G. Montgomery, Maricopa County Attorney
by Richard W. Garnett, III, Deputy County Attorney
Attorneys for Appellee
Phoenix
¶1 Robert Ong Hing and Alice Hing ("Taxpayers") challenge the Arizona Tax Court's dismissal of their appeal ofthe 2009 valuation of their real property. They contend that Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") section 42-16201(A) (2006) allows a direct appeal to the Tax Court until December 15 of the year following the valuation year. The Tax Court ruled that an appeal must be filed by December 15 of the valuation year and therefore dismissed Taxpayers' appeal to it. For reasons that follow, we affirm the dismissal of the Taxpayers' appeal to the Tax Court as untimely.
¶2 Taxpayers own numerous parcels of real property in Maricopa County. On or before March 1, 2008, they received notice of the 2009 tax year valuations. More than nineteen months later, on November 25, 2009, Taxpayers appealed the 2009 valuations to the Tax Court. Maricopa County moved to dismiss on the ground that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Taxpayers had not filed their action by December 15, 2008 as required by A.R.S. § 42-16201(A). The Tax Court agreed and dismissed the case with prejudice. Hing v. Maricopa County, 224 Ariz. 421, 231 P.3d 953 (Tax Ct. 2010). This appeal followed.
¶3 This appeal raises the single issue of when A.R.S. § 42-16201(A) required Taxpayers to file their direct appeal to the Tax Court and thereby vest it with subject matterjurisdiction: by December 15 of the valuation year or by December 15 of the tax year. Whether the tax court had subject matter jurisdiction of this action is a question of law that we review de novo. Forum Dev., L.C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Revenue, 192 Ariz. 90, 93, 961 P.2d 1038, 1041 (App. 1997).
¶4 By law, each county assessor must provide all property owners with notice of their property's full cash value and classification no later than March 1 of each year. A.R.S. § 42-15101(A) (2006). A dissatisfied property owner has sixty days after the mailing of that information to petition the assessor for a valuation change or, alternatively the property owner may file an action in the tax court pursuant to A.R.S. § 42-16201(A), which provides:
A property owner who is dissatisfied with the valuation or classification of the property as determined by the county assessor may appeal directly to the court as provided by this article on or before December 15 regardless of whether the person has exhausted the administrative remedies under this chapter, except as provided in subsection B of this section.
(Emphasis added.)
¶5 When interpreting statutes, our primary task is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent. Bustos v. W.M. Grace Dev., 192 Ariz. 396, 398, 966 P.2d 1000, 1002 (App. 1997). We look first to the statutory language "on the presumption that the legislature says what it means." Id.(citing Mail Boxes Etc., U.S.A. v. Indus. Comm'n of Ariz., 181 Ariz. 119, 121, 888 P.2d 777, 779 (1995)). If that language "is clear and unambiguous, we regard it as conclusive unless clear legislative intent to the contrary exists or impossible or absurd consequences would result." Id. But if we find the language ambiguous, "we may also consider 'the context and subject matter, the effects and consequences of the statute, and other acts that are in pari materia.'" Premiere RV & Mini Storage L.L.C. v. Maricopa County, 222 Ariz. 440, 444, 1 14, 215 P.3d 1121, 1125 (App. 2009) (citation omitted).
¶6 Id. (quoting Stein v. Sonus U.S.A., Inc., 214 Ariz. 200, 201, 1 3, 150 P.3d 773, 774 (App. 2007)). Generally, courts interpret ambiguities in tax statutes in favor of the taxpayers, State ex rel. Ariz. Dep't of Revenue v. Phoenix Lodge No. 708, Loyal Order of Moose, Inc., 187 Ariz. 242, 247, 928 P.2d 666, 671 (App. 1996), but we do so only after considering any legislative guidance and applying the normal rules of construction. Ariz. Dep't of Revenue v. Salt River Project Agric. Imprvmt. & Power Dist., 212 Ariz. 35, 41, 1 22, 126 P.3d 1063, 1069 (App. 2006).
