Hinkle v. State, 42071

Decision Date21 May 1969
Docket NumberNo. 42071,42071
Citation442 S.W.2d 728
PartiesKenneth Howard HINKLE, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
CourtTexas Court of Criminal Appeals

John P. Spiller, Houston, for appellant.

Carol S. Vance, Dist. Atty., James C. Brough, Asst. Dist. Atty., Houston, and Jim D. Vollers, State's Atty., Austin, for the State.

OPINION

ONION, Judge.

The offense is murder with malice; the punishment, 99 years and 1 day.

The indictment charged appellant with the shooting death of Louis L. Sander, an on-duty Houston City Police Officer, on or about January 21, 1967.

We shall first consider appellant's last two grounds of error. In ground of error #15 he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the conviction contending the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion for instructed verdict.

On the evening of January 21, 1967, shortly after 9 p.m. the deceased Sander was chatting with his partner, Officer Gene Brown, and Southern Pacific Railroad employee, Alton Lewis, at the intersection of Rothwell and McKee Streets in Houston, Harris County, Texas. Each officer was on a three-wheel motorcycle and Lewis was in his car. A pickup truck ran a stop sign and Officer Brown went south on McKee to stop it.

When Brown did not return within a short period of time Sander started to leave to check on him. Just then a brown 1965 Pontiac ran a nearby stop sign. Sander turned on Rothwell Street and followed the Pontiac. Meanwhile Lewis drove south to where Brown had stopped the pickup. He left his car to talk to Brown and it was then that they heard one shot followed seconds later by five rapidly fired shots, all coming from the area where Sander was last seen.

In their respective vehicles Officer Brown and Lewis started in that direction. They met a brown Pontiac going south on McKee. Lewis recognized it as the car that had earlier run the stop sign and observed that the color of the rear license plate was red and white. Brown observed that the Pontiac contained only the male driver and had no front license plate.

At the intersection of Nance and Hardy Streets they found the 24-year-old deceased Sander shot and lying on the pavement with his head against his motorcycle. His pistol from which five shots had been fired was beside his hand. A fireman, Captain C. L. Travelbee from a fire station located at the intersection, was at the scene when they arrived.

Both Travelbee and a visitor to the fire station who left such building upon hearing shots observed a brown Pontiac leaving the scene at a high rate of speed and turn south on McKee Street. It was the only car in the vicinity.

Officer Sander died about 9:30 p.m., the cause of death being a gunshot wound of the chest. The autopsy revealed that the bullet entered through the breastbone at the fourth rib and penetrated the heart and lung. Dr. Joseph Jachimczyk, County Medical Examiner, related the fatal bullet was fired from a gun which was 20 inches or so from the deceased at the time, and the circumstances, including the angle of the bullet, were consistent with a shot having been fired by a person sitting in a car while the officer was walking up to a car which was on his right.

The next morning, Sunday, at approximately 9:05 a.m. alert Police Officer E. M. Dobbs observed a brownish gold 1965 Pontiac car in a parking lot in the 100 block of Milam Street in Houston. Lewis and Brown identified the vehicle, bearing no front license plate but a 1966 red and white Arkansas license plate (1--66362) on the rear, as the automobile they had observed the night before.

The Pontiac which, when discovered, bore indentations which appeared to have been made by bullets, was shown to have been stolen in Little Rock, Arkansas, on January 7, 1967. Various witnesses, too numerous to here describe, identified the recovered Pontiac as the car they saw appellant using in Galveston and Houston during the days immediately leading up to the time of the shooting. He was shown to have been in the car in Houston earlier on the very day of the shooting. In all instances, except one the day before the killing, appellant was shown to have been alone in the car.

A glove found in the car after its discovery on the parking lot was shown by the testimony of a chemist to be identical upon microscopic examination in cloth and manufacture to three gloves recovered from the automobile in which appellant was sleeping when he was arrested in New Orleans, Louisiana.

The State's evidence shows that at approximately 10:17 p.m. appellant called his brother, Bill Hinkle, in Beaumont from a public telephone two blocks from where the Pontiac was found the next morning.

Noland, a cab driver, testified he picked up appellant at 819 Congress Street on the night in question near the Blue Moon Lounge a block or two from where the Pontiac was discovered and took him to the Eight Ball Lounge on Broadway about six miles away and arrived there about 11:45 p.m.

Tulloch, another cabbie, related he picked up appellant at the Eight Ball Lounge and carried him to the Hotel Courts shortly before midnight on the date in question.

The State's evidence shows, without contradiction, that appellant's brother, Bill Hinkle, was in Beaumont with his wife at the time of the alleged shooting of Officer Sander.

It was shown that some time after 10 p.m. on the night in question Bill Hinkle received a telephone call from the appellant in Houston and told his wife they had to go get Kenneth as he was drunk. They drove from Beaumont to Houston, found the appellant at the Hotel Courts about 1 a.m., and returned to Beaumont.

The .38 caliber bullet which killed Officer Sander was shown to have been fired from the same gun which fired a bullet into a liquor and wine cabinet in Little Rock, Arkansas during a robbery of Mr. and Mrs. Leeland Sartin which was committed by the appellant and his brother Bill on January 8, 1967. Bill Hinkle was shown to have been in possession of the pistol at the time.

Appellant did not testify or call any witness in his behalf.

We conclude that the evidence offered was clearly sufficient to authorize the court to deny the motion for instructed verdict and to support the jury's verdict, the court having properly charged on the law of circumstantial evidence.

Ground of error #15 is overruled.

Appellant claims the trial court erred in admitting, over objection, evidence of the extraneous offenses committed in Arkansas.

In 4 Branch's Ann.P.C., 2nd ed., Sec. 2255, p. 616, it is written:

'Testimony as to the commission of other crimes or offenses by the defendant is not admissible unless such other crime or offense has some bearing or relation to the case for which he is on trial. But relevant evidence which proves or tends to prove the identity of the defendant, connects him with the offense charged, disproves a claimed defense, or which shows intent, malice, system, motive, res gestae, or the defendant's state of mind, is admissible although by such proof it is also shown that the defendant took part in or committed another crime or offense.'

The extraneous offenses were offered by the State to establish identity and to show motive. The court in its charge properly limited consideration of such evidence to the purposes for which they were offered.

Appellant cites and relies upon Hafti v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 416 S.W.2d 824, and Bennett v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 422 S.W.2d 438. In both of those cases an instrument (a gun in Hafti and a tire tool in Bennett) was shown to be the fruit of a former unrelated crime, there being nothing to show that the fact had a bearing or any relation to the case being tried.

Further, we quote from the able brief prepared by Assistant District Attorney James C. Brough:

'In Hafti it was expressly pointed out that the proof as to the manner in which defendant there got the gun was not necessary to prove intent or identity.

'In the case at bar, there is no eyewitness as to identity, as was the case in Hafti. Here the issue of identity was equivocal, was based on circumstantial evidence, and required connections which could not be made without evidence of the theft of an automobile being used by Appellant on the day of the offense, and of a robbery in which a bullet was fired from the same pistol which killed Officer Sander.

'Clearly, the evidence as to the robbery is necessary to prove identity, and the proof of the car theft goes to motive and intent. A man driving a stolen car, when stopped by an officer for a traffic violation, is far more likely to shoot the officer than is one with a clear conscience. Ellisor v. State (162 Tex.Cr.R. 117), 282 S.W.2d 393, cited in Spencer v. Texas (385 U.S. 554), 87 S.Ct. 648 at 652 (17 L.Ed.2d 606), and Chavira v. State (167 Tex.Cr.R. 197), 319 S.W.2d 115.

'Where, as here identity and intent are in issue, and are equivocal, and the State relies on circumstantial evidence, relevant proof involving extraneous offenses is admissible on the State's case in chief. McClelland v. State (Tex.Cr.App.), 389 S.W.2d 678 at 682.

'Clearly, there was no error resulting from proof of the extraneous offenses, or of the State's opening statement which accurately set forth proof to be made.'

We are in full accord with the State's position. See Parks v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 437 S.W.2d 554.

Ground of error #16 is overruled.

Appellant's first claim of error is that he was illegally arrested in New Orleans on January 24, 1967, by F.B.I. Agent Zigrossie and the fruits of a search incident to this arrest were improperly admitted into evidence.

There was no objection to the testimony of what was found as a result of such search and when such items were offered the only objection was that such evidence was 'immaterial.'

Only recently in Spencer v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 438 S.W.2d 109, involving the search of an automobile after arrest, we said:

'The sole question presented for review is the admission into...

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