¶7 Taxpayers point out that the current version of § 42-16201(A), like its previous versions, does not refer to a specific year. In years prior to 1994, the prescribed date for taxpayer action was "November 1," without specifying a year, and we interpreted that deadline to fall on November 1 of the tax year. See Pesqueira v. Pima Cnty. Assessor, 133 Ariz. 255, 256, 650 P.2d 1237, 1238 (App. 1982) ( former A.R.S. § 42146); Rio Rico Props., Inc. v. Santa Cruz Cnty., 172 Ariz. 80, 92, 834 P.2d 166, 178 (Tax Ct. 1992) ( former A.R.S. § 42-246); Read v. Ariz. Dep't of Revenue, 166 Ariz. 533, 535, 803 P.2d 944, 946 (Tax Ct. 1991) ( former A.R.S. § 42246).
¶8 But the statutory scheme did not remain static. Beginning in 1994, a comprehensive revision of our property tax statutes took place, and in 1997, the legislature repealed § 42246 and renumbered it as § 42-16201. Sempre Ltd. P'ship v. Maricopa Cnty., 225 Ariz. 106, 109, 1 12, 235 P.3d 259, 262 (App. 2010) ). In 1995, the legislature adopted a scheme that created a two-year tax cycle consisting of a "valuation year" followed by a "tax year." 1994 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 323, amended by 1995 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 249. In Forum Development, we described the consequences of these reforms for the 1997 tax year and thereafter:
192 Ariz. at 94, 961 P.2d at 1042 (emphasis added). Consistent with our holding in Forum Development, the applicable direct appeal deadline is now December 15 of the valuation year. Id.
¶9 We have long cautioned against reliance on cases, such as those cited by Taxpayer, that preceded legislative changes. Maricopa Cnty. v. Chatwin, 17 Ariz. App. 576, 579, 499 P.2d 190, 193 (1972), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in RCJ Corp. v. Ariz. Dep't of Revenue, 168 Ariz. 328, 812 P.2d 1146 (Tax Ct. 1991). In light of the sweeping changes governing direct appeals from tax valuations, antecedent cases such as Pesqueira, Rio Rico, and Read cannot be relied upon to interpret post-1996 statutes. Id.
¶10 Taxpayers nonetheless argue that the legislature must have intended the appeal deadline to fall after the levy date inthe tax year in order to permit property owners to review the final tax bill and make informed decisions about whether to appeal. Although this benefit existed under the previous statutory scheme, the legislature reasonably could have decided that the assessors' needs for additional time to complete the valuation, assessment, and appellate processes compelled a change. Forum Dev., 192 Ariz. at 94, 961 P.2d at 1042. Taxpayers' argument, therefore, is not compelling.
¶11 Taxpayers also note that Forum Development concerned the interim valuation rules for 1995 to 1996 that applied to new owners and contend that statements pertaining to cases arising in 1997 and later constitute dicta. We conclude, however, that Forum Development's analysis was correct and, since then, the legislature has not indicated its rejection of the scheme we described in Forum Development.
¶12 A later case underscores our point. In Frederikson v. Maricopa County, 197 Ariz. 104, 107-08, 11 13-14, 3 P.3d 1024, 1027-28 (App. 1999), we rejected the taxpayers' assertion that they qualified as new owners and thus were entitled to delay a valuation appeal until December 15 of the tax year pursuant to A.R.S. § 42-16205(B). Instead, we held that "[e]ven in the face of Forum Development, in the 1998 and 1999 legislative sessions the legislature left both the normal appealdeadline and the full-year extension wholly intact." Id. at 1 13
¶13 Furthermore, Frederikson required us to determine whether the appeal was saved by A.R.S. § 42-16205(B). Because that statute did not apply, we necessarily determined that the appeal was untimely and affirmed its dismissal pursuant to the predecessor of A.R.S. § 42-16201(A). Id. at 106, 1 7 & n.4, 108, 1 14, 3 P.3d at 1026 & n.4, 1028. Because those taxpayers had not filed their appeal by December 15 of the valuation year, dismissal was warranted.
¶14 Finally, Frederikson cured any ambiguity that may have originally existed in A.R.S. § 42-16201(A). As the tax court observed here, a published appellate interpretation becomes part of the statute. Hing, 224 Ariz. at 423, 231 P.3d at 955 (citing Galloway v....
